# \*\*Final Supplement – FMPS\*\*

## \*\*Kritik Updates\*\*

### Rupture K Link – Pragmatism Swiss Army Knife

#### Embrace pragmatism – fallibilism, anti-skepticism, and consequentialism are the most effective instruments to navigate both abstract theory and the political world. They’re compatible with revolutionary visions but defense misconceives pragmatism as a defense of actual pragmatists.

Jack Knight & James Johnson 11. Jack Knight is professor of political science and law at Duke University and the author of Institutions and Social Conflict. James Johnson is associate professor of political science at the University of Rochester and former editor of Perspectives on Politics. “The Priority of Democracy: Political Consequences of Pragmatism”. Princeton University Press 2011. 8/22/11. Chapter 2. 25-28. GJII

Pragmatism “narrowly conceived” is a philosophical view that consists of “a set of arguments about knowledge, meaning and truth.”1 That said, pragmatists are an unruly lot. They disagree among themselves about various philosophical and political issues.2 We are uninterested here in adjudicating these disputes. Our concern is less with policing pragmatism and its boundaries than with advancing a conception of democracy that derives considerable motivation from its pragmatist bearings but that will prove compelling whether or not one embraces pragmatism. We consequently distinguish between the general, relatively ambiguous concept of pragmatism and the particular conception of pragmatism that we endorse. In so doing, we embrace what Dewey calls “the pragmatic rule” which holds that “in order to discover the meaning of [an] idea ask for its consequences.”3 As we formulate and defend our conception of pragmatism, we are especially concerned with highlighting its consequences for thinking about political institutions in general and democratic political arrangements in particular.

Our characterization of pragmatism explicitly is reconstructive. We do not claim that this or that classical or contemporary pragmatist actually adopts a position of the sort we outline. We do, however, draw upon the resources that those classical and contemporary pragmatists offer as we formulate our own defensible pragmatist position. Our enterprise is distinctive in large part because other pragmatists either have not made the sorts of argument we advance, have derived different implications from positions we might share, or would resist the more general position that we reconstruct from particular arguments. We are, in any case, interested here less in engaging in a full-scale debate with these writers than in relying upon them, as foil or as warrant, for the conception that we reconstruct.

At the most abstract level, one might depict pragmatism as one variety of instrumentalism in that it conceives of beliefs, conceptions, theories, and so forth as tools humans use to navigate the natural and social world.4 This portrait, while perhaps accurate, is too general to be useful. In order to discern the consequences of pragmatism, we need a more fine-grained conception. Here we understand three commitments as central to pragmatism.

First, pragmatists are committed to fallibilism. 5 This commitment has two implications. It means that pragmatists recognize that even those beliefs about which we are most convinced may turn out to be false. It also means that whatever certainty we may attain requires that we actively organize experience in such a way that our beliefs are challenged.6 This requirement is not nearly so onerous as it might at first seem. In a sense, we have no other option. For pragmatists insist that the social and natural world is marked by considerable indeterminacy.7 As a result, individuals and groups necessarily will confront unforeseen contingencies that will challenge their ostensibly settled beliefs and judgments.8 Fallibilism simply requires that when faced with such problematic circumstances, we prove ready and willing to revise our beliefs should they prove mistaken or erroneous.

Second, pragmatists are committed to anti-skepticism. 9 While any of our beliefs may prove false, it is not possible for us to suppose that they all are false. As Peirce insists, “complete doubt” is impossible, a mere philosophical pretension. Peirce did, however, countenance the sort of “real and living doubt” that is generated by problems we encounter in experience and that prompts us to try to settle our beliefs. This is “real doubt” precisely insofar as we have reason to question our beliefs. For pragmatists, then, both doubt and belief must be justified.10

Finally, pragmatists are committed to consequentialism. This comes through clearly in the “pragmatic rule” just mentioned. There, Dewey distills the advice of Peirce, who urges pragmatists to “consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”11 The classical pragmatists arguably considered this advice to be general and took its relevance to the philosophical problems surrounding the concept of “truth” only as one specific instance of its broader applicability.12

Pragmatists also commonly endorse holism in the sense that they see beliefs and conceptions as forming interconnected, more or less coherent webs. This view applies to pragmatism itself. Fallibilism, anti-skepticism, and consequentialism are themselves interrelated. Start with fallibilism. It is clear that if any of even our most confidently held beliefs might be false in the pragmatist sense of being useless or self-defeating, they also must be revisable. This raises the issue of what bounds, if any, constrain our ability to question and revise our beliefs. One temptation here is thoroughgoing skepticism or relativism.13 Pragmatists resist this temptation. Instead they embrace an anti-skeptical position that limits both the nature and scope of doubt. It is plausible to see this combination of theoretical commitments as among pragmatists’ unique intellectual contributions.14

Fallibilism and anti-skepticism each sustain the pragmatist commitment to consequentialism. Pragmatists see the social and natural world as fraught with contingency. As a result, even our most fundamental beliefs inevitably will be called into question and potentially proven false. What is important is how individuals and communities respond to the resulting tensions and strains, to the real doubt that unforeseen contingencies generate. Peirce famously identified several ways of settling beliefs—the methods of tenacity and of authority, the a priori method, and the method of science. And while he himself insisted that the majority of mankind would forever resolve doubt via the method of authority, he insisted that the experimentalism central to science afforded the surest way to fix or settle belief.15 For experimentation represents the most reliable way of generating solutions to problematic situations. And we assess the results of properly conducted experiments in terms of their actual or anticipated consequences. We take this commitment to be general in the sense that it applies, for example, not just to theoretical concepts, but to public policies and to social, economic, and political institutions as well.16

This claim may seem surprising, given the propensity of some prominent contemporary pragmatists to insist regularly and loudly that pragmatist philosophical commitments have no identifiable political consequences. Indeed, something of an odd, imperfect, and ultimately uncomfortable convergence has emerged on this point.17 Richard Posner, for instance, holds that “philosophical pragmatism . . . lacks any political valence and thus is equally compatible with reactionary and revolutionary social visions.”18 Similarly, Richard Rorty intones: “Philosophy and politics are not that tightly linked. There will always be room for a lot of philosophical disagreement between people who share the same politics, and for diametrically opposed political views among philosophers of the same school. In particular, there is no reason why a fascist could not be a pragmatist in the sense of agreeing with pretty much everything Dewey said about the nature of truth, knowledge, rationality and morality.”19 In what follows, we focus on the role that interpretations of the philosophy and politics of Martin Heidegger play in sustaining what we refer to as the Posner-Rorty consensus.

### Rupture K Link – Ballot

#### Asking for the ballot is a double turn.

Rita Dhamoon 05. Professor at the Department of Political Science in the University of British Columbia. “Beyond Inclusion Politics: Reconstituting the Political Order”. 6/2/5. <https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Dhamoon.pdf>. GJII

Furthermore, inclusion discourses can potentially relativize and trivialize differences (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 226). The CAPAR goes to some length to avoid this. It cites the Ethnic Diversity Survey which found that nearly 50 percent of Blacks reported discrimination or unfair treatment compared to 33 percent of South Asians and 33 percent of Chinese respondents (Heritage, 2005: 8); it acknowledges that in exploring “the different experiences of ethno-racial and ethno-cultural groups and to provide meaningful statistics on racism, race must be compared with other factors such as gender, age, education and income” (Heritage, 2005: 9); and it specifically identifies the value of intersectional analysis because of the particular “issues affecting Aboriginal women, racial minority women, and migrant, immigrant and refugee women” (Heritage, 2005: 27). Yet despite these measures, it is striking to note that the plan conflates racism with colonialism and anti-Semitism, thereby undermining the ability to address differences. Whilst the plan acknowledges particular kinds of experiences -- such as employment discrimination against ethnic groups, disproportionate numbers of Indigenous people in prisons, and attacks against Jewish synagogues -- it does not name these as racism, colonialism and anti-Semitism. Thus even though the plan lays out a working definition of racism (Heritage, 2005: 7-9), it fails to identify the differing forms of racialized, colonial and anti-Semitic experiences. This is important, for instance, because of the ways in which Indigenous people are addressed in the CAPAR without reference to historical and on-going colonial legislative acts that are racially oppressive, including for the example the Indian Act which continues to be used by the state to control status determination and band membership.4 Though Indigenous peoples are racialized in ways similar to people of colour through white supremacy, the attempted erasure of Indigenous bodies, knowledge, resources and land is distinct from the racism faced by people of colour in Canada. As Lee and Cardinal state, “By not recognizing hierarchies in categorical difference, strategies of inclusion contribute to the erasure of inequality by pluralizing differences and ignoring power and resource differentials” (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 226). The role of power should be critical in any analysis of racialized, ethnic and/or cultural identities and relations, and yet is strangely neglected in the CAPAR. Instead, the plan articulates inclusion through a discourse of collective unity. One of the three objectives of the CAPAR is “to strengthen social cohesion through antiracism measures” (Heritage, 2005: 10). The conclusion reiterates this point in which it is stated that the priorities of the CAPAR “enhance the value of Canadian citizenship by strengthening our social bonds, and making our shared values more relevant to contemporary life in Canada” (Heritage, 2005: 56). In particular the plan highlights the role of Citizenship and Immigration Canada in integrating immigrants. Whilst the framing of integration presents ways to include otherwise excluded peoples, the discourse of inclusion masks the ways in which integration itself can be wrought with conformist and assimilationalist tendencies. Whilst the necessity to develop bonds of social cohesion and shared values and citizenship should be an important feature of the political order, mechanisms of inclusion can also potentially erase differences that some groups want to maintain. Many Indigenous leaders made this argument following the 1969 White Paper which suggested that erasing the requirement of status for Indians would bring this group of Indigenous people to the same level of citizenship as other Canadians. As Indigenous activist and scholar Harold Cardinal (1969) argued shortly after the White Paper was published, while First Nations people have historically been excluded because of their status they also depend on their legal status as ‘Indians’ to assert treaty rights and make claims of self-determination.5 Inclusionary goals, in other words, presume that integration is desirable but without fully accounting for the fine line between integration and assimilation. That is not to say that the CAPAR promotes a model of forced assimilation. Rather, the plan expresses the desire for inclusion through what Richard Day calls ‘seductive integration’ (2000: 9). Day argues that dominant groups create a society in which excluded Others are implicitly seduced into dominant norms, values and structures because their chances of political, economic and social success are dependent on integrating (or being included) into the core. As such, inclusion is framed for the benefit of racialized Others rather than as a way to demand forced conformity; if ethnic and racial minorities become included into mainstream society through participation in dominant practices and structures, or so the argument goes, they will reap material benefits. This not only overestimates the potential of inclusion to eliminate repressive and productive forms of power (where one outcome is racism), but it also underestimates the ways in which inclusion enables the state to manage the ‘strangeness’ of Others through indirect measures. Put differently, inclusion does not necessarily end racism and at the same time it allows the state to regulate racialized Others by bringing those on the outside into the core.

### Cap K – Link – Feminism

#### Feminism fails – it encourages a “leaning in” to the accumulative tendencies of capitalism

\*does not link to vulnerability

**Fraser 13** (Nancy Fraser, professor of philosophy and politics at the New School for Social Research in New York, “How feminism became capitalism's handmaiden - and how to reclaim it”, *The Guardian*, 10/14/13, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/14/feminism-capitalist-handmaiden-neoliberal>) // EL

As a feminist, I've always assumed that by fighting to emancipate women I was building a better world – more egalitarian, just and free. But lately I've begun to worry that ideals pioneered by feminists are serving quite different ends. I worry, specifically, that our critique of sexism is now supplying the justification for new forms of inequality and exploitation. In a cruel twist of fate, I fear that the movement for women's liberation has become entangled in a dangerous liaison with neoliberal efforts to build a free-market society. That would explain how it came to pass that feminist ideas that once formed part of a radical worldview are increasingly expressed in individualist terms. Where feminists once criticised a society that promoted careerism, they now advise women to "lean in". A movement that once prioritised social solidarity now celebrates female entrepreneurs. A perspective that once valorised "care" and interdependence now encourages individual advancement and meritocracy. What lies behind this shift is a sea-change in the character of capitalism. The state-managed capitalism of the postwar era has given way to a new form of capitalism – "disorganised", globalising, neoliberal. Second-wave feminism emerged as a critique of the first but has become the handmaiden of the second. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the movement for women's liberation pointed simultaneously to two different possible futures. In a first scenario, it prefigured a world in which gender emancipation went hand in hand with participatory democracy and social solidarity; in a second, it promised a new form of liberalism, able to grant women as well as men the goods of individual autonomy, increased choice, and meritocratic advancement. Second-wave feminism was in this sense ambivalent. Compatible with either of two different visions of society, it was susceptible to two different historical elaborations. As I see it, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in recent years in favour of the second, liberal-individualist scenario – but not because we were passive victims of neoliberal seductions. On the contrary, we ourselves contributed three important ideas to this development. One contribution was our critique of the "family wage": the ideal of a male breadwinner-female homemaker family that was central to state-organised capitalism. Feminist criticism of that ideal now serves to legitimate "flexible capitalism". After all, this form of capitalism relies heavily on women's waged labour, especially low-waged work in service and manufacturing, performed not only by young single women but also by married women and women with children; not by only racialised women, but by women of virtually all nationalities and ethnicities. As women have poured into labour markets around the globe, state-organised capitalism's ideal of the family wage is being replaced by the newer, more modern norm – apparently sanctioned by feminism – of the two-earner family. Never mind that the reality that underlies the new ideal is depressed wage levels, decreased job security, declining living standards, a steep rise in the number of hours worked for wages per household, exacerbation of the double shift – now often a triple or quadruple shift – and a rise in poverty, increasingly concentrated in female-headed households. Neoliberalism turns a sow's ear into a silk purse by elaborating a narrative of female empowerment. Invoking the feminist critique of the family wage to justify exploitation, it harnesses the dream of women's emancipation to the engine of capital accumulation. Feminism has also made a second contribution to the neoliberal ethos. In the era of state-organised capitalism, we rightly criticised a constricted political vision that was so intently focused on class inequality that it could not see such "non-economic" injustices as domestic violence, sexual assault and reproductive oppression. Rejecting "economism" and politicising "the personal", feminists broadened the political agenda to challenge status hierarchies premised on cultural constructions of gender difference. The result should have been to expand the struggle for justice to encompass both culture and economics. But the actual result was a one-sided focus on "gender identity" at the expense of bread and butter issues. Worse still, the feminist turn to identity politics dovetailed all too neatly with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing more than to repress all memory of social equality. In effect, we absolutised the critique of cultural sexism at precisely the moment when circumstances required redoubled attention to the critique of political economy. Finally, feminism contributed a third idea to neoliberalism: the critique of welfare-state paternalism. Undeniably progressive in the era of state-organised capitalism, that critique has since converged with neoliberalism's war on "the nanny state" and its more recent cynical embrace of NGOs. A telling example is "microcredit", the programme of small bank loans to poor women in the global south. Cast as an empowering, bottom-up alternative to the top-down, bureaucratic red tape of state projects, microcredit is touted as the feminist antidote for women's poverty and subjection. What has been missed, however, is a disturbing coincidence: microcredit has burgeoned just as states have abandoned macro-structural efforts to fight poverty, efforts that small-scale lending cannot possibly replace. In this case too, then, a feminist idea has been recuperated by neoliberalism. A perspective aimed originally at democratising state power in order to empower citizens is now used to legitimise marketisation and state retrenchment. In all these cases, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in favour of (neo)liberal individualism. But the other, solidaristic scenario may still be alive. The current crisis affords the chance to pick up its thread once more, reconnecting the dream of women's liberation with the vision of a solidary society. To that end, feminists need to break off our dangerous liaison with neoliberalism and reclaim our three "contributions" for our own ends. First, we might break the spurious link between our critique of the family wage and flexible capitalism by militating for a form of life that de-centres waged work and valorises unwaged activities, including – but not only – carework. Second, we might disrupt the passage from our critique of economism to identity politics by integrating the struggle to transform a status order premised on masculinist cultural values with the struggle for economic justice. Finally, we might sever the bogus bond between our critique of bureaucracy and free-market fundamentalism by reclaiming the mantle of participatory democracy as a means of strengthening the public powers needed to constrain capital for the sake of justice.

### Cap K – Link – Queerness

#### The affirmative’s queer project becomes commodified without an examination of capitalism

**Hennessy 17** (Rosemary Hennessy, Professor of English and Director of the Center for the Study of Women, Gender, and Sexuality at Rice University, “Profit and Pleasure : Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism”, *Taylor & Francis Group*, 8/21/17, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=4983407.

Cultural studies is an extensive and eclectic transdisciplinary mode of inquiry, marked by contestations, internal divisions, disparate genealogies, and a rich diversity. I take the risk of offering some generalizations about it as a body of knowledge, not because I want to subsume this contentious plurality under a monolithic profile, but in order to highlight some of the ways the discourses and paradigms that came to prevail amid this diversity bear a historical relation to the process of commodification that has accompanied the triumph of neoliberalism in the past twenty years. Cultural studies is now a massively funded field, and in that sense, as in much other cultural production, its U.S. variant has become the leading global instance. In some very literal ways, cultural studies in the United States has been commodified in that its knowledges have entered the circuit of commodity exchange pervasively and profitably. What emerged twenty years ago as maverick institutes insecurely anchored in academic institutions has become a full-blown, funded discipline, complete with graduate programs and Ph.D.s, conferences and cross-continental networks, high-profile corporate publishers, course readers and histories. Some of the leading figures in cultural studies have commented on the perils of its success. Lawrence Grossberg suggested in 1988 that the selling (out) of U.S. cultural studies was well advanced and that its success story has “all the ingredients of a made-for-tv movie” (Pfister 204 ). 3 Stuart Hall has commented on this evolution, too, referring to it as a dangerous time for cultural studies in the United States precisely because of the incorporation of academia and the isolation of American intellectuals within the established confines of institutional academic life. If these are boom times for cultural studies, it may be no accident that these are also times when one of the potentially sharpest combatants of neoliberalism is losing its critical edge. “In the period of this Clinton administration,” Stuart Hall warns, “[cultural studies] feels like a deeply reactionary form of free enterprise modernity” (Morley and Chen 397 ). The enormous outpouring of academic work in cultural studies over the past two decades has also been characterized by a distinct and emphatic erasure of capitalist economy from its knowledges, more specifically an erasure of the historical links between culture and capitalism that is characteristic of cultural materialism. Critical notice of this de-linking has been a part of the history of cultural studies, too, however, and more of these critical voices are beginning to be heard in the United States. For example, the collection Cultural Studies in Question, edited by Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding, takes this problem as one of its main concerns. 4 In their introduction, Ferguson and Golding contend that “cultural studies has neglected the deep structural changes in national and global, political and economic and media systems by eschewing economic, social or policy analysis” (xiv). In an essay in the same volume, Nicholas Garnham argues that in order to move on and fulfill the promises of its original project, cultural studies needs to “rebuild the bridges with political economy that it burnt in its headlong rush towards the pleasures and differences of postmodernism” ( 56 ). In large measure this headlong rush took the form of Foucauldian cultural materialism. We can see this trajectory quite distinctly in the work of Stuart Hall himself, who finally abandoned his always somewhat tenuous endorsement of historical materialism by the late eighties in favor of the post-marxism of Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe. 5 Hall’s contributions to cultural studies are formidable, as evidenced in his own work, his relationship to the many projects produced out of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, England, and his transnational influence. 6 At the center, after a protracted engagement with Althusserian marxism throughout the seventies, Hall and other scholars shifted their attention from grappling with the problem of how to address the relationship between capitalism’s economic base and the cultural-ideological superstructure to elaborations of the internal articulation of the superstructure itself (Sparks 83 ). In the next decade and into the nineties concern with the complex causal connections between capitalism’s underlying structures and cultural forms and with any specifically marxist analysis virtually disappeared from the incorporation of cultural studies. One index of the materialism that has come to define the British legacy can be seen in the Open University textbook series Culture, Media and Identities . These are glossy, well-packaged books aimed at introducing an undergraduate audience to cultural studies. Each of them follows a heuristic model called “the circuit of culture.” Through a circuit of interlocking relations — production, consumption, regulation, representation — this model illustrates the various processes by which identities come to be. The authors assert that it is “possible to start at any point” ( 2 ) in the circuit, but that an analysis has to go all the way round in order to be complete. Two features of this heuristic are notable: capitalism’s relationships of exploitation have no determining force on culture because “culture is now regarded as being as constitutive of the social world as economic or political processes.” Not only this, the authors go on to confirm, “in recent years ‘culture’ has been promoted to an altogether more important role as theorists have begun to argue that because all social practices are meaningful practices, they are all fundamentally cultural” (duGay 2 ). In the Open University series textbook Identity and Difference, edited by Kathryn Woodward, the “production” and “consumption” of identities are also thoroughly cultural activities. The section on “Sexualities,” by Lynn Segal, for example, treats the ways sexual identities are represented through cultural texts and symbolic systems. It includes a historical perspective that stretches from Anglo-European sexology to queer theory, and indeed it does mention scholarship that “correlate[s] shifts in scientific accounts of sexual difference with wider social changes and contests for power” (Segal 190 ). But there is no mention of what these “wider social changes” might be, what they might have to do with adjustments in capitalism’s relations of labor or with forms of commodification. The question remains whether abandoning all causal connections between culture and material relations outside of culture has strengthened cultural studies’ critical edge. My own view is that it has not. It seems to me that no analysis of cultural forms that professes to critically intervene in the violence taking place in the wake of neoliberal social policies can evade the historical relationships between culture and capital. In promoting a view of culture severed from any ties to the fundamental structures of capitalism, cultural studies is helping to produce forms of consciousness that supplement neoliberalism’s conservative individualism. While much work in cultural studies may seem overtly opposed to the privatizing tactics of neoliberalism, to the extent that cultural studies produces ways of understanding that exile meaning-making and identity in the realm of culture, sheltered from any link to capital or class, its discourses reiterate a cultural logic that has been one of capitalism’s most potent ideological forms. Surprisingly, this is a view that Stuart Hall himself intimates against the grain of his own later work. In an interview in 1992 , he predicted that in the future class concerns will be more central to cultural studies than they were in the eighties. In fact, he added, “I am sure that we will return to the fundamental category of capital” (Morley and Chen 400 ). 7 What would it mean to reverse this trend, to return cultural studies to the fundamental category of capital? How might we do so in a way that would allow us to link culture to the development and meeting of human needs and yet not forfeit inquiry into the complex ways cultural forms and identities are historically articulated? Of course, I am especially interested in how the answers to these questions might affect how we understand sexual identity. Sexual identity has become one of the prime channels of cultural studies’ “headlong rush toward the pleasures and differences of postmodernism.” Not only has it provided the occasion for much new work on the libidinal economies of culture, but sexual identity also has been hailed as the basis for new postmodern models of political alliance and cited as an obvious index of the limits of class analysis. 8 Consequently, the very possibility of linking the study of sexual identity to capital has become all but unspeakable. As a way into this hypermanaged forbidden zone of cultural work, I want to suggest that we revisit some of the abandoned debates in the encounter between cultural studies and marxism at the dawn of neoliberalism.

#### Desire is predetermined by capitalism – consolidation of new identities that inevitably pursues the logic of commodification limits the development of collective agency

**Hennessy 17** (Rosemary Hennessy, Professor of English and Director of the Center for the Study of Women, Gender, and Sexuality at Rice University, “Profit and Pleasure : Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism”, *Taylor & Francis Group*, 8/21/17, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=4983407.

By the late nineteenth century, the market economy in Europe and the United States was also drawing sexuality out of the family in many forms, in commercial entertainment and new kinds of nonprocreative intimacy (D’Emilio and Freedman 166– 200 ). The recruitment of women into the workforce in the colonies and the metropolitan centers was a crucial component of these changes, negotiated ideologically through the often contradictory adjustments to women’s and working-class men’s positions as subjects of consent, of property, and of racial identity. For women, the discourses of sexuality often organized access to political agency and ownership. Women continued to provide invisible labor in the home, and a gendered division of labor within the family alliance remained essential to the production of labor power and by extension to the accumulation of surplus value in the marketplace. The new technologies of sex operated in a normative, dialectical way both to undermine and to resecure this arrangement, and one of the ways they did so was through the reification of sexual identity. The reification of sexual identity in the late nineteenth century is overdetermined by a set of structural changes in capitalist production that involved technological developments, the mechanization and consequent de-skilling of work, the production boom brought on by technological efficiency, the opening of new consumer markets, and the eventual development of a widespread consumer culture (Hobsbawm 34– 55 ). A new and growing mass media, including the advertising industry, displaced unmet needs into new desires and offered the promise of compensatory pleasures, or at least the promise of pleasure in the form of commodity consumption. The inducement of social demand and consumer desire was one of the key components of the new consumer culture and a crucial mechanism through which capitalist overproduction was managed ideologically. This process took place on multiple fronts and involved the formation of newly desiring subjects, forms of agency, intensities of sensation, and economies of pleasure that were consistent with the requirements of a more mobile workforce and a growing consumer culture. Most significantly, the position of desiring subject was gradually being opened to women who would eventually be recruited as the ideal and consummate consumers. Related to the formation of new desiring subjects was the emergence of the new identities heteroand homosexual. These new subjects of sexual desire were at odds with a Victorian gender hierarchy that accorded the position of desiring subject only to men. As George Chauncy has argued, the differentiation of homosexual desire from cross-gender behavior at the turn of the century reflects a major reconceptualization of the nature of human sexuality. Basic to this change was a shift from a paradigm for human sexuality in which men were active sexual agents and women were passive or passionless sexual recipients. Active or passive sexual aim — which was taken to be paradigmatic for one’s masculine or feminine gender role — had formerly been more important than sexual object choice. More and more frequently, however, sexual object choice became the distinguishing feature of sexual identity, and it was on the basis of this standard that the distinction between heteroand homosexuality was erected (Chauncy 1994, 92 ). The emergence of new consuming and desiring subjects only gradually and unevenly displaced the Victorian social logic of gender with the modern logic of sexual object choice ( 100 ; Floyd 173 ). The dialectical process of “displacement” is a significant instance of overdetermination here. The new identity categories heteroand homosexual disrupted the bourgeois gender hierarchy that had supported a domestic economy of household production and property rights in that they accorded both men and women positions as subjects and objects of desire. But a patriarchal gender hierarchy was reinscribed in the emergent heteronorm and its homosexual other to the extent that the oppositions between femininity and active desire and between masculinity and sexual objectification remained intact. Heterosexuality became a normative identity whose stability was guaranteed through an array of reified perverse (sexual and racial) others but also through a modernized gender hierarchy. In other words, the organizational structures of gender and desire on which heteronormative identity relies prescribe a double reification of the human capacity for sensation, affect, and social intercourse. Heteronormativity posits a “natural” equation between sex (male or female) and gender (masculine and feminine) and it polices desire according to a gendered asymmetry between sexual subject (e.g., masculine) and object choice (feminine). At the same time, heteronorms reify homosexuality — defining, disciplining the human potential for sensation and social intercourse into an identity that complies with the heteronormative logics of gender and desire, only perversely so. It was only gradually through the nineteenth century that homosexuals, predominantly men, came to be seen as discrete sexual identities whose perverse sexual desire (men for men) was interpreted (and sometimes lived) through a heteronormative gender scheme. Sexual identity as an identity organized around whom one desires to be sexual with was engendered out of the scientific effort to explain and to tame disruptions of the gender system. This gradual shift from gender (in)coherence to (homo)sexual desire as the basis for identity is evident in the writing of late-nineteenth-century sexologists. In the work of the first generation of sexologists, the “invert” or “third sex” is in fact a subject who presents an incoherently gendered identity. The term “invert” was first used in the mid-nineteenth century to describe not homosexuality but a broadly transgendered condition of which same-sex desire was one symptom (Hekma; Prosser 135– 55 ). Generally the term “invert” is understood in terms of the classic description of “a woman trapped in a man’s body.” As an individual who makes sense of himself or herself as incoherently gendered, or as someone who is understood that way by others, the invert transgresses the gendered fabric of possessive individualism. After 1900 (which marked the publication of Havelock Ellis’s Sexual Inversion ) the term “invert” fell out of common use as gender difference was increasingly being folded into a new conception of sexual difference based on a desiring subject constructed in terms of aim or object choice. Freud, for example, refigures the transgendered components of inversion into perverse sexual object choice; other perversions and related sexual identities are understood to be deviations from a normative sexual aim. In this way the “invert’s” transgender identity becomes only one stop on the way to homosexual identity. This shift to sexual object choice as the defining feature of sexual identity has a contradictory relationship to patriarchal gender ideology. The emergence of a new subject of sexual desire was conditioned by the gradual disruption of gender distinctions taking place through changes in the division of labor, property, and consent law. This was a subject that was not defined so much in terms of species needs for reproduction as in terms of individual consumer preferences or the objects he or she desires (Birken 49 ). But the challenge to the asymmetrical gender scheme of bourgeois culture was not so pat. In sexology, for example, we find that even as the promotion of this new consuming subject of desire opened up the possibility of challenging the gender differences that defined reproduction, it also erected a new version of them. By emphasizing the multiplicity of individual preferences and the idiosyncratic nature of desire, and by starting with the assumption that individuals are first of all free consumers — or subjects of desire — sexology disrupted the traditional bourgeois gender hierarchy. At the same time sexology performed the conservative function of reinstalling the heterogender paradigm within this new sexual ideology of desire. As sexuality was being wrenched free from reproduction and everyone was potentially being sexualized, the threatening possibility of a genderless sexual desire was contained by a new paradigm of sexual identity that articulated it in a heterogendered frame. The new identities heteroand homosexual, based as they were on the appropriate gender of the object of desire, became ways of distinguishing sexual identities that not only tamed the potential threat to patriarchal gender difference but actually reincorporated it into a new (heterogender) ideology of sexual identity. The increasing differentiation of sexual identities (in the form of perversions) reflected the decline of older holistic concepts of gender and the articulation of newer, more object-oriented ones. The implications of this transcoding of gender were most telling for women. That women were permitted a new sexual agency may have been a break from the bourgeois gender ideology of passionless womanhood, but the desiring feminine subject was acceptable only so long as she directed that desire toward a heteronormative goal in which she was not the agent but the object of desire. The enfolding of bourgeois gender ideology within the new ideology of sexual desire helped forestall the possibility of even imagining lesbian desire in any other terms than female inversion. Consequently, until well into the twentieth century, sexologists and the culture at large could only conceive of the “real” lesbian who desires another woman by engendering her as “mannish” or butch (Birken 94– 96; Chauncy 107 ). The heteronormative identity that was consolidated in the late nineteenth century, then, prescribes a double reification of the human capacity for sensation, affect, and social intercourse through the organizational structures of gender and desire: it proposes an equation between sex and gender and it organizes desire according to the gendered asymmetry, which we might call “heteropolarity.” At the same time, heteronorms reify what comes to be known as “homosexuality”— defining, disciplining the human potential for sensation and social intercourse into an identity that complies with the heteronormative logics of gender and desire, only perversely so. In other words, the heteronormative paradigm set the terms even for queer desire. The emergence of this heterogendered, heteropolar normative paradigm and of the reified identities of heteroand homosexual is an important feature of the historical formation of a new desiring subject. Sexology’s construction of a sexuality of desire separated the human capacity for sensation and affect from the ideology of family need. As a new subject of desire rearticulated bourgeois gender ideology in this and other cultural sites, the relationship between sexual identity and gender remained uneven, contradictory, and prescribed. The construction of sexual identity in terms of object and aim potentially made it possible to conceive of all combinations of desiring subject and object (masculine/feminine man or masculine/feminine woman desiring masculine/feminine man or masculine/ feminine woman). But because capitalist investment in a heterogendered division of labor persisted, the potentially arbitrary boundaries between sexual identity and gender identity would continue to be secured through heterogendered norms, even as those boundaries were contested and unevenly articulated in mainstream and counterculture. By scripting desire in terms of heterogendered identities that are understood to be opposite sexes, the distinction between heteroand homosexuality controlled the unruly possibility posed by the new desiring subject — the possibility that masculinity, femininity, sexual agent, and sexual object might indeed correlate in any number of possible desiring combinations within or between persons. I am not the first to argue that the consolidation of two distinct social identities — heteroand homosexual — is not simply a discursive event or a cultural phenomenon. Several historians have made this point. John D’Emilio’s well-known early essay argues that it was two aspects of capitalism — wage labor and commodity production — that allowed men and women to call themselves gay, to see themselves as part of a community, and to organize politically on the basis of that identity. D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman as well as other scholars (George Chauncy, Jeffrey Weeks) have suggested that commodity consumption was also a key material condition for the emergence of new sexual identities. The late-nineteenthcentury shift to a consumer economy provoked a more widespread acceptance of pleasure, self-gratification, and personal satisfaction that easily translated to the province of sex. What I want to stress is that this cultural-ideological process was overdetermined by the logic of the commodity, a logic that binds ways of knowing and forms of identity to changes in the relations of production. In other words, the reification of sexual identity is overdetermined by the relationships that capitalist production came to rely on in the late nineteenth century, relationships that include forms of consciousness that are adequate to new demands of production and consumption. These new demands took place in several arenas — among them the recruitment of women into the workforce and consumer culture and the gradual unhinging of sexuality from its procreative function as regulated by the family’s patriarchal gender system. One of the most significant displacements was the conjuncture of rationalized production with the engineering of desire inducement. Against the background of the Great Depression of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the expanding volume of overproduction fueled the rise of commodity consumption and a new consumer culture in industrialized nations. The competitive struggle for control of consumer demand generated the spectacular growth of advertising and innovations in the field of credit designed to increase consumption (Birken 120 ). At the same time, the technological developments responsible for overproduction also spurred new forms of rationalized labor that would eventually take the form of Fordism. In an excellent recent essay, Kevin Floyd astutely contends that this historical development is a significant one in the history of the subject of desire under capitalism. The conjuncture of engineered production and engineered desire inducement interfaced with the construction of men and women as sexual subjects and sexual objects and helped give desire a certain ideological independence. The result was a reification of the erotic, ultimately inseparable from the retrenchment of capitalism (Floyd 178 ), a reification we might understand as overdetermined by the displacements of new forms of commodity production and consumption, by the transposition of need into desire, and by changes wrought in other cultural-ideological categories. Emerging as the prime institution involved in the formation of sexual identity in the late nineteenth century, heteronormativity shaped this reification in the service of the kernel of human relationships essential to capitalism in several ways. One of them involved the contradictory and dialectical relationship between sexuality and gender. By the end of the nineteenth century, heteronormative sexual identity was becoming one of the historical components of labor and labor power insofar as it organized forms of consciousness on which social divisions — including but not restricted to the division of labor — would depend. In disciplining human affect and sensation into discretely gendered subjects and objects of desire, heteronormativity reinforced the sexual division of labor in the home as well as the exploitation of women’s labor in the wage market. The distinction between a normative sexual subject and its abject other on which heteronormativity rested also served to contain the threat posed to patriarchal gender hierarchies by the unhinging of sexuality from family. In addition, the reification of sexual identity was an important part of a much broader process of moving human eros into the realm of exchange value. By consolidating human sensation into discrete and bounded sexual identities, heteronormativity helped shape the human potential and need for sensation and social interaction (or eros) in terms of objective aims or desires. This reification of the erotic would prove vital to the development of commodity culture insofar as it helped consolidate forms of desire that would be crucial in the marketing and consumption of commodities. 12 Satisfaction of needs through exchange value is the most common phenomenon of alienation, and human sexuality has certainly entered commodity exchange through this process. But the less visible relationship between commodification and sexuality lies in the reification of the human potential for sensation and affect into sexual identities. Like all cultural practices in capitalist production, this process was and is a contradictory one. The freeing up of sensory-affective capacities from family alliances was simultaneously rebinding desire into new commodified forms. But while heteronorms organized desire and identity, they never did so completely or entirely successfully. Unlike the poststructuralist or cultural materialist who sees these failures as the effect of a radical instability inherent in discourses or in language itself, the culture theorist who returns her analysis to capital knows that heteronorms are insecure because they are sites of ideological crisis and symptoms of the social struggle over meaning and ultimately over resources. This struggle threatens to disclose not only the fabricated nature of sexuality but also the social relations that bind its organization to capital’s contradictory structures. The narratives and social movements of nineteenth-century marriage resisters, “New Women,” and some feminists disclosed many of these connections and indicated that heteronormative resistance was not always launched by homosexuals who only gradually as a group countered the sexual norms they themselves were being framed by. Let me sum up some of the points I am making. First of all, heteronorms are cultural-ideological. They depend on the reification of sensory-affect into identities that legitimate and enable certain historical processes of capitalism. The gender foundation of heteronormative sexual identities is directly related to the extraction of surplus value through the gendered division of labor both in the family’s role in the reproduction of labor power and in the workplace. To the extent that heteronormativity is premised on a gender hierarchy, it has served to legitimate and naturalize the gendered division of labor. However, just because capitalism has made use of heteronormativity does not mean that it is necessary for capitalist production. Capitalism does not require heteronormative families or even a gendered division of labor. What it does require is an unequal division of labor. If gayor queer-identified people are willing to shore up that unequal division — whether that means running corporations or feeding families, raising children or caring for the elderly — capital will accept us, and in areas where production has moved far out of the patriarchal household and patriarchal gender ideologies have flexed or changed, it has done so, though unevenly and reluctantly. This limited acceptance is not just a freestanding cultural phenomenon any more than the emergence of “new families” includes all non-nuclear arrangements. While heteronormativity’s dependence on gender difference continues to bolster an unequal division of labor in the home and in the marketplace, and the ideology of family shelters an unwaged domestic labor force — whether straight or gay — race still has to bear a great share of the burden for the production of surplus value. The companion to the “New (white) Gay Family” is the single workfare mother whose sexual identity is less relevant than her social status as excessive breeder. Finally, I am arguing that reified sexual identities — straight, gay, queer — are tied to capitalism’s class system in that they are ways of seeing and knowing oneself and others that shore up the logic of commodity exchange on which capital is based. This is a logic that abstracts social phenomena, including human relationships, from the historical conditions that make them possible. In this regard, claiming a queer identity or claiming a straight identity can participate in the same cultural logic. The point I want to stress here is not that sexuality has a class character or that class trumps sexual identity, but that consolidation of new sexual identities that pursues the logic of commodification limits the development of collective agency. The occlusion of class in theories of sexuality and the disavowal of class struggle or class affinities in sexual liberation movements are part of the legacy of capital’s commodification of consciousness. One of the costs of the reification of eros into heteronormative identity and its homo-alternative is the separation of class and sex analysis. Underlying this split is the loss of a way of seeing and a form of social organization that recognizes that human needs are collectively produced and that can address the immense human toll taken by the contradictory relationships through which this process is enacted under capitalism.

### Fem IR – FW 2NC

#### Feminist scholarship is key to valuable discussions about NATO

Wright 3/8 (Katharine A. M. Wright, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, 3-8-2022, “A feminist perspective on the Russia-Ukraine War: Implications for NATO”, the London School of Economics and Political Science, Accessed 7-19-2022, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2022/03/08/a-feminist-perspective-on-the-russian-ukraine-war-implications-for-nato/> )//kpt

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine seemingly caught the international community and many International Relations scholars by surprise. It has been heralded as a [return to ‘realpolitik’](https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86525) leading to a (re)focus on the state as the primary referent point of international politics. Yet while feminist IR scholars have made important inroads into the discipline in recent decades, demonstrating how the [personal is not only political but international too](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520279995/bananas-beaches-and-bases), at this time of crisis we again find feminist insights marginalised from mainstream **discussion of the war and its consequences** (with a few notable exceptions, including work by [Jenny Mathers](https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-families-of-unhappy-russian-conscripts-could-undermine-kremlins-war-effort-178362) and a subsequently postponed [RUSI event](https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/uk-russia-expert-dialogue-diversity-within-debates)).

**Feminists IR scholars have much** value **to add** to the discussion to aide our understanding of the war and its gendered impact. For example, how masculinities and femininities are **invoked in constructing Russia** and Ukraine in geopolitical imaginaries, the absence of women from both Ukranian and Russian negotiation delegations, or in the gendered silences of just who is seen to fight/be protected in Western media coverage, to name just a few of examples. However, the purpose of this blog is to focus on the implications of the war for NATO through a feminist lens.

Feminist IR scholars’ primary concern with **NATO** stems from a premise that it **functions as an**[**institution of international hegemonic masculinity**](https://www.militarygender.com/). This has included a focus on how NATO shares lessons on the value of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and a gender perspective, [constituting both through a militarist lens](https://www.militarygender.com/), even if gender work often remains under resourced and not fully utilised within the [alliance](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0192512116638763)and its [operations](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533312.2018.1492876). Feminist IR **scholars** have also **examined** **how** **gendered narratives are invoked to shape** NATO, its value, and purpose, both internally [**through storytelling**](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600826.2018.1440195) and the interactions of ‘[gendermen](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23337486.2016.1264108)’ (and [women](https://www.militarygender.com/)) **and** externally **through** the [**projection**](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1750635217730588) and [reception](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/natos-strategic-narratives-angelina-jolie-and-the-alliances-celebrity-and-visual-turn-addendum/6C0424D2916B174FAAA0FFF5F083E69D) **of strategic** **narratives**.

The value of women, and more recently gender perspectives, to the alliance is nothing new and [NATO has long been concerned with the integration of women](https://www.militarygender.com/) into its armed forces in relation to balancing ‘manpower’ shortages and supporting operational effectiveness. More recently, in 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that “[Gender equality is an integral part of all NATO policies, programmes and projects](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_167021.htm)”

Likewise, the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan on WPS makes it clear that “NATO aims to address gender inequality and integrate WPS through the Alliance’s three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security [emphasis author’s own]”. Even if ‘nations have the primary responsibility’ in respect to collective defence, it is these nations which makeup NATO and agree its response, they are therefore responsible for ensuring “the provision of trained troops and experts on gender issues, as well as a better gender balance in NATO-led forces depend entirely on national decisions”. The NATO WPS policy has “encouraged [member and partner states] to make WPS an integral part of their defence and security.” The test of whether they have or not comes now.

Despite such a commitment, we have yet to see NATO, or its members or partners, articulate the relevance of gender in their response to the Russian intervention in Ukraine. While there remains a lot we don’t know about NATO’s reaction, we would expect, if it were in place, for NATO to have made the case for the relevance of a gender perspective publicly. If the response to Russia’s actions has seen NATO return to its Article 5 collective defence founding purpose, it has also, yet again, drawn attention to the [disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of NATO’s commitment to the WPS agenda](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=nN2A1m4AAAAJ&pagesize=80&citation_for_view=nN2A1m4AAAAJ:IWHjjKOFINEC). This also further undermines and demonstrates the hollowness of recent [calls for NATO to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-nato-should-adopt-a-feminist-foreign-policy/).

As **feminist IR scholars**, we **should be asking** not only [where are the women](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520279995/bananas-beaches-and-bases) but where are the gender advisors and where is the gender expertise? Is the NATO Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security being included in all high-level discussions? Are Gender Advisors being deployed with the NATO Response Forces? **Has a gender perspective been incorporated into NATO’s strategic communications?** Is a gender perspective being included in all decision-making processes? Has a gender perspective been part of the briefings at the NATO extraordinary meetings on Ukraine? Which (if any) member and partners states (including those with Feminist Foreign Policies, such as Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg and Sweden) are raising NATO’s commitments under WPS as something to be taken into consideration at these meetings? And what gender expertise are they contributing substantively? Moreover, given in the last decade [NATO has begun engaging civil society formally on its WPS work](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=nN2A1m4AAAAJ&cstart=20&pagesize=80&citation_for_view=nN2A1m4AAAAJ:-f6ydRqryjwC), we must ask where are their voices and perspectives now?

This short contribution has sought to raise questions and provocations related to the WPS agenda and how it has (or hasn’t) been invoked in NATO’s response to the Russia-Ukraine War. It has also demonstrated that **feminist knowledge and attention to NATO is needed now more than ever**. It is just one take, and there remains [more than one feminist perspective](https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/71/2/339/2534617) on NATO, while feminism remains a broad school, even if feminist IR scholars remain united by a [commitment to emancipatory praxis](https://www.routledge.com/Feminist-Security-Studies-A-Narrative-Approach/Wibben/p/book/9780415457286). It has shown how, even at times such as these, **we need to make space to hear voices outside of the mainstream discourse**, which might make us uncomfortable or challenge the accepted status quo, because doing so **keeps alive the possibility** that **another world is possible**. **Asking feminist questions of NATO specifically can contribute to a better understanding of the alliance’s role in the global power order**, in particular [**how it engages with and shapes ‘new’ security threats**](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520083363/the-morning-after)**, including the Russian intervention in Ukraine.**

### Fem IR – AT: Perm

#### They girlboss-ify the movement ☹

---not sure if this has been put out or not yet

Cockburn 11 (Cynthia Cockburn, feminist researcher and writer and Visiting Professor in Sociology at City University London, 2011, “Snagged on the Contradiction: NATO, Resolution 1325, and Feminist Responses”, Accessed 7-19-2022, <https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/WIA2012_07TalkingPointsCynthiaCockBurn.pdf> )//kpt

Contradictions in Resolution 1325

As feminist antimilitarists, as women of the Noto-NATO movement, how should we respond to the integration by NATO of Resolution 1325? After all, the instrument was universally welcomed by women. Its objectives were irrefutably sound which is, to draw attention to the impact of armed conflict specifically its impact on women. Such anticipated impact is for women to be recognised not as mere victims but as actors, capable of contributing to the ending of war and to achieving peace and redefining security. One can imagine that the United Nations Security Council might see NATO as an exemplary institution, implementing the resolution in pretty much the manner desired - and desired not only by the UN (we suppose), but by the women who drafted the Resolution and pressed the Security Council to pass it. Many of the measures NATO are introducing in Afghanistan, as described above, are in the circumstances, desirable. Given that ISAF is present in Afghanistan, we can only be glad if NATO personnel, prompted by Resolution 1325, behave respectfully towards women and try not to make their lives any worse than its current state. If Afghan women are to be searched at checkpoints, it is certainly more desirable that they should be handled by women than men. Yet, how can we who oppose NATO, who deplore its very existence and its war in Afghanistan – welcome its espousal of ‘our’ Resolution 1325? Especially when that war was legitimated by those who launched it, in part, by its potential for liberating women from fundamentalist oppression.

I would suggest that there are at least four elements in the contradiction that is now anguishing many feminist antimilitarists, not the least, ourselves in the No-to-NATO movement.

The most obvious and fundamental is the perennial ‘equality’ dilemma in feminism. At many moments in the history of the women’s movement, a divergence has surfaced between women who call for ‘equality’ and those who assert ‘difference’. Those who stress ‘equality’ believe that equal treatment of women is simple justice. Those who stress ‘difference’ believe **equality** is **too easily interpreted as ‘equality’** **with men in a men’s worsld**. They call for a transformative change in gender power relations and a valorisation of women and the feminine. Yet in turn (and herein lies the contradiction), the **positive assertion of difference** can **become** an undesirable **entrenchment of** complementation in **gender relations**, trapping us in the gender dichotomy. The divergence between ‘equality’ and ‘difference’ strategies becomes seriously divisive when the equality demanded by women concerns access to **roles** that self-**evidently** **enhance patriarchal**, capitalist, nationalist or **militarist power**. Serving in the armed forces is an acutely troubling case in point.

It should be noted that Resolution 1325 does not in fact call for more women in armies. It urges, in rather careful terms, an expansion of “the role and contribution of women in United Nations fieldbased operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel.” In promoting a higher proportion of women in militaries, NATO is not actually ‘implementing 1325’. The feminisation of soldiering (at least in my interpretation), is part of NATO’s thrust to modernise and professionalise contributing national armies. It has picked up the ball of gender equality thrown into play by feminists and is running with it for its own objectives. What can we do as feminists in such a situation? We have surely to emphasise that equality is a matter of justice, and in a just and inclusive society, women should not be debarred on account of their gender from doing anything they want to do. Just as ethnic minorities should not be debarred from police force for instance. But we must simultaneously critique and seek to dismantle all the power relations that deform and subvert not only justice in employment, but also the quality of human life and relationships – including those of militarism. It’s unimaginable that the struggle for equality can be pursued, anywhere or ever, except hand in hand with an unrelenting struggle for transformative change in gender and other power relations.

The second contradiction I believe goes like this: **NATO is a militarist organisation** but the **intention** of Resolution 1325 **is anti-militarist**. 54 Yet its **wording** and provisions leave it co-**optable by militarism**. In fact, back in 2000 in New York, the ink was scarcely dry on the document before quite a lot of the feminist women involved were voicing self-criticism about their failure to frame the 1325 measures with a strong statement about ending militarism, militarisation and war itself. They were advised by those close to the UN system, and indeed informed by common sense, that the Security Council would not accept any insistence from the women on the resolution - a sharp critique of militarism, militarisation and the pursuit of war policies by member states. That is indeed why the women originators of the Resolution censored themselves. All the same, the UN was created to put an end to war. The Security Council’s primary responsibility, under the Charter is the maintenance of international peace and security.19 Some of the women now wondered, “should we not have called the Security Council’s bluff?”20 Four years later, Carol Cohn neatly summarised the effect of their failure to engage in struggle with the Security Council on this issue. She wrote, **Protecting women in war**, and **insisting** that they have an **equal right to participate** in the processes and negotiations that end particular wars, both **leave** **war** itself **in place**... [1325 is not] an intervention that tries either to prevent war, or to contest the legitimacy of the systems that produce war - that is, ‘to put an end to war’. In this sense, it **fits** **comfortably** **into** the already extant concepts and **discursive practices of** the **Security Council**, **where** the dominant paradigm holds a world made up of **states** that ‘**defend’** state **security** through military means...Letting (some) women into decision-making positions seems a small price to pay for leaving the war system essentially undisturbed.21

The third **contradiction** is inherent **in** the several interpretations to which the **word ‘security’** lends itself. Women have been at pains for a decade or more now to redefine ‘security’.22 We readily adopted the critique of military conceptions of security by those who began to speak and write of ‘human security’.23 Then, in the concept of ‘women’s security,’ we gave ‘human security’ gender specificity.24 This was, for feminists, the meaning of the word in the title of the Resolution: Women, Peace and Security. The **ideal** of ‘security’ can however too **readily** be **manipulated** **by** an organisation such as **NATO**, that however it 55 2012 Women in Action describes security in words, **manifests** it **in** action as meaning the **militarisation** of society **and** a **readiness to fight wars**.

Fourth, and finally, some of the women who were involved in the movement to achieve Resolution 1325 were self-critical afterwards on the grounds that they had failed at any point to express an explicit critique of men, masculinity and patriarchy in relation to militarism, militarisation and war. The Resolution said nothing about the male-dominant gender order in which we all live, the supremacy of men in political and military systems, the affinity of military values with hegemonic masculine values, and the overwhelming statistical preponderance of men in actual acts of violence against both men and women, whether in peace or war. As Carol Cohn puts it, to have the effect we desire as feminists, the women transnational activists in this story would have to address “the pernicious, pervasive complexities of the gender regimes that undergird not only individual wars but the entire war system.”25 (I argue that we should go further and **recognise gender power relations as a predisposing**, and thus causal, **factor** **in militarisation and war**.26) The fact is that, just as the **UN** cannot criticise the USA, capitalism and militarisation, so it is quite **unable to make any critique of masculinity**. Sandra Whitworth would later write in her post1325 study of UN peace keeping, “There is…no discussion within UN documents of militarism or militarised masculinities or, for that matter, of masculinities more generally” (Whitworth 2004:137). It may be beyond the bounds of reason to imagine the Security Council taking the step (albeit logical) from deploring the rape of women in war to pointing the finger at men’s perennial propensity for violence and specifically for sexual violence against women. Yet, this silence on men, masculinity and the male-dominant gender order has vitiated Resolution 1325. In the absence of a strong statement against the ‘co-production’ of hegemonic masculinity and militarism, it becomes little more than an aspiration on the one hand, to make war a bit safer for women, on the other, to **alert** the **powers**-that-be to **the resource women can be** **in** **helping them do their job**. The **Resolution** is **left hostage to co-optation by militarist states and military institutions for military purposes.**

### Fem IR K – Climate Link

#### Their securitization of climate change is the continuation of a long line of failed militaristic policies, only embracing a feminist perspective can we truly mitigate their impacts

**Nagel 15**(Joane, Social and Behavioral Sciences – Sociology Professor, “Gender, Conflict, and the Militarization of Climate Change Policy”, CS)

In their 2007 report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, a group of prominent retired U.S. military advisors described climate change as a “threat multiplier” facing many countries in the world, especially the United States. They cataloged dangers to national security from climate changerelated flooding, drought, extreme weather, disease, famine, and environmentally forced migration. The report’s focus on dangers and conflicts reflected the institutional perspective and interests of its all-male military advisory board. They recommended strategic planning to defend against the threat of climate change. They did not call for action on the causes of climate change such as the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The militarization of climate change, by defining it primarily as a security threat, represents one of several ways in which climate change policy is gendered. The international failure to respond effectively to climate change also can be understood by analyzing the gender dimensions of the institutions that dominate international climate change research, planning, and negotiations. In her 2010 Nature article, “Call in the Women,” feminist geographer Susan Buckingham argued that gender imbalance is a major reason for the ongoing stalemate in international efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Starting in 1995, international environmental leaders have gathered each year at United Nations Conference of Parties (COP) meetings around the world to settle on a response to escalating changes in the global climate. In the past twenty years of annual COP meetings, these mainly male negotiators have not managed to produce any significant binding agreements to reduce the rate and scale of climate change. Negotiators’ inability to craft an international climate change agreement has persisted in the face of mounting scientific evidence and wide consensus about the dangerous consequences of climate change to the planet’s biosphere and human societies. Critics of negotiators’ ineffectiveness typically fault the economic interests of carbon emitting countries in maintaining a global energy and economic system that benefits them. They seldom attribute COP meeting failures to the enduring power of gender privilege. Buckingham, however, sees a more gendered COP landscape marked by the gendered culture and approach of male negotiators. To bolster this critique, she reports consistent research findings supporting improved decision making in economic and political settings where women are included in adequate numbers. Not surprisingly, this research is ignored by predominately male representatives who dominate the ranks of COP representatives (women comprise less than thirty percent of COP delegates). This is despite the fact that in 1995 the United Nations called for including women in all levels of environmental decision making. Buckingham’s conclusion: “there is enough evidence now to justify increasing women’s involvement in decision-making on climate change. We should do so without delay.” It is not simply their gender that accounts for the poor track record of the mainly male negotiators; it also is the interests that they represent. If women representatives replaced some or all of the men at these meetings, would agreements be reached, GHG levels reduced, and the dangers of climate change averted? It would be an interesting experiment, and simply on the ethical grounds of gender equity, it warrants mandating equal gender representation at all COP meetings and other United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)–sponsored bodies and activities, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Gender parity, however, would not change the national and economic interests dominating COP meetings. Whether they are men or women from the global North or South, representatives at COP meetings typically represent elite interests. Women might bring a different experiential and gendered perspective to the negotiations, but they still would face institutional resistance to change, especially by a UN system historically run by elite men. This is partly because gender is not only a feature of individuals. Gendered cultures, practices, and networks characterize organizations as well.

#### Especially true when looking at their solvency mechanism, their usage of the DoD cements a masculine framework for solutions, their policies are built around supporting the military, not fixing the climate crisis

**Nagel 15**(Joane, Social and Behavioral Sciences – Sociology Professor, “Gender, Conflict, and the Militarization of Climate Change Policy”, CS)

A preponderance of largely male governments and male-dominated economic interests protecting the unequal status quo can be understood mainly as hindrances to successful climate negotiations. But they are not the only important gendered features of the international system responsible for influencing climate change policy. As we saw above, the military is another gendered institution intimately related to national governments and economies. National militaries are less responsible for stalling organized responses to climate change; they are critical articulators of climate change hazards and advocates for defining climate change as a problem not of controlling carbon emissions, but of protecting national security. Despite the end of the Cold War (characterized by a large-scale U.S.–USSR arms race) in 1990, in 2010 world military expenditures were higher than in any year since the end of the Second World War in 1945. The United States far outpaces other countries in military expenditures. The U.S. accounted for thirty-nine percent of global military expenditures in 2012, when military expenditures consumed more than four percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. The United States is among a handful of the most militarized countries in the world, as measured by military expenditures per capita, including Israel, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Russia, Jordan, Algeria, and Azerbaijan. Even the world’s poorest countries sport national armies whose weapons and training are subsidized by or purchased from the world’s major arms dealers, most notably the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China. The world’s militaries are historically hyper-masculine institutions with cultures embracing honor, bravery, loyalty, strength, and violence. Men dominate the ranks and leadership of military institutions just as they dominate national politics and economics around the world. In the United States, the military plays a critical role in scientific research, including climate change research. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has a basic scientific research and development budget that is two and a half times greater than the National Science Foundation (NSF)—the agency tasked with funding basic research across the sciences, mathematics, and engineering. The NSF has a broad mission of supporting transformative research on all topics and issues across disciplines. The DOD’s much narrower mission is to protect national security. This focus on security—food security, energy security, water security, and environmental security—determines the research projects it supports. As a result, the DOD has been a powerful voice in emphasizing national security dangers from and defenses against climate change and in shaping the work of the many researchers it supports in universities, industry, and national labs and research facilities. The DOD’s agenda reflects classical military/masculine tactics for attacking climate change: large-scale geo-engineering approaches to manage solar radiation or sequester carbon, energy research focused on military missions, conflict scenario planning, climate forecasting and modeling, and global resource assessments. The DOD has very limited interest in funding “softer” (feminine) research topics on the health, social, racial, gender, or age disparities in climate change impacts, factors that promote community resilience in the face of disasters, or strategies for reducing the carbon emissions causing climate change.

### Fem IR K – AT: Scenario Planning

#### Modern war uses narratives of beautiful and helpless women to justify atrocious acts, only a feminist critique of war theory can reveal the deep flaws in IR theory

**Sjoberg 08**(Laura, American feminist scholar of international relations and international security and Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London, “Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More Than Ever”, CS)

Feminists argue that the construction of women as ‘beautiful souls’ at once serves as moral justification for war-fighting stronger than the underlying jus ad bellum standards (protecting innocent women and children), obscures women’s actual suffering in war (given the moral reliance of war-fighting on women’s being shielded from the actions and effects of war), and props up gender subordination more generally (by limiting women’s capabilities inside war and supporting gender differentiation in citizenship status and other social roles). As such, the just war tradition’s reliance on gendered ideal-types in the non-combatant immunity principle has real negative impacts, both inside and outside of the making of war. The gender subordination that just war theory perpetrates is another problem to add to the laundry list of difficulties that the tradition has as it looks for current applicability. Not only does a gender-based critique of the just war tradition demonstrate gender bias in the just war tradition, but also reveals that just war theory often fails on its own terms because of that gender bias (Sjoberg, 2006b). This demonstrates that just war’s difficulties cannot be solved by simply adding new rules for new sorts of war; broader problems exist. A feminist critique of just war theory reveals important ways forward, and suggests broader solutions. This paper argues that a gender-based critique and reformulation of just war theory can suggest an agenda for the reinvention of the tradition in a sharper, more relevant form. Before proceeding to that reformulation, perhaps a note on the method by which one draws gender-based critique is appropriate. Feminist scholars study global politics through ‘gendered lenses’, where gender as an evaluative and constitutive variable frames their analysis of global politics (Peterson and Runyan, 1999). When looking through gendered lenses, feminists are concerned with the influence of gender subordination in global politics and interested in paths to redress that subordination. As Jill Steans notes, ‘feminist critical theorists are trying to find a way forward which retains both gender as a category of analysis and retain the historical commitment to the emancipator project in feminism’ while addressing broader policy issues across state and cultural boundaries (Steans, 1998, 29). A feminist critique of the just war tradition, then, looks for locations of gender subordination within the foundations of just war theory, and then uses gender as a category of analysis to search for emancipatory alternatives.

### Fem IR K – Turns War

#### Feminist perspective solves the most serious impacts of war

**Sjoberg 08**(Laura, American feminist scholar of international relations and international security and Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London, “Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More Than Ever”, CS)

Through gendered lenses, we can see a number of guidelines for the reinterpretation of these standards. First, a feminist perspective would argue that the question of just cause is one that should not be decided by any one actor or from any one epistemological perspective or political standpoint. Instead, in keeping with strong objectivity, justice needs to be considered dialogically. Additionally, feminists’ interest in empathy would mean that potential belligerents should, in the dialogue about the meaning of justice, attempt not only to comprehend but also to emotionally identify with the positions of the other actors in the dialogue. An ethic of care demands that the planning and fighting of wars be done with a special concern for the plight of those traditionally marginalized in social and political life. A care-based politics of war-making demands that states and/or other political actors refrain from fighting wars that will not mainly impact those people against whom those actors have just cause. It also suggests that calculations of the ‘civilian damage’ of war include a broader range of human insecurities, including issues like unemployment, debt, transportation damage, health infrastructure damage, and the like (Tickner, 1992). Along the same lines, a gender perspective suggests a broader group of situations that just war theory should be used to analyze. These include any situations where conflict is likely to cause mass human insecurity, including economic sanctions, civil conflicts, and/or religious or cultural oppression. The source of these observations is feminist work on the continuity of violence in international politics. Twenty years ago, Betty Reardon called the international political arena a ‘war system’, indicating that constant political violence, economic deprivation, gender and cultural subordination, and environmental destruction are a structural feature of people’s (and especially women’s) lives in global politics (1985). Chris Cuomo followed up, arguing that war ‘is not just an event’ and instead can be seen as a continuous property of global politics (1996). These insights demonstrate that a feminist approach to war, and its moral consequences, differs substantively from conventional just war approaches. As such, a feminist perspective suggests several foundational principles for a reformulated just war tradition, less totalizing but more honest about its capacities, less deterministic but more prepared to deal with the contingency of today’s international conflicts: (1) A dialogue about the meaning of justice for just cause, inclusive of a broad array of international actors and aiming at building consensus through empathetic cooperation. (2) Emotional identification as a major component of international relations in times of conflict. (3) An ad bellum prescription that an actor should not engage a war, no matter how just the cause, that cannot be fought mainly against those who have created the just cause. (4) Special attention to the impacts of war on those traditionally marginalized in social and political life, especially women. (5) A new, more sensitive principle of discrimination, which acknowledges the terrible civilian damages caused by war, and calculates not only the immediate effects of guns and bombs, but also the lasting human effects of conflict and violence. (6) A modified, ‘war system’ approach to those situations that should be covered by just war analysis that covers the most intense sources of humaninflicted human insecurity, even outside of the traditional confines of ‘war’.

#### Older models and justifications for waging war no longer hold up, a feminist lens provides these theories with empathy and morality, making conflict increasingly avoidable

**Sjoberg 08**(Laura, American feminist scholar of international relations and international security and Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London, “Why Just War Needs Feminism Now More Than Ever”, CS)

In a world where there are as many just war theories as there are just war theorists, yet massively destructive wars take place, just war theory needs both focused moral priorities and some way to regulate meaning without excluding perspectives. Because excluding perspectives is likely to increase, rather than decrease, the number and intensity of international conflicts; just war cannot regulate meaning either by imposing some actors’ meanings on others or by giving way to absolute relativism. Instead, an approach to meaning that is both communicative and empathetic has a number of distinct advantages. First, it demands that parties in a conflict listen to their opponents’ and third parties’ understandings of the meaning of justice. Listening can be a first step to overcoming conflicts. Second, it requires that parties reconsider the claimed universalism of their understandings of global politics. This could inspire less myopic understandings of security states, transgressing realism as a selffulfilling prophecy. Third, the element of emotional identification adds an important additional layer to listening. In empathetic cooperation, actors not only have to ‘hear’ other states’ positions, but are also asked to attempt to understand on rational and emotional levels. Finally, attention to the political margins is important, and long-neglected, in the analysis of the ethics of war. The 21st century has seen a number of international political conflicts that are increasingly violent and increasingly difficult to analyze using traditional just war standards. Where just war theory used to be able to find a state that made war, the war on terrorism has made obvious the relevance of non-state actors to war-making. Where just war theory used to be able to talk about noncombatant identification and immunity, guerilla wars, air wars, and wars against an unidentified enemy have complicated the discrimination principle. Where just war used to be able to confine itself to the cultural context of the belligerents, an increasingly global world sees conflicts between cultural contexts. In such an international political atmosphere, political leaders need an ethical compass to war-making and war-fighting now more than ever. In the face of this increasing need for a moral compass, political leaders find a just war tradition that struggles with being outdated, risks susceptibility to political manipulation, lacks clarity in conceptual understandings of justice and war, and entrenches gender subordination in global politics. Just war needs a unifying motivating morality that allows for both diversity and decisionmaking. The feminist reformulated just war principles contained in this article provide the groundwork for such a motivating morality. Just war needs a way to adapt to cultural pluralism; feminist empathy constructs a workable dialogue. Just war needs a way to adapt to the constant challenge of technological change; feminisms center their moral thinking on the lives of individuals and thus provide a framework for thinking about new technologies. Just war needs a way to pay attention to the structural violence and human security effects of infrastructural attacks and aerial wars. Feminisms’ focus on political marginality helps just war to see this suffering, and to prioritize it in ethical evaluation. From the top levels of strategic policy-making to the margins of political life, people need just war theory now more than ever. Because people need just war theory, just war theory needs feminism.

### Fem IR K – NATO Bad

#### NATO is an instrument of hegemonic masculinity---their threat construction and rhetoric of nation-states recreates the impacts they seek to prevent because the masculine will *always* seek more enemies to securitize and otherize

Cockburn 10 (Cynthia Cockburn, feminist researcher and writer and Visiting Professor in Sociology at City University London, 9-20-2010, “Women-against-NATO – Making a Feminist Case”, War Resisters’ International, Accessed 7-19-2022, <https://wri-irg.org/en/story/2010/women-against-nato-making-feminist-case> )//kpt

In April 2009, as part of the mobilization against the NATO Summit in Strasbourg, No-to-NATO organized a two-day counter-conference, in the course of which some forty women from NATO member states held a workshop on ‘a feminist case against NATO’.[1] Some of us have continued to work together by e-mail, and we hope to mark the forthcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, this November, with women’s protest actions.

What is our ‘feminist case’ against NATO? In many ways it’s the same case we make against militarism and war in general. That’s to say, we note the adverse ways they impact on women, and the damaging gender roles, active and passive, into which they draw both sexes. We point up the fact that gender relations, as we know and live them, are relations of power and inequality, founded in violence. They involve the social construction of masculinity as combative. Proper manhood requires a readiness to use force in defence of ‘honour’, while femininity is associated with passivity and victimhood. Women who want to escape the feminine stereotype have little choice but to imitate the masculine model. This **dichotomous gender culture** is one of the long-term, **underlying**, **causes of war**, because it predisposes our societies to see taking up arms as a normal and acceptable way of dealing with political conflicts. Consequently, feminist activists call for the transformation of gender relations as a necessary element of the movement to end war.

So how does this apply in the struggle against NATO? It’s important to stress that, for sure, all the women on our ‘Women Against NATO’ e-list are making exactly the same base-line case as all other opponents of NATO. Briefly, that **NATO** is a Cold War instrument that should have been closed down when the Warsaw Pact folded; that it is primarily a vehicle for the economic and military interests of the USA and to a lesser extent those of the post-colonial Western European states; and that its current strategy of enlargement and its increasingly ‘**expeditionary’ mode make it a growing threat to peace** on a global scale. Furthermore, NATO’s existence flouts international law and United Nations principles; it chimes with increasing militarization of the European Union; and it locks member states into the nuclear weapons and MDI systems on which the USA continues to insist.

However, beyond this general critique of NATO, we perceive the alliance in gendered terms. **NATO** is a massive **military alliance of nation states**. Nira Yuval-Davis and other feminist theorists have shown how the **concept of ‘nation’ is gendered**, how **nationalism** **and patriarchy are** **interlocked**, and how nations and nationalists use and exploit ‘women’. NATO is the product of Cold War thinking that **saw** the **globe** **as divided into** two ‘**blocs’** of nation states, champions of rival ideologies. Some feminist contributions to the Strasbourg workshop talked about the ‘patriarchal logic’ of blocs, a **brotherhood** of nations in arms **seeking** out **fantasy** **enemies** long **after** the **Cold War** has ended.

Secondly, women have been making a feminist case against NATO’s military bases, installations and production facilities in our countries. Although, for the most part, these belong to the national armed forces of member states, they are in effect part and parcel of NATO resources in Europe. Several women wrote workshop papers about the damaging effect of military installations on the lives of women in neighbouring communities. They described women’s non-violent direct action outside the razor wire and security checkpoints, protesting against the toxic pollution, the danger of radiation, the noise and blighted areas entailed by the military use of land. Women also protest against sexual exploitation and violence against women by military personnel. In Bosnia and Kosovo, UN and NATO-led forces not only generated a massive sex industry, but individual soldiers – along with NATO contractors and UN police – were actively involved in the trafficking process, receiving trafficked women and girls at borders, smuggling them into military bases and acting as pimps. Although NATO adopted, in 2004, a Policy Against Human Trafficking, no suspected NATO traffickers have been prosecuted.[2]

Third, the persistence of the ‘NATO system’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union has prevented each European country cashing in ‘the peace dividend’ by reducing its armed forces and humanizing its international posture. It has required them to sustain a **high degree** **of** **militarization** that masculinizes and deforms everyday life. It has, what’s more, fostered the militarization of the European Union, so that an economic alliance we joined as a guarantor of cooperation and harmony is turning into yet another war-fighting machine. It has been argued that the EU is converting to this ‘hard’ image in response to the chiding of US policy-makers that Europe is a feminine, soft, civilian power. European leaders want to play ‘with the big boys’.[3] A commitment to contribute to a European force as well as to NATO **calls for high military expenditures** in EU member states. Feminists argue that this **drains funds from the education, health and housing services** badly needed by women, the sex that still carries a very high proportion of the burden of domestic life and care.

Finally, feminist antimilitarists make a case against NATO as a perpetrator of wars. The effects of war are dramatically gendered. There is a growing trend to civilian casualties, disproportionately women and their dependants. Women are the majority of the displaced and refugees, trying to maintain their families in impossible circumstances. Thousands are widowed, deprived of a viable existence. Sexual violence redoubles in and after war. We see all this in NATO’s war in Afghanistan.

Improbable as it may seem, NATO prides itself on ‘mainstreaming’ gender into its structures and activities. ‘NATO and its Partners’, they say on their website, ’are promoting the role of women within NATO-led operations and missions’ and increasing the knowledge and skills available on ‘gender and diversity’. Last year the Strategic Commands received guidelines for the integration into the NATO Command Structure of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on ‘Women, Peace and Security’. There is a NATO Office on Gender Perspectives, and gender advisers have been appointed. An implementation report is to be published in time for the Lisbon Summit.[4]

Given the implications for women of NATO’s campaign Afghanistan, the Alliance’s self-professed gender sensitivity can only deepen feminist cynicism about ‘gender mainstreaming’. Here is an alliance of powerful Western states exploiting the notion of ‘liberating Afghan women from oppression by the Taliban’ as one of its devious justifications for invading the country. Women’s insecurity is multiplied in the chaos and brutality of a decade of armed conflict. Then the intruders announce plans to make their escape by negotiating the re-entry to power of – the Taliban. Afghan women certainly have a feminist case against NATO. So do women in NATO member states.

#### NATO functions as an institution of hegemonic masculinity---the narrative of military “teaching” and “training” reinforces the Western role of the masculine protector

Wright 4/18 (Katherine AM Wright, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, 4-18-2022, “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda”, SAGE journals, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221084561> )//kpt

NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity: method and approach

**NATO** is a political-military alliance built on consensus decision-making. Moving beyond its Cold War origins, the alliance’s remit has **expanded** significantly **beyond** a sole focus on **collective defence to include** crisis management and **cooperative security**. This has seen NATO’s focus enlarge from a regional one to a global one, with recent engagements in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo, for example. Its status as a multilateral institution means it is limited by its members’ priorities and therefore sensitive not to implicate NATO or NATO member states in wrongdoing ([Hebert, 2012](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)).

In centring **NATO** as an ‘**institution of international hegemonic masculinity’** ([Wright et al., 2019](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)), in this analysis, it is possible to shed light on the peculiarities of NATO’s WPS work to date, against which engagement with civil society takes place. This has two co-constituting elements, first, internally, **existing gender norms** and expectations of masculinity and femininity **reflective** **of** a **hierarchical military institution** are (re)created and (**re)enforced through NATO’s engagement** with WPS ([Wright et al., 2019](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561): 71). For example, men working on WPS at NATO navigate both the trivialisation and the feminisation of such work and must (re)negotiate their own identities. Yet in so doing they reinforce the importance of men speaking to and listening to other men (rather than women) reinforcing the gendered status quo ([Wright et al., 2019](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561): 93; see also [Hurley, 2018a](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)).

Second, externally, as a transnational military alliance, **NATO** **acts as a ‘teaching machine’** in which member and partner states learn the value of WPS as a ‘military tool’ through socialisation with each other ([Wright et al., 2019](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561); see also [Enloe, 1981](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)). This means **perpetuating** an understanding of WPS as a means to support operational effectiveness through ‘**the role of masculinist protector which reinforces** **hegemonic militaristic**, masculine **ideals** and norms’ ([Wright et al., 2019](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561): 34). This patriarchal logic **puts** ‘**women** and children, **in a subordinate position** **of dependence and obedience’** **to justify** the waging of **war** ([Young, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561): 2), for example, **NATO’s** **intervention** in Afghanistan ([Wright, 2019](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)). It is **reinforced through** the stories **NATO** tells internally about its WPS engagement ([Hurley, 2018b](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)) and externally in **public diplomacy** ([Wright, 2019](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)) and to support partnerships with other states but also celebrities ([Wright and Bergman Rosamond, 2021](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00108367221084561)) and now civil society. Thus, **interrogating** civil society **perceptions of NATO** in this context **adds** an additional dimension to **understanding how NATO seeks to legitimise itself** as a WPS actor, further constituting its role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.

#### Their focus on NATO security cooperation and governance justifies further interventionism in the name of a greater global good

Ruohonen 14 (Anna Ruohonen, Master’s thesis for University of Lapland, Spring 2014, “Gendering NATO – A Feminist Analysis Of a Military Organization”, Lauda, <https://lauda.ulapland.fi/handle/10024/61130> )//kpt

2.3. Gender, Development, Security

NATO uses feminist rhetoric of women’s rights, and that rhetoric of women’s rights is used simultaneously with the rhetoric of peace and stability. The **adaptation of feminist rhetoric** is misleading in that sense that it is **used** more **as a justification** **of the operation** than it is used for helping the women in the country in question. As the examples show, the aim is rather promoting peace, good governance and development than improving the conditions in targeted country. Johanna Valenius discusses peacekeeping as her object of study in the United Nations. According to the UN, peacekeeping today has evolved and expanded from the peacekeeping of the first forty years of the UN: “while it once emphasized monitoring and observing by military personnel, peacekeeping today can include many components, among them military, civilian police, civil affairs, elections, refugee return, humanitarian relief, demining, nation-building and human rights”. According to NATO’s definition of crisis management (NATO 2012), the only difference between the two is the military component, which can be done under the name of crisis management but not under UN’s definition of peacekeeping. In case of NATO, Afghanistan is a place where the purpose of the military is twofold: it is supposed to engage with ‘the war on terror’ simultaneously when it engages with peacekeeping efforts. This relationship between war and **peace promotion is paradoxical to the organization** but also for the people “attacked” or “protected” by the forces (Kronsell 2012, 3)

Engaging women in security work, reconstruction and stabilization is central to achieving international objectives in Afghanistan (Publication 5, 3).

Women remain nonetheless too often excluded from taking part in maintaining, restoring, and defending stability. Their victimisation in conflict situation and **marginalisation in peace** building efforts continue to have **profound impact on** global **security** (Text 4).

Gender issues have been on the peacekeeping/crisis management agenda approximately three decades. It seems that when military conflicts and crises become more and more complex, more is required from international crisis management to transform and work effectively. As a result of Resolution 1325, states and militaries have implemented gender policies in the name of efficiency, which has very often led to an essentialist notion of sex and gender (DeGroot 2001; Valenius 2007b; Simic 2010). According to Elina Penttinen, the need for a more comprehensive approach in security stems from the situation during the Kosovo intervention when NATO had to take on a number of humanitarian tasks that they were not prepared for in advance (Penttinen 2013, 49).

To place the gender policy agenda in a wider perspective is to valuate it in relation to the aims of state building and reconstruction more generally. According to Jens Stilhoff Sörensen, the **global liberal governance** **and state building contribute to** **social** and spatial **fragmentation**, not to reconciliation and re-integration. It does so by dismantling previously existing frameworks and introducing market relations, where the state has limited instruments for attracting cross-sectarian loyalty, and through divisive biopolitics in both “soft” measures, like promoting civil society (Sörnesen 2012, 49). **Liberalism** **appears** as an ethos of government that aims **to govern** **by promoting freedom**, and that freedom is conceptualized in certain ways. The **rhetoric** is not statecentric, but **takes** **people** **as** its **objective**. The process is not to manage the risks on an individual level, but **by securing** the **people most identifiable as civilian** population, **women** **and children**. In the case of NATO, women and children **are** **considered** as **objects**. I will return to the “womenandchildren” in the following paragraph. According to Linnèa Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, the problem of **intervention** **cannot** **be divorced from** its external **political origins** (Gelot and Söderbaum 2012, 131). Global interventions by international actors are **justified in the name of** the “**global** **good**”. For example in Afghanistan, humanitarian intervention is presented not only as a way of ending lethal conflict, but also as a means of “getting politics right” in the aftermath of war (Gelot and Söderbaum 2012, 132). Gelot and Söderbaum claim that the fundamental problem of this is that ‘the **global good’** is **often** taken as **synonymous** **with** “the **liberal peace**” **or** as **neoliberal “good governance**”, and the **supposed fruits of intervention** (stable/constitutional rule, macroeconomic stability, “good governance”, law and order) are **connected** **with the neoliberal project** (Gelot and Söderbaum 2012, 132–133).

The visit underlined the fundamental principle that the protection of human rights – including women’s rights –represents an essential driver toward lasting stability in Afghanistan (News No. 8).

### Security K – Anarchy Alt

#### The alternative is the indigenous/neolithic model

Willson 13, Humanities PhD New College San Francisco (S. Brain, JD, American University, “Developing Nonviolent Bioregional Revolutionary Strategies,” http://www.brianwillson.com/developing-nonviolent-bioregional-revolutionary-strategies/)

Industrial civilization is on a collision course with life itself. Facilitating its collapse is a deserved and welcomed correction, long overdue. Collapse is inevitable whether we seek to facilitate it or not. Nonetheless, whatever we do, industrial civilization, based as it is on mining and burning finite and polluting fossil fuels, cannot last because it is destroying the ecosystem and the basis of local, cooperative life itself. It knows no limits in a physically finite world and thus is unsustainable. And the numbers of our human species on earth, which have proliferated from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 7 billion today, is the consequence of mindlessly eating oil – tractors, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides – while destroying human culture in the process. Our food system itself is not sustainable. Dramatic die-off is part of the inevitable correction in the very near future, whether we like it or not. Human and political culture has become totally subservient to a near religion of economics and market forces. Technologies are never neutral, with some being seriously detrimental. Technologies come with an intrinsic character representing the purposes and values of the prevailing political economy that births it. The Industrialism process itself is traumatic. It is likely that only when we experience an apprenticeship in nature can we be trusted with machines, especially when they capital intensive & complicated. The nation-state, intertwined more than ever with corporate industrialism, will always come to its aid and rescue. Withdrawal of popular support enables new imagination and energy for re-creating local human food sufficient communities conforming with bioregional limits. II. The United States of America is irredeemable and unreformable, a Pretend Society. The USA as a nation state, as a recent culture, is irredeemable, unreformable, an anti-democratic, vertical, over-sized imperial unmanageable monster, sustained by the obedience and cooperation, even if reluctant, of the vast majority of its non-autonomous population. Virtually all of us are complicit in this imperial plunder even as many of us are increasingly repulsed by it and speak out against it. Lofty rhetoric has conditioned us to believe in our national exceptionalism, despite it being dramatically at odds with the empirically revealed pattern of our plundering cultural behavior totally dependent upon outsourcing the pain and suffering elsewhere. We cling to living a life based on the social myth of US America being committed to justice for all, even as we increasingly know this has always served as a cover for the social secret that the US is committed to prosperity for a minority thru expansion at ANY cost. Our Eurocentric origins have been built on an extraordinary and forceful but rationalized dispossession of hundreds of Indigenous nations (a genocide) assuring acquisition of free land, murdering millions with total impunity. This still unaddressed crime against humanity assured that our eyes themselves are the wool. Our addiction to the comfort and convenience brought to us by centuries of forceful theft of land, labor, and resources is very difficult to break, as with any addiction. However, our survival, and healing, requires a commitment to recovery of our humanity, ceasing our obedience to the national state. This is the (r)evolution begging us. Original wool is in our eyes: Eurocentric values were established with the invasion by Columbus: Cruelty never before seen, nor heard of, nor read of – Bartolome de las Casas describing the behavior of the Spaniards inflicted on the Indigenous of the West Indies in the 1500s. In fact the Indigenous had no vocabulary words to describe the behavior inflicted on them (A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, 1552). Eurocentric racism (hatred driven by fear) and arrogant religious ethnocentrism (self-righteous superiority) have never been honestly addressed or overcome. Thus, our foundational values and behaviors, if not radically transformed from arrogance to caring, will prove fatal to our modern species. Wool has remained uncleansed from our eyes: I personally discovered the continued vigorous U.S. application of the “Columbus Enterprise” in Viet Nam, discovering that Viet Nam was no aberration after learning of more than 500 previous US military interventions beginning in the late 1790s. Our business is killing, and business is good was a slogan painted on the front of a 9th Infantry Division helicopter in Viet Nam’s Mekong Delta in 1969. We, not the Indigenous, were and remain the savages. The US has been built on three genocides: violent and arrogant dispossession of hundreds of Indigenous nations in North America (Genocide #1), and in Africa (Genocide #2), stealing land and labor, respectively, with total impunity, murdering and maiming millions, amounting to genocide. It is morally unsustainable, now ecologically, politically, economically, and socially unsustainable as well. Further, in the 20th Century, the Republic of the US intervened several hundred times in well over a hundred nations stealing resources and labor, while imposing US-friendly markets, killing millions, impoverishing perhaps billions (Genocide #3). Since 1798, the US military forces have militarily intervened over 560 times in dozens of nations, nearly 400 of which have occurred since World War II. And since WWII, the US has bombed 28 countries, while covertly intervening thousands of times in the majority of nations on the earth. It is not helpful to continue believing in the social myth that the USA is a society committed to justice for all , in fact a convenient mask (since our origins) of our social secret being a society committed to prosperity for a few through expansion at ANY cost. (See William Appleman Williams). Always possessing oligarchic tendencies, it is now an outright corrupt corporatocracy owned lock stock and barrel by big money made obscenely rich from war making with our consent, even if reluctant. The Cold War and its nuclear and conventional arms race with the exaggerated “red menace”, was an insidious cover for a war preserving the Haves from the Have-Nots, in effect, ironically preserving a western, consumptive way of life that itself is killing us. Pretty amazing! Our way of life has produced so much carbon in the water, soil, and atmosphere, that it may in the end be equivalent to having caused nuclear winter. The war OF wholesale terror on retail terror has replaced the “red menace” as the rhetorical justification for the continued imperial plunder of the earth and the riches it brings to the military-industrial-intelligence-congressional-executive-information complex. Our cooperation with and addiction to the American Way Of Life provides the political energy that guarantees continuation of U.S. polices of imperial plunder. III. The American Way Of Life (AWOL), and the Western Way of Life in general, is the most dangerous force that exists on the earth. Our insatiable consumption patterns on a finite earth, enabled by but a one-century blip in burning energy efficient liquid fossil fuels, have made virtually all of us addicted to our way of life as we have been conditioned to be in denial about the egregious consequences outsourced outside our view or feeling fields. Of course, this trend began 2 centuries earlier with the advent of the industrial revolution. With 4.6% of the world’s population, we consume anywhere from 25% to nearly half the world’s resources. This kind of theft can only occur by force or its threat, justifying it with noble sounding rhetoric, over and over and over. Our insatiable individual and collective human demands for energy inputs originating from outside our bioregions, furnish the political-economic profit motives for the energy extractors, which in turn own the political process obsessed with preserving “national (in)security”, e.g., maintaining a very class-based life of affluence and comfort for a minority of the world’s people. This, in turn, requires a huge military to assure control of resources for our use, protecting corporate plunder, and to eliminate perceived threats from competing political agendas. The U.S. War department’s policy of “full spectrum dominance” is intended to control the world’s seas, airspaces, land bases, outer spaces, our “inner” mental spaces, and cyberspaces. Resources everywhere are constantly needed to supply our delusional modern life demands on a finite planet as the system seeks to dumb us down ever more. Thus, we are terribly complicit in the current severe dilemmas coming to a head due to (1) climate instability largely caused by mindless human activities; (2) from our dependence upon national currencies; and (3) dependence upon rapidly depleting finite resources. We have become addicts in a classical sense. Recovery requires a deep psychological, spiritual, and physical commitment to break our addiction to materialism, as we embark on a radical healing journey, individually and collectively, where less and local becomes a mantra, as does sharing and caring, I call it the Neolithic or Indigenous model. Sharing and caring replace individualism and competition. Therefore, A Radical Prescription Understanding these facts requires a radical paradigmatic shift in our thinking and behavior, equivalent to an evolutionary shift in our epistemology where our knowledge/thinking framework shifts: arrogant separateness from and domination over nature (ending a post-Ice Age 10,000 year cycle of thought structure among moderns) morphs to integration with nature, i.e., an eco-consciousness felt deeply in the viscera, more powerful than a cognitive idea. Thus, we re-discover ancient, archetypal Indigenous thought patterns. It requires creative disobedience to and strategic noncooperation with the prevailing political economy, while re-constructing locally reliant communities patterned on instructive models of historic Indigenous and Neolithic villages.

#### Voluntary agreements solve all relevant concerns

Springer, 17—University of Victoria (Simon, “The limits to Marx: David Harvey and the condition of postfraternity,” Dialogues in Human Geography 2017, Vol. 7(3) 280–294, dml)

Stretching the horizontal vision: Federation beyond hierarchy and authority Life already shows in which direction the change will be made. Not in increasing the powers of the State, but in resorting to free organization and free federation in all those branches which are now considered as attributes of the State. —Peter Kropotkin (2002 [1887]: 68–69) The second major claim that Harvey draws from Barcelona is that anarchism lacks the ability ‘to stretch the vision of political activism from local to far broader geographical scales’ (2017: 242). Harvey means to warn us of what he elsewhere refers to as the ‘fetishism of organizational preference’ (2012a: 7), which he assumes to be a mistaken prioritization of the method of organizing over its desired outcome. To Harvey, such a prefigurative politics, which is the here and now of anarchism (Ince, 2012; Springer, 2012), supposedly prevents anarchists from being able to plan major infrastructures, manage environmental concerns, or service transport and communication networks. Of course, I already provide a partial answer to this in my original essay (Springer, 2014d), where I point to Colin Ward’s (2004) example of postal services functioning not through a central world authority, but via voluntary agreements. Kropotkin (2002 [1887]) makes the same point with respect to the independent federation of European railways in his time. Harvey attempts to preempt being called out on the inaccuracy of his claim by stating that ‘anarchist town planners (including Bookchin) understood this problem but their work is largely ignored within the anarchist movement’ (2017: 242–3). To say this work is overlooked only reveals Harvey’s limited knowledge of the literature and the scant attention he pays to anarchist writings, and particularly to anarchosyndicalism, anarchism’s oldest answer to industrial relations wherein worker-managed production systems are networked into a stateless socialist society (Rocker, 2004 [1938]; Solidarity Federation, 2012). Harvey knows of Bookchin’s libertarian municipalism, but he doesn’t take it seriously. Demonstrating the depths of his state-centric imagination, he lampoons it by saying ‘if it looks like a state, and feels like a state, and quacks like a state, then it’s a state’ (Harvey, 2012c: n.p.). Elsewhere, he suggests Bookchin’s idea about assemblies is ‘well worth elaborating as part of a radical anti-capitalist agenda’ (Harvey, 2012a: 85), yet instead of actually doing so, Harvey falls back on a centralization argument, where the state takes center stage. Perhaps the most confounding statement in Harvey’s entire essay is that the dialectic between decentralization and centralization is one of the most important contradictions within capital ... and I wish all those, like Springer, who advocate decentralization as if it is an unalloyed good would look more closely at its consequences and contradictions. Given that I dedicate an entire essay to this exact question (Springer, 2014b), it’s unfortunate that Harvey asks me to listen when he clearly doesn’t do so himself. Far from treating decentralization as a pure virtue, I attempt to work through what a progressive, anarchist view of decentralized horizontalism actually means. In the process, I identify the contradictions that lurk within Harvey’s hierarchical political outlook, arguing that he ‘poisons the well of decentralization by pre-emptively refusing its possibilities and positioning every movement towards a more autonomous political arrangement as a device that somehow necessarily greases the rails for a neoliberal future’ (Springer, 2014b: 403). Harvey dismisses anarchism’s coupling of decentralization with anti-capitalism precisely because Marxism cannot accommodate prefigurative politics, treating horizontality as a charming, but ultimately limited if not futile, distraction from realizing the bigger revolutionary picture. Horizontalism is consequently positioned as something that might happen after the promised great withering of the state, and so we can see plainly that the ‘stages of history’ is not a caricature, but an unacknowledged specter that continues to haunt the Marxist project. Failing to understand this particular limit to Marxism, Harvey invokes the idea that ‘it is difficult if not impossible ... to take consensual horizontality to much larger scales’ and that it is impossible to proceed without setting up ‘confederal’ or ‘nested’ (which means inevitably hierarchical in my view but then this too may just be semantics) structures of decision-making that entail[s] serious adjustments in organized thinking as well as forms of institutionalized governance. (2017: 248) I’ve already offered a lengthy response, where I make clear that the relationship between scale and hierarchy is not mere semantics (Springer, 2014b), yet Harvey is content to ignore the whole critique of the scalar imagination and the emancipatory politics that flow from a flat ontology (Marston et al., 2005; Woodward et al., 2012). To Harvey it would seem that a caricature of authority is a better reply than thinking through how a rhizomic politics can indeed ‘stretch the vision of political activism’ (2017: 242), and how it does so without resorting to the hierarchical politics that are necessarily implied by scalar thinking. Federalism is, of course, the long-standing anarchist answer to hierarchy (Proudhon, 1980 [1863]; Ward, 2011), yet Harvey apparently can’t be bothered to work through their differences. Instead of a serious discussion of authority, we get nuggets like I certainly would not welcome a pilot landing at JFK proclaiming that as a good anarchist she does not accept the legitimacy of the air traffic controllers’ authority and that she proposes to disregard all aviation rules in the landing process. (Harvey, 2017: 239) While Harvey assumes he has stumbled upon the ultimate trump card, he simply confuses specialist knowledge with authority. This is a question that Bakunin (2010 [1882]: 24) answered long ago when he wrote: In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that of the architect or the engineer. For such or such special knowledge I apply to such or such a savant. But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor savant to impose his authority upon me. I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticism and censure. This isn’t good enough for Harvey though, and he routinely ridicules horizontal organization, using extreme examples like nuclear power plants and air traffic control to make his case. For example, in a lecture delivered at London School of Economics (LSE), he argued that horizontalism is impractical because there are many aspects of contemporary life that are now organized in what you might call ‘tightly-coupled systems’ where you need command and control structures. I wouldn’t want my anarchist friends to be in charge of a nuclear power station. (Harvey, 2012b: n.p.) Yet since horizontal organizational tactics in anarchism are usually part of a broader class struggle (Solidarity Federation, 2012), it is absurd to suggest that there would ever be a time where anarchists would enter into assembly—federated or otherwise—during a nuclear meltdown or the complex operation of landing an airplane. Indeed, without a discernable hierarchy to oppose, ‘in what possible circumstance would collective struggle be necessary during such risky periods?’ (fkshultze, 2013). Nonetheless, mutual aid in times of disaster—both natural and manufactured—is a recurrent human theme, where people regularly come together and organize themselves effectively around an ensuing crisis in the complete absence of a centralized authority. We saw this with spectacular effect in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, where the state was more concerned with restoring ‘law and order’ and criminalizing desperate people than it was with relief and rescue efforts. In response to the state’s failure, people instead helped themselves and each other, particularly through the formation of the Common Ground Collective. For Kropotkin (2008 [1902]: 137), the tendency for mutual aid ‘has so remote an origin, and is so deeply interwoven with all the past evolution of the human race, that it has been maintained ... notwithstanding all vicissitudes of history’.

### Security K – FW

#### “Fair rules” are a bureaucratic utopia that reinforces state surveillance and stifles creativity.

David Graeber 15, arguably the most important anthropologist of the 21st century, American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist, leading figure in Occupy Wall Street credited with coining the phrase “We are the 99 Percent,” assistant professor and associate professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007, “The Utopia of Rules, or Why We Really Love Bureaucracy After All,” Ch. 3 of The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy, p. 201–205,

Over the last thirty or forty years, anti-authoritarians around the world have been working on creating new, and more effective, modes of direct democracy—ones that might operate without any need for a bureaucracy of violence to enforce them. I’ve written about these efforts extensively elsewhere. A lot of progress has been made. But those working on such projects often find themselves having to deal with exactly this sort of horror of “arbitrary” power. Part of the work of developing new forms of consensus process, for example, is to create institutional forms that encourage, rather than inhibit, improvisation and creativity. As activists sometimes put it: in most circumstances, if you bring together a crowd of people, that crowd will, as a group, behave less intelligently, and less creatively, than any single member of the crowd is likely to do if on their own. Activist decision-making process is, instead, designed to make that crowd smarter and more imaginative than any individual participant.

It is indeed possible to do this, but it takes a lot of work. And the larger the group, the more formal mechanisms have to be put in place. The single most important essay in this whole activist tradition is called “The Tyranny of Structurelessness,”170 written in the 1970s by Jo Freeman, about organizational crises that occurred in early feminist consciousness-raising circles when those groups began to attain a certain size. Freeman observed that such groups always started out with a kind of rough-and-ready anarchism, an assumption that there was no need for any formal, parliamentary rules-of-order type mechanisms at all. People would just sit down in a sisterly manner and work things out. And this was, indeed, what happened at first. However, as soon as the groups grew to over, say, twenty people, informal cliques invariably began to emerge, and small groups of friends or allies began controlling information, setting agendas, and wielding power in all sorts of subtle ways. Freeman proposed a number of different formal mechanisms that might be employed to counteract this effect, but for present purposes, the specifics don’t really matter. Suffice it to say that what is now referred to as “formal consensus process” largely emerges from the crisis Freeman described, and the debate her intervention set off.

What I do want to bring attention to is that almost everyone who is not emerging from an explicitly anti-authoritarian position—and no insignificant number even of those who are—completely misread Freeman’s essay, and interpret it not as a plea for formal mechanisms to ensure equality, but as a plea for more transparent hierarchy. Leninists are notorious for this sort of thing, but Liberals are just as bad. I can’t tell you how many arguments I’ve had about this. They always go exactly the same way. First, Freeman’s argument about the formation of cliques and invisible power structures is taken as an argument that any group of over twenty people will always have to have cliques, power structures, and people in authority. The next step is to insist that if you want to minimize the power of such cliques, or any deleterious effects those power structures might have, the only way to do so is to institutionalize them: to take the de facto cabal and turn them into a central committee (or, since that term now has a bad history, usually they say a coordinating committee, or a steering committee, or something of that sort.) One needs to get power out of the shadows—to formalize the process, make up rules, hold elections, specify exactly what the cabal is allowed to do and what it’s not. In this way, at least, power will be made transparent and “accountable.” (Notice that word again. It comes from accountancy procedures.) It won’t in any sense be arbitrary.

From a practical, activist perspective, this prescription is obviously ridiculous. It is far easier to limit the degree to which informal cliques can wield effective power by granting them no formal status at all, and therefore no legitimacy; whatever “formal accountability structures” it is imagined will contain the cliques-now-turned-committees can only be far less effective in this regard, not least because they end up legitimating and hence massively increasing the differential access to information which allows some in otherwise egalitarian groups to have greater power to begin with. As I pointed out in the first essay, structures of transparency inevitably, as I’ve described, begin to become structures of stupidity as soon as that takes place.

So say one argues this point, and the critic concedes it (which usually they have to because it’s pretty much common sense). If so, the next line of defense is generally aesthetic: the critic will insist it’s simply distasteful to have structures of real power that are not recognized and that can, even if they entirely lack any degree of violent enforcement, be considered arbitrary. Usually, one’s interlocutor won’t go so far as actually admitting their objections are aesthetic. Usually they will frame their arguments in moral terms. But occasionally, you will find some honest enough to admit that’s what’s going on. I well remember having an Occupy Wall Street-sponsored debate in Central Park (I’m sure it’s recorded somewhere) with Norman Finkelstein—a brilliant and altogether admirable activist, who had come of age with the Civil Rights Movement and still saw groups like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as his inspiration. At this debate, Finkelstein stated the matter outright. Maybe it’s true, he admitted, that the best way to keep such cliques from attaining too much power is to maintain a principle that they should not exist. But as long as such cliques are allowed to exist without being formally acknowledged and regulated, you’re maintaining a system that says it’s okay to be governed, even a tiny bit, from the shadows. It might not be that much of a practical problem. You might well be right that formally recognizing their existence might actually end up creating less overall freedom than leaving well enough alone. But in the final analysis, I just find the idea of being governed from the shadows, in any sense, distasteful.

In such arguments, we are witnessing a direct clash between two different forms of materialized utopianism: on the one hand, an anti-authoritarianism that, in its emphasis on creative synthesis and improvisation, sees freedom basically in terms of play, and on the other, a tacit republicanism that sees freedom ultimately as the ability to reduce all forms of power to a set of clear and transparent rules.

For the last two hundred years, in Europe and North America—and increasingly, elsewhere—that latter, bureaucratized notion of freedom has tended to hold sway. New institutional arrangements that operate by rules so strict and predictable they essentially disappear, so that one doesn’t even know what they are (such as the physical or electronic post offices with which I began) tend to be put forward as platforms for human freedom that emerge from the very technical contingencies of running efficient structures of power. These arrangements seem to preserve the positive elements of play while somehow circumventing its more disturbing potentials.

But time and again, we have seen the same results. Whether motivated by a faith in “rationality” or a fear of arbitrary power, the end result of this bureaucratized notion of freedom is to move toward the dream of a world where play has been limited entirely—or, at best, boxed away in some remote location far from any serious, consequential human endeavor—while every aspect of life is reduced to some kind of elaborate, rule-bound game. It’s not that such a vision lacks appeal. Who hasn’t dreamed of a world where everyone knows the rules, everyone plays by the rules, and—even more—where people who play by the rules can actually still win? The problem is that this is just as much a utopian fantasy as a world of absolute free play would be. It will always remain a glimmering illusion that dissolves away as soon as we touch it.

Such illusions are not always bad things. One could make a case that most of the greatest human accomplishments were the result of such quixotic pursuits. But in this particular case, and in this larger political-economic context, where bureaucracy has been the primary means by which a tiny percentage of the population extracts wealth from the rest of us, they have created a situation where the pursuit of freedom from arbitrary power simply ends up producing more arbitrary power, and as a result, regulations choke existence, armed guards and surveillance cameras appear everywhere, science and creativity are smothered, and all of us end up finding increasing percentages of our day taken up in the filling out of forms.

### Security K – AT: Perm

#### The perm fails

Simon Springer 12, professor of geography at the University of Victoria, “Anarchism! Or What Geography Ought To Be,” Antipode Vol. 44(5) pg. 1613

That radical geography retains a decidedly statist focus perhaps also betrays the colonial origins of the discipline itself and a hesitation in breaking from old disciplining habits. Yet the contemporary nation-state, following Anderson (1991) and Billig (1995), must be understood as a smaller-scale replica of the colonial state. Although differing in their diffusion and distribution across space, both national and colonial state power express the same violent principles of a privileged few wielding influence over others, and imposing a singular identity upon antecedent ways of imagining belonging. Marx was not oblivious to this critique, yet here again he advanced a utilitarian ideal. As capitalism spread around the globe, it gave rise to powerful resistance movements by oppressed workers and peasants—led by vanguards—which Marx believed would eventually engender the transcendence of capitalism. In particular instances Marx supported nationalist struggles, viewing nationalism as another “stage in development” towards a future workers’ internationalism (Lewis 2000). Yet from an anarchist perspective it is hard to see the emancipatory end when the means are shot through with violence. What “national liberation” actually represents is the trading of one set of elites for another, and thus one form of colonialism for another. While the territorial expression has been scaled down, the underlying logic remains unchanged. Just as the colonial state sought and was frequently able to impose a monopoly on violence, the struggle to create the nation-state is likewise a struggle for the monopoly of violence (Harris 2004). What is created in both instances—a colonial or national state— is itself a means of violence. In recognizing this congruency—notwithstanding Hart’s (2008:680) so-called “properly post-colonial frame of understanding” that continues to privilege the state—to be “post-colonial” in any meaningful sense is to also be “post-statist” or anarchic, wherein the hierarchies, order, authority, and violence upon which these parallel state projects have been built are rejected outright. Moreover, internationalism by definition can never actually transcend the state; instead it continues to presuppose and assume nations. By calling for trans- geographical co-operation between nations, Marx’s internationalism fails to move beyond the notion of the nation-state as the foundational unit of belonging. Why then has contemporary radical geography not developed an “anti-colonial imagination” that rises to the post-statist challenge that Anderson (2005) argues such a vision actually demands? Reclus and Kropotkin demonstrated long ago that geography lends itself well to emancipatory ideas, and “it was no accident that two of the major anarchists of the late Nineteenth Century were also geographers” (Ward 2010:209). There exists an extraordinary latent potential within contemporary radical geography to become even more radical in its critiques, and thus more liberationist in its focus by embracing an anarchist ethos. Anarchism is able to recognize capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, neoliberalism, militarism, nationalism, classism, racism, ethnocentrism, Orientalism, sexism, genderism, ageism, ableism, speciesism, carnism, homophobia, transphobia, sovereignty and the state as interlocking systems of domination. The mutually reinforcing composition of these various dimensions of “archy” consequently means that to uncritically exempt one from interrogation, is to perpetuate this omnicidal conglomeration as a whole. Unlike the circumscriptions of Marxian geography, the promise of anarchist geographies rests precisely in their ability to think integrally and therein refuse to assign priority to any one of the multiple dominating apparatuses, as all are irreducible to one another (Brown 1996). This means that no one struggle can wait on any other. It’s all or nothing, and the a priori privilege of the workers, the vanguards, or any other class over others is to be rejected on the basis of its incipient hierarchy.

#### It causes bloodshed

Springer et al. 12**.** Simon Springer, professor of geography at the University of Victoria (Canada), Anthony Ince, professor of geographical and earth sciences at the University of Glasgow, Jenny Pickerill, professor of geography the University of Leicester (UK), Gavin Brown, professor of geography the University of Leicester (UK), and Adam J. Barker, professor of geography the University of Leicester (UK), “Reanimating Anarchist Geographies: A New Burst of Colour,” Antipode Vol. 44 No. 5 2012 pg. 1598

Social transformation is, of course, **necessarily a spatial project**, and **a spatial dimension** to the **effective critique of existing structures** is an **important element** of **imagining** and **forging spaces** for new ones. Accordingly, we remain **deeply cynical** of those ostensibly **“radical” views** that **leave the prescriptions** and **authority** of the state firmly **intact**. Without **appreciating the infinite possibilities** that actually exist if we only had the **collective courage** and **freedom to explore them**, we are left with an **all too limited vision** of the **geographical horizons** of **human organization**. We must similarly remain attentive to the idea that **adaptations and abuses of state power** are intrinsic not only to neoliberalism and capitalism more generally (Peck 2001), **but also to Marxism in its traditional sense**. In the face of **the sheer enormity of the bloodshed** that came with **communist projects** in the **former Soviet Union**, **Maoist China**, and **Pol Pot’s Cambodia**, and the **conflict**, **othering**, and **violence** that is facilitated by a **Westphalian system of sovereign rule**, we long for and are **actively committed** to procuring **alternative socio-spatial arrangements** wherein people are **liberated** from **all forms of domination** and are **free to collectively make of themselves** **what they will**. While we are **keen to critique Marxist-Leninism** in all its various guises, we acknowledge that there are **heterodox Marxists** working with **more autonomist** and **libertarian ideas** that share similar concerns and are **far less antithetical to anarchist approaches**. At the same time, we recognize that it is incorrect to suggest— as post-left anarchists like Fredy Perlman (1983) have argued—that if we simply choose to act differently then society will magically transform into a post-capitalist, post-statist world. Anarchist thinkers have long interrogated complex matrices of control and surveillance, highlighting the ways in which the agents of state and capital converge to produce powerful regimes of containment or straightforward obliteration of their political opponents (Graham 2005, 2009; Gue ́rin 2005; Marshall 1992; Woodcock 2004). Indeed, Daniel Gue ́rin’s (2010 [1936]) careful tracing of the synergies between the rise of European fascism in the 1930s and the organizational and disciplinary logic of the capitalist state can be read as a powerful warning from history in the current context of recession, unrest, and the re-emergence of the far right.

Thus, anarchist approaches to understanding and acting in society operate in a **tension between** an **assertion of peoples’ agency** to **collectively self-manage their affairs** on the one hand, and **the everyday matrices of power** that constrain **autonomy**, **solidarity** and **equality** on the other. However, anarchism is also a philosophy that is **healthily sceptical** of analysis for its own sake, and combines its **powerful critique of capital** and authority with a **creative and decentralized mode of praxis**. So while we recognize the importance of **utopian thought**, we are **not content to dwell exclusively** in the realm of ideas, and advocate for the **importance of direct action** in changing for the better the **material conditions** of our own lives as well as the lives of others (Graeber 2009). Notwithstanding the now-cliche ́d refrain that anarchists were at the creative centre of the movements against neoliberal globalisation around the turn of the twenty-first century, anarchist thought and action has **profoundly influenced** contemporary society in a **much more long-term and subcutaneous sense**. The proliferation of **wikis**, **peer-to-peer file-sharing** and **open-source software**; the **continued popularity** of the **co-operative movement**, **tenants’ associations** and **trade** and **credit unions**; and a host of **small- scale mutual aid groups**, **networks** and **initiatives**—these have, all to varying extents, been **pioneered**, **inspired or run by anarchists**. Our perception of anarchism’s role in the world is, however, **in direct proportion** to our understanding of **what anarchism is** and **where (or how) it takes place**. Although at times it may appear that anarchism is chiefly (or solely) manifested in occasional spectacular riots on the streets of Athens, Prague, London and Seattle, papers in this special issue indicate that anarchism is a **philosophy of everyday life**, ingrained in its **practitioners as a tool for survival**, **wellbeing** and **social change**. It is worth noting that, perhaps precisely due to the legacy of Reclus and Kropotkin, anarchist geographers have tended to shy away from engaging with the more insurrectionary approaches to anarchism, where instead anarchism has been understood as a **living breathing process** that is **acutely implicated in our shared histories**, our **present circumstances**, and **our collective futures**. In this special issue, a broad understanding of anarchism is deployed to demonstrate how it—much like other political philosophies—is a multi-vocal and developing terrain, contested both from within and without.

### Security K AT: Squo Solves/AFF good

#### The system is unsustainable

Rana Dasgupta 18, Distinguished Visiting Lecturer at Brown, 4/5/2018, “The demise of the nation state,” https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/apr/05/demise-of-the-nation-state-rana-dasgupta

What is happening to national politics? Every day in the US, events further exceed the imaginations of absurdist novelists and comedians; politics in the UK still shows few signs of recovery after the “national nervous breakdown” of Brexit. France “narrowly escaped a heart attack” in last year’s elections, but the country’s leading daily feels this has done little to alter the “accelerated decomposition” of the political system. In neighbouring Spain, El País goes so far as to say that “the rule of law, the democratic system and even the market economy are in doubt”; in Italy, “the collapse of the establishment” in the March elections has even brought talk of a “barbarian arrival”, as if Rome were falling once again. In Germany, meanwhile, neo-fascists are preparing to take up their role as official opposition, introducing anxious volatility into the bastion of European stability.

But the convulsions in national politics are not confined to the west. Exhaustion, hopelessness, the dwindling effectiveness of old ways: these are the themes of politics all across the world. This is why energetic authoritarian “solutions” are currently so popular: distraction by war (Russia, Turkey); ethno-religious “purification” (India, Hungary, Myanmar); the magnification of presidential powers and the corresponding abandonment of civil rights and the rule of law (China, Rwanda, Venezuela, Thailand, the Philippines and many more).

What is the relationship between these various upheavals? We tend to regard them as entirely separate – for, in political life, national solipsism is the rule. In each country, the tendency is to blame “our” history, “our” populists, “our” media, “our” institutions, “our” lousy politicians. And this is understandable, since the organs of modern political consciousness – public education and mass media – emerged in the 19th century from a globe-conquering ideology of unique national destinies. When we discuss “politics”, we refer to what goes on inside sovereign states; everything else is “foreign affairs” or “international relations” – even in this era of global financial and technological integration. We may buy the same products in every country of the world, we may all use Google and Facebook, but political life, curiously, is made of separate stuff and keeps the antique faith of borders.

Yes, there is awareness that similar varieties of populism are erupting in many countries. Several have noted the parallels in style and substance between leaders such as Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi, Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. There is a sense that something is in the air – some coincidence of feeling between places. But this does not get close enough. For there is no coincidence. All countries are today embedded in the same system, which subjects them all to the same pressures: and it is these that are squeezing and warping national political life everywhere. And their effect is quite the opposite – despite the desperate flag-waving – of the oft-remarked “resurgence of the nation state”.

The most momentous development of our era, precisely, is the waning of the nation state: its inability to withstand countervailing 21st-century forces, and its calamitous loss of influence over human circumstance. National political authority is in decline, and, since we do not know any other sort, it feels like the end of the world. This is why a strange brand of apocalyptic nationalism is so widely in vogue. But the current appeal of machismo as political style, the wall-building and xenophobia, the mythology and race theory, the fantastical promises of national restoration – these are not cures, but symptoms of what is slowly revealing itself to all: nation states everywhere are in an advanced state of political and moral decay from which they cannot individually extricate themselves.

Why is this happening? In brief, 20th-century political structures are drowning in a 21st-century ocean of deregulated finance, autonomous technology, religious militancy and great-power rivalry. Meanwhile, the suppressed consequences of 20th-century recklessness in the once-colonised world are erupting, cracking nations into fragments and forcing populations into post-national solidarities: roving tribal militias, ethnic and religious sub-states and super-states. Finally, the old superpowers’ demolition of old ideas of international society – ideas of the “society of nations” that were essential to the way the new world order was envisioned after 1918 – has turned the nation-state system into a lawless gangland; and this is now producing a nihilistic backlash from the ones who have been most terrorised and despoiled.

The result? For increasing numbers of people, our nations and the system of which they are a part now appear unable to offer a plausible, viable future. This is particularly the case as they watch financial elites – and their wealth – increasingly escaping national allegiances altogether. Today’s failure of national political authority, after all, derives in large part from the loss of control over money flows. At the most obvious level, money is being transferred out of national space altogether, into a booming “offshore” zone. These fleeing trillions undermine national communities in real and symbolic ways. They are a cause of national decay, but they are also a result: for nation states have lost their moral aura, which is one of the reasons tax evasion has become an accepted fundament of 21st-century commerce.

More dramatically, great numbers of people are losing all semblance of a national home, and finding themselves pitched into a particular kind of contemporary hell. Seven years after the fall of Gaddafi’s dictatorship, Libya is controlled by two rival governments, each with its own parliament, and by several militia groups fighting to control oil wealth. But Libya is only one of many countries that appear whole only on maps. Since 1989, barely 5% of the world’s wars have taken place between states: national breakdown, not foreign invasion, has caused the vast majority of the 9 million war deaths in that time. And, as we know from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Syria, the ensuing vacuum can suck in firepower from all over the world, destroying conditions for life and spewing shell-shocked refugees in every direction. Nothing advertises the crisis of our nation-state system so well, in fact, as its 65 million refugees – a “new normal” far greater than the “old emergency” (in 1945) of 40 million. The unwillingness even to acknowledge this crisis, meanwhile, is appropriately captured by the contempt for refugees that now drives so much of politics in the rich world.

The crisis was not wholly inevitable. Since 1945, we have actively reduced our world political system to a dangerous mockery of what was designed by US president Woodrow Wilson and many others after the cataclysm of the first world war, and now we are facing the consequences. But we should not leap too quickly into renovation. This system has done far less to deliver human security and dignity than we imagine – in some ways, it has been a colossal failure – and there are good reasons why it is ageing so much more quickly than the empires it replaced.

Even if we wanted to restore what we once had, that moment is gone. The reason the nation state was able to deliver what achievements it did – and in some places they were spectacular – was that there was, for much of the 20th century, an authentic “fit” between politics, economy and information, all of which were organised at a national scale. National governments possessed actual powers to manage modern economic and ideological energies, and to turn them towards human – sometimes almost utopian – ends. But that era is over. After so many decades of globalisation, economics and information have successfully grown beyond the authority of national governments. Today, the distribution of planetary wealth and resources is largely uncontested by any political mechanism.

But to acknowledge this is to acknowledge the end of politics itself. And if we continue to think the administrative system we inherited from our ancestors allows for no innovation, we condemn ourselves to a long period of dwindling political and moral hope. Half a century has been spent building the global system on which we all now depend, and it is here to stay. Without political innovation, global capital and technology will rule us without any kind of democratic consultation, as naturally and indubitably as the rising oceans.

If we wish to rediscover a sense of political purpose in our era of global finance, big data, mass migration and ecological upheaval, we have to imagine political forms capable of operating at that same scale. The current political system must be supplemented with global financial regulations, certainly, and probably transnational political mechanisms, too. That is how we will complete this globalisation of ours, which today stands dangerously unfinished. Its economic and technological systems are dazzling indeed, but in order for it to serve the human community, it must be subordinated to an equally spectacular political infrastructure, which we have not even begun to conceive.

It will be objected, inevitably, that any alternative to the nation-state system is a utopian impossibility. But even the technological accomplishments of the last few decades seemed implausible before they arrived, and there are good reasons to be suspicious of those incumbent authorities who tell us that human beings are incapable of similar grandeur in the political realm. In fact, there have been many moments in history when politics was suddenly expanded to a new, previously inconceivable scale – including the creation of the nation state itself. And – as is becoming clearer every day – the real delusion is the belief that things can carry on as they are.

The first step will be ceasing to pretend that there is no alternative. So let us begin by considering the scale of the current crisis.

Let us start with the west. Europe, of course, invented the nation state: the principle of territorial sovereignty was agreed at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The treaty made large-scale conquest difficult within the continent; instead, European nations expanded into the rest of the world. The dividends of colonial plunder were converted, back home, into strong states with powerful bureaucracies and democratic polities – the template for modern European life.

By the end of 19th century, European nations had acquired uniform attributes still familiar today – in particular, a set of fiercely enforced state monopolies (defence, taxation and law, among others), which gave governments substantial mastery of the national destiny. In return, a moral promise was made to all: the development, spiritual and material, of citizen and nation alike. Spectacular state-run projects in the fields of education, healthcare, welfare and culture arose to substantiate this promise.

The withdrawal of this moral promise over the past four decades has been a shattering metaphysical event in the west, and one that has left populations rummaging around for new things to believe in. For the promise was a major event in the evolution of the western psyche. It was part of a profound theological reorganisation: the French Revolution dethroned not only the monarch, but also God, whose superlative attributes – omniscience and omnipotence – were now absorbed into the institutions of the state itself. The state’s power to develop, liberate and redeem mankind became the foundational secular faith.

During the period of decolonisation that followed the second world war, the European nation-state structure was exported everywhere. But westerners still felt its moral promise with an intensity peculiar to themselves – more so than ever, in fact, after the creation of the welfare state and decades of unprecedented postwar growth. Nostalgia for that golden age of the nation state continues to distort western political debate to this day, but it was built on an improbable coincidence of conditions that will never recur. Very significant was the structure of the postwar state itself, which possessed a historically unique level of control over the domestic economy. Capital could not flow unchecked across borders and foreign currency speculation was negligible compared to today. Governments, in other words, had substantial control over money flows, and if they spoke of changing things, it was because they actually could. The fact that capital was captive meant they Governments could impose historic rates of taxation, which, in an era of record economic growth, allowed them to channel unprecedented energies into national development. For a few decades, state power was monumental – almost divine, indeed – and it created the most secure and equal capitalist societies ever known.

The destruction of state authority over capital has of course been the explicit objective of the financial revolution that defines our present era. As a result, states have been forced to shed social commitments in order to reinvent themselves as custodians of the market. This has drastically diminished national political authority in both real and symbolic ways. Barack Obama in 2013 called inequality “the defining challenge of our time”, but US inequality has risen continually since 1980, without regard for his qualms or those of any other president.

The picture is the same all over the west: the wealth of the richest continues to skyrocket, while post-crisis austerity cripples the social-democratic welfare state. We can all see the growing fury at governments that refuse to fulfil their old moral promise – but it is most probable that they no longer can. Western governments possess nothing like their previous command over national economic life, and if they continue to promise fundamental change, it is now at the level of PR and wish fulfilment.

There is every reason to believe that the next stage of the techno-financial revolution will be even more disastrous for national political authority. This will arise as the natural continuation of existing technological processes, which promise new, algorithmic kinds of governance to further undermine the political variety. Big data companies (Google, Facebook etc) have already assumed many functions previously associated with the state, from cartography to surveillance. Now they are the primary gatekeepers of social reality: membership of these systems is a new, corporate, de-territorialised form of citizenship, antagonistic at every level to the national kind. And, as the growth of digital currencies shows, new technologies will emerge to replace the other fundamental functions of the nation state. The libertarian dream – whereby antique bureaucracies succumb to pristine hi-tech corporate systems, which then take over the management of all life and resources – is a more likely vision for the future than any fantasy of a return to social democracy.

Governments controlled by outside forces and possessing only partial influence over national affairs: this has always been so in the world’s poorest countries. But in the west, it feels like a terrifying return to primitive vulnerability. The assault on political authority is not a merely “economic” or “technological” event. It is an epochal upheaval, which leaves western populations shattered and bereft. There are outbreaks of irrational rage, especially against immigrants, the appointed scapegoats for much deeper forms of national contamination. The idea of the western nation as a universal home collapses, and transnational tribal identities grow up as a refuge: white supremacists and radical Islamists alike take up arms against contamination and corruption.

The stakes could not be higher. So it is easy to see why western governments are so desperate to prove what everyone doubts: that they are still in control. It is not merely Donald Trump’s personality that causes him to act like a sociopathic CEO. The era of globalisation has seen consistent attempts by US presidents to enhance the authority of the executive, but they are never enough. Trump’s office can never have the level of mastery over American life that Kennedy’s did, so he is obliged to fake it. He cannot make America great again, but he does have Twitter, through which he can establish a lone-gun personality cult – blaming women, leftists and brown people for the state’s impotence. He cannot heal America’s social divisions, but he still controls the security apparatus, which can be deployed to help him look “tough” – declaring war on crime, deporting foreigners, hardening borders. He cannot put more money into the hands of the poor who voted for him, but he can hand out mythological currency instead; even his poorest voters, after all, possess one significant asset – US citizenship – whose value he can “talk up”, as he previously talked up casinos and hotels. Like Putin or Orbán, Trump imbues citizenship with new martial power, and makes a big show of withholding it from people who want it: what is scarcer, obviously, is more precious. Citizens who have nothing are persuaded that they have a lot.

These strategies are ugly, but they cannot simply be blamed on a few bad actors. The predicament is this: political authority is running on empty, and leaders are unable to deliver meaningful material change. Instead, they must arouse and deploy powerful feelings: hatred of foreigners and internal enemies, for instance, or the euphoria of meaningless military exploits (Putin’s annexation of Crimea raised the hugely popular prospect of general Tsarist revival).

But let us not imagine that these strategies will quickly break down under their own deceptions as moderation magically comes back into fashion. As Putin’s Russia has shown, chauvinism is more effective than we like to believe. Partly because citizens are desperate for the cover-up to succeed: deep down, they know to be scared of what will happen if the power of the state is revealed to be a hoax.

In the world’s poorest countries, the picture is very different. Almost all those nations emerged in the 20th century from the Eurasian empires. It has become de rigueur to despise empires, but they have been the “normal” mode of governance for much of history. The Ottoman empire, which lasted from 1300 until 1922, delivered levels of tranquillity and cultural achievement that seem incredible from the perspective of today’s fractured Middle East. The modern nation of Syria looks unlikely to last more than a century without breaking apart, and it hardly provides security or stability for its citizens.

Empires were not democratic, but were built to be inclusive of all those who came under their rule. It is not the same with nations, which are founded on the fundamental distinction between who is in and who is out – and therefore harbour a tendency toward ethnic purification. This makes them much more unstable than empires, for that tendency can always be stoked by nativist demagogues.

Nevertheless, in the previous century it was decided with amazing alacrity that empires belonged to the past, and the future to nation states. And yet this revolutionary transformation has done almost nothing to close the economic gap between the colonised and the colonising. In the meantime, it has subjected many postcolonial populations to a bitter cocktail of authoritarianism, ethnic cleansing, war, corruption and ecological devastation.

If there are so few formerly colonised countries that are now peaceful, affluent and democratic, it is not, as the west often pretends, because “bad leaders” somehow ruined otherwise perfectly functional nations. In the breakneck pace of decolonisation, nations were thrown together in months; often their alarmed populations fell immediately into violent conflict to control the new state apparatus, and the power and wealth that came with it. Many infant states were held together only by strongmen who entrusted the system to their own tribes or clans, maintained power by stoking sectarian rivalries and turned ethnic or religious differences into super-charged axes of political terror.

The list is not a short one. Consider men such as Ne Win (Burma), Hissène Habré (Chad), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia), Ahmed Sékou Touré (Guinea), Muhammad Suharto (Indonesia), the Shah of Iran, Saddam Hussein (Iraq), Muammar Gaddafi (Libya), Moussa Traoré (Mali), General Zia-ul-Haq (Pakistan), Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines), the Kings of Saudi Arabia, Siaka Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mohamed Siad Barre (Somalia), Jaafar Nimeiri (Sudan), Hafez al-Assad (Syria), Idi Amin (Uganda), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) or Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe).

Such countries were generally condemned to remain what one influential commentator has called “quasi-states”. Formally equivalent to the older nations with which they now shared the stage, they were in reality very different entities, and they could not be expected to deliver comparable benefits to their citizens.

Those dictators could never have held such incoherent states together without tremendous reinforcement from outside, which was what sealed the lid on the pressure cooker. The post-imperial ethos was hospitable to dictators, of course: with the UN’s moral rejection of foreign rule came a universal imperative to respect national sovereignty, no matter what horrors went on behind its closed doors. But the cold war vastly expanded the resources available to brutal regimes for defending themselves against revolution and secession. The two superpowers funded the escalation of post-colonial conflicts to stupefying levels of fatality: at least 15 million died in the proxy wars of that period, in theatres as dispersed as Afghanistan, Korea, El Salvador, Angola and Sudan. And what the superpowers wanted out of all this destruction was a network of firmly installed clients able to defeat all internal rivals.

There was nothing stable about this cold war “stability”, but its devastation was contained within the borders of its proxy states. The breakup of the superpower system, however, has led to the implosion of state authority across large groups of economically and politically impoverished countries – and the resulting eruptions are not contained at all. Destroyed political cultures have given rise to startling “post-national” forces such as Islamic State, which are cutting through national borders and transmitting chaos, potentially, into every corner of the world.

Over the past 20 years, the slow, post-cold-war rot in Africa and the Middle East has been exuberantly exploited by these kinds of forces – whose position, since there are more countries set to go the way of Yemen, South Sudan, Syria and Somalia, is flush with opportunity. Their adherents have lost the enchantment for the old slogans of nation-building. Their political technology is charismatic religion, and the future they seek is inspired by the ancient golden empires that existed before the invention of nations. Militant religious groups in Africa and the Middle East are less engaged in the old project of seizing the state apparatus; instead, they cut holes and tunnels in state authority, and so assemble transnational networks of tax collection, trade routes and military supply lines.

Such a network currently extends from Mauritania in the west to Yemen in the east, and from Kenya and Somalia in the south to Algeria and Syria in the north. This eats away the old political architecture from the inside, making several nation states (such as Mali and the Central African Republic) essentially non-functional, which in turn creates further opportunities for consolidation and expansion. Several ethnic groups, meanwhile – such as the Kurds and the Tuareg – which were left without a homeland after decolonisation, and stranded as persecuted minorities ever since, have also exploited the rifts in state authority to assemble the beginnings of transnational territories. It is in the world’s most dangerous regions that today’s new political possibilities are being imagined.

The west’s commitment to nation states has been self-servingly partial. For many decades, it was content to see large areas of the world suffer under terrifying parodies of well-established Western states; it cannot complain that those areas now display little loyalty to the nation-state idea. Especially since they have also borne the most traumatic consequences of climate change, a phenomenon for which they were least responsible and least equipped to withstand. The strategic calculation of new militant groups in that region is in many ways quite accurate: the transition from empire to independent nation states has been a massive and unremitting failure, and, after three generations, there needs to be a way out.

But there is no possibility that al-Shabaab, the Janjaweed, Seleka, Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, Isis or al-Qaida will provide that way out. The situation requires new ideas of political organisation and global economic redistribution. There is no superpower great enough, any more, to contain the effects of exploding “quasi-states”. Barbed wire and harder borders will certainly not suffice to keep such human disasters at bay.

Let us turn to the nature of the nation-state system itself. The international order as we know it is not so old. The nation state became the universal template for human political organisation only after the first world war, when a new principle – “national self-determination,”, as US President Woodrow Wilson named it – buried the many other blueprints under debate. Today, after a century of lugubrious “international relations”, the only aspect of this principle we still remember is the one most familiar to us: national independence. But Wilson’s original programme, informed by a loose international coalition including such diverse visionaries as Andrew Carnegie and Leonard Woolf (husband of Virginia), aimed for something far more ambitious: a comprehensive intra-state democracy designed to ensure global cooperation, peace and justice.

How were human beings to live securely in their new nations, after all, if nations themselves were not subject to any law? The new order of nations only made sense if these were integrated into a “society of nations”: a formal global society with its own universal institutions, empowered to police the violence that individual states would not regulate on their own: the violence they perpetrated themselves, whether against other states or their own citizens.

The cold war definitively buried this “society”, and we have lived ever since with a drastically degraded version of what was intended. During that period, both superpowers actively destroyed any constraints on international action, maintaining a level of international lawlessness worthy of the “scramble for Africa”. Without such constraints, their disproportionate power produced exactly what one would expect: gangsterism. The end of the cold war did nothing to change American behaviour: the US is today dependent on lawlessness in international society, and on the perpetual warfare-against-the-weak that is its consequence.

Just as illegitimate government within a nation cannot persist for long without opposition, the illegitimate international order we have lived with for so many decades is quickly exhausting the assent it once enjoyed. In many areas of the world today, there is no remaining illusion that this system can offer a viable future. All that remains is exit. Some are staking everything on a western passport, which, since the supreme value of western life is still enshrined in the system, is the one guarantee of meaningful constitutional protection. But such passports are difficult to get.

That leaves the other kind of exit, which is to take up arms against the state system itself. The appeal of Isis for its converts was its claim to erase from the Middle East the catastrophe of the post-imperial century. It will be remembered that the group’s most triumphant publicity was associated with its penetration of the Iraq-Syria border. This was presented as a victory over the 1916 treaties by which the British and French divided the Ottoman Empire amongst themselves – Isis’s PR arm issued the Twitter hashtag #SykesPicotOver – and inaugurated a century of Mesopotamian bombing. It arose from an entirely justifiable rejection of a system that obstinately designated – during the course of a century and more – Arabs as “savages” to whom no dignity or protection would be extended.

The era of national self-determination has turned out to be an era of international lawlessness, which has crippled the legitimacy of the nation state system. And, while revolutionary groups attempt to destroy the system “from below”, assertive regional powers are destroying it “from above” – by infringing national borders in their own backyards. Russia’s escapade in Ukraine demonstrates that there are now few consequences to neo-imperial bagatelles, and China’s route to usurping the 22nd-richest country in the world – Taiwan – lies open. The true extent of our insecurity will be revealed as the relative power of the US further declines, and it can no longer do anything to control the chaos it helped create.

### Security K – AT: Realism

#### Realism makes war structurally inevitable. Only a fundamental shift in thinking patterns solves.

Andrew Robinson 10, political theorist and activist based in the UK, 8/6/10, “In Theory Anarchism, war and the state,” <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/anarchism-war-and-the-state/>, Stras

In response to a common misconception, it is not true that anarchists oppose the state because they are naïve about human nature. Anarchist views about human nature are widely variant. Objections to the state can be convincing based on many different views, such as distrusting people to hold too much power without abusing it. Statists might be said to have a dual conception of human nature: the good people are trusted with excessive power so as to disempower the bad people. Statism is thus associated with hierarchical differentiations of people. Further, the objection is not simply to states as institutions but to state-like ways of relating and acting: in some accounts, the state is a social relation. In anarchist theory, states are viewed as expressions of hierarchical, oppressive social logics. They are forces of decomposition, which tend to attack or break down alternative, horizontal social relations. They are also based on ‘reactive’ emotional forces of suspicion, hatred and aggression which they channel to produce warlike relations among people. They also turn on one another, accumulating wealth by pillaging other states or societies. Against such state violence, anarchist strategies often seek to find or form focal-points for social power which can counterbalance or draw energies away from state power. These focal-points necessarily involve living and acting in non-militarist, non-authoritarian ways.

In Statism and Anarchy, Bakunin portrays the modern state as primarily military, and closely connected to the ruling class. As a military force, the state is necessarily aggressive, competing with other states for power. It produces moral and intellectual decay through its corrupting power. The extent of this decay depends on the extent to which the state’s way of thinking filters down through society, a process which is strongest in the most militaristic states. The ‘people’, primarily meaning the excluded and powerless, are for Bakunin a potential counterpoint to the state, and can destroy it in insurrection.

Kropotkin similarly argues that the state, or ‘political principle’ (vertical association or hierarchy), is counterposed to society, or the ‘social principle’ (horizontal association or affinity). In The State: Its Historic Role, he argues that the state is ‘synonymous with war’. The state brings peace, if at all, only as lifeless dominance in a ‘colourless, lifeless whole’. Social networks bring effervescent life, whereas states bring death through structural violence and pillage. Since the state cannot tolerate other sources of power, it wages constant war against social networks as they arise. There is thus a constant zero-sum struggle between the state as a force of control and impoverishment and social networks as spaces for freedom and creativity. Local communities have capabilities for self-defence and/or peacebuilding. Although wars can be fought outside or against states, they have a different significance, enlivening people in the defence of liberty rather than disempowering them through its destruction.

Stirner’s argument is rather different. In The Ego and its Own, he starts from a critique of social roles and categories, termed ‘spooks’ in his work, to derive a critique of submission to overarching categories of all kinds. Stirner is what would today be called an ‘anti-essentialist’, an opponent of fixed labels and of the privileging of some aspects of a person over others. States are rejected as bearers of particular categories which are wrongly accorded a greater status than other categories. Further, sacrifices for the state are always matters of the state’s self-interest. By claiming a monopoly on violence, the state pursues self-interested violence at the expense of its subjects.

Tolstoy’s Christian Anarcho-Pacifism draws similar distinctions, but characterises the anti-state pole rather differently. For Tolstoy, the state’s ‘law of violence’ stands against a ‘law of love’, with each expressing a particular emotional climate and set of passions. States embody ‘low passions’ such as hatred (often channelled against outsiders using nationalism), against which love provides a basis for peace and happiness. Love is expressed in acts such as conscientious objection, withdrawing the social activity on which state violence is based.

Anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman were central in anti-conscription activism in First World War America and were jailed as prisoners of conscience. Their anti-militarist critiques placed a strong emphasis on socialist criticisms of the capitalistic basis of war. Elites use irrational prejudices to manipulate people into fighting on their behalf. Rudolf Rocker wrote an influential anarchist critique of nationalism around the same time, portraying the state as distorting legitimate particularisms into hateful chauvinisms. Also in this period, Randolph Bourne popularised the phrase ‘war is the health of the state’. In an unfinished work titled The State, he argued that the state demands ‘mystic[al] devotion’, which war is a means to realise. In war, the permanent state machine displaces party competition and comes to monopolise public life. Its main aim is not victory, but the ‘spiritual compulsion’ bound up with the ideal of the state, with the triumph of a ‘herd’ mentality over creativity and difference. The outpouring of irrational, reactive forces is managed by nationalistic elites for their own benefit.

With fascism overrunning Europe, the leftist psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich pioneered a sexual-liberationist critique of militaristic states in his Mass Psychology of Fascism. Reich views repressive social systems as enabled by repressive biological and emotional structures through which people prevent themselves from feeling emotions. Fascism emerges from a complete identification with state power and the leader, a pattern derived from identification with the father in patriarchal, authoritarian families. Such families train people to channel attachments vertically rather than horizontally. More recently, Klaus Theweleit used this approach to interpret the masculine violence of proto-fascist groups as an attempt to seek existential security in categories of purity and displays of superiority over demonised others. On a similar line of thought, authors from the Frankfurt School have argued that industrialised war and genocide throw doubt on the benevolence of modernity. Adorno links war to the desire to dominate nature. Fromm argues that humanity’s survival is put at risk by a peculiarly human type of malevolent aggression arising from alienation. Marcuse critiques the discourse of war as a kind of doublespeak, and interprets modern war as a self-frustrating product of the frustration-aggression complex. Frustration arising from capitalist life is channelled and rendered socially functional through military aggression, but cannot be alleviated by such aggression because human means of war have been replaced with technological means. War thus tends towards repetition and escalation.

Walter Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ distinguishes between three types of violence or effective action. States are founded in law-making violence which posits their own command as the law, are maintained by law-preserving violence which maintains a status-quo through small acts of enforcement, and can be shattered by law-destroying violence (such as a general strike). For Benjamin, the state is based on reactive attachments, here interpreted as power over life for the sake of power, and is fearful, becoming more authoritarian over time as it becomes afraid of the emergence of counter-powers. Law-making violence is instrumental, whereas law-destroying violence is expressive, directing itself against the capability to use law-making or preserving violence.

The theory of the state as a source of social decomposition by means of social war is extended by Antonio Negri in his 1970s-era works. Negri views state violence as a means to preserve capitalist domination as a kind of irrational social command over labour. The new form of the state, the ‘crisis-state’, is geared to a permanent state of exception which simultaneously causes and wards off extreme risks of destruction such as nuclear war. It also forms an internal warfare state directed at forces of life, autonomous social movements, with which it is in an irreducible antagonism. In this phase, Negri views such movements as tending to become an armed society counterposed to the state. This view of radical antagonism fades in Negri’s more recent work, but still in Hardt and Negri’s Empire and Multitude, the state is deemed to be waging an unwinnable, unlimited global war indistinguishable from policing. Also from an autonomist standpoint, the Midnight Notes Collective have argued that recent wars are means for preserving Northern monopolies on advanced technologies by playing on risks of weapons proliferation, or are resource wars focused on the enclosure and exploitation of resources. The idea of the ‘state of exception’ has been expanded by Giorgio Agamben.

Looking at autonomy more broadly, alternatives to the state also emerge in studies of stateless indigenous social groups. There is substantial debate on whether such groups are warlike, with scholars arguing that certain groups are extremely peaceful or engage only in ritualised forms of combat. Clastres’ theory of indigenous warfare stands out in showing the difference between indigenous and statist types of war. In his theory, indigenous war is a way of asserting the difference and autonomy of each village or band, placing an obstacle in the way of state-formation by ensuring that power remains diffuse. Statist war, in contrast, causes ethnocide, which is inscribed in the nature of the state as the dissolution of the many into the one. Autonomous social movements such as La Ruta Pacifica also offer autonomous responses to war. In this group’s discourse, social weaving is theorised as a way of counterposing energies of hope to those which sustain the permanent state of war in Colombia. Their activities focus on morale-boosting, emotional repair, collective mourning and working through fear. They believe that violence decomposes social relations, so that power can be exercised by recomposing relations.

### Security K AT: But Nukes!

#### Nukes can be safely dismantled and repurposed.

Benjamin Plackett 19, science journalist, 2/8/2019, “The Science of Dismantling a Nuclear Bomb,” https://www.insidescience.org/news/science-dismantling-nuclear-bomb

What do you do with the leftover uranium or plutonium? Once the weapon has been taken apart, the process of dealing with what’s left is identical for both the older and the more sophisticated bombs. “When the great powers decided to reduce their stockpiles, we were left with fairly substantial quantities of plutonium,” said Rosner. “So, what do you do?” One obvious answer is to repurpose the radioactive material -- either plutonium or uranium -- to produce electricity. To make it suitable for a power plant, the material needs to be diluted with less enriched versions. "There are no power reactors anywhere in the world that are designed to deal with weapons-grade material,” said Plant. “You have to down-blend it before you can turn it into fuel.” But that isn’t what actually happens to most of the radioactive material. “It’s not always economically viable. It can be cheaper to enrich new material than it is to downgrade it and repurpose it,” said Rosner. “Shipping plutonium or uranium all over the place from storage to reactor isn’t popular either.” “Mostly it’s just stuck in storage facilities,” said Rosner. Decommissioning the radioactive waste and keeping it safe is a science in its own right. The extracted uranium or plutonium will contain different isotopes -- variants of themselves that have different atomic masses, which means their radioactivity decays at different rates. The highly radioactive isotopes have short half-lives, which means they decay much faster than the less radioactive ones, and that creates a lot of heat. “The material has to be put in water pools for about half a decade to cool the rods while they decay,” said Rosner. “Then you’re left with relatively low-level waste that’s less radioactive.”

### Security K AT: Global Cooperation

#### No uniqueness---the western led liberal order has completely and utterly failed to facilitate global cooperation over anything

Robert J. Lieber 14. Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown University, “The Rise of the BRICS and American primacy,” International Politics, Vol. 51, p. 137-154

Skepticism about the BRICS and the momentum assumed by liberal internationalists has not been scarce.6 Realist scholars have understandably been critical of the assumptions underlying these approaches as well as of the foreign policy choices they imply. However, other scholars too have found increasing reason for criticism. For example, Barma et al (2013, p. 56) have recently observed that, ‘Instead of a gradual trend toward global problem solving punctuated by isolated failures, we have seen over the last several years essentially the opposite: stunningly few instances of international cooperation on significant issues’. Moreover, Patrick (2010, p. 44) of the Council on Foreign Relations has cautioned that, ‘The United States should be under no illusions about the ease of socializing rising nations. Emerging powers may be clamoring for greater global influence, but they often oppose the political and economic ground rules of the inherited Western liberal order, seek to transform existing multilateral arrangements, and shy away from assuming significant global responsibilities’. In this regard, Laidi has argued that despite their own heterogeneity, the BRICS actually share a common objective in opposing Western liberal internationalist narratives that run counter to traditional state sovereignty. Instead, they seek to protect their own prerogatives, independence of action and national autonomy in an increasingly interdependent world (Laidi, 2012, pp. 614–615).

### Deleuze K – 1NC Biotech Link

#### Biotechnology is the next site for control. The human body will be reduced to bioinformatics.

Faucher, 13 [Kane X. Faucher is a professor at University of Western Ontario, January 2013, accessed on 7-24-2022, Springer, "EX LIBRIS: A NOMAD INFORMATION SCIENCE?", https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bbm%3A978-94-6209-428-4%2F1.pdf]/ISEE

One area of applied informatics has taken the form of what has been called bioinformatics. This burgeoning field of inquiry involves the storage and retrieval of biological data, be this identifying unique genetic markers in the individual or for security purposes in retinal identification. When it is employed for the regulation and control of individuals by state or corporate entities, the “dark side” of bioinformatics would be an outgrowth of what Michel Foucault calls “biopower,” the overall function of which is to subjugate human subjects to regulatory controls. Even beyond human subjects, bioinformatics in its connection to biotechnologies has been instrumental in the creation of new pest-resistant seeds, such as are developed by major biotech firms like Monsanto, Syngenta, et al. It is possible, with the assistance of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, to develop an alternative, if not nomadic, bioinformatics that recognizes what a body can do, and studies its flows rather than subjects bodies to regulatory control relying on computational processes. Although much of bioinformatics, as allied with biotechnology and genomics, starts with mathematical formulae, algorithms, and statistics to discover the simple behavioural rules at a cellular and genetic level to explain biological processes in biotic systems, a “nomadized” or “iterantized” bioinformatics would appreciate the flows and assemblages in biotic systems as being signals of expression. Would it be useful? The short answer would be no, but it is a move away from utility that uncovers the intensive qualities of the biological world. Deleuze and Guattari are rightly suspicious of any practice that takes reductionism as its starting point––be that of an atomic or genetic register––given that it may smuggle hylomorphism as the pivot around which the understanding of the world turns. It is here that we grapple with the metonymy or polysemy of the very word information and how it is applied in different contexts. In information systems theory, this is indexed on the product of data processing and the automation of processes in computing technology. This takes for granted the term of information being under the sole discretion of the technical aspects of the term which excludes from view its more philosophical or even mathematical understanding, although it seems to share more overlap with the latter with respect to a Shannon-Weaver definition. From the technical standpoint emerges the engineering approach to managing large systems, specific communication problems, and “information overload.” Again, this use of information is strictly deployed for the purposes of understanding and improving the infrastructure of “information” systems in communication technologies and the Internet. Winnowing information as a subspecies of computing technologies, researchers in informatics such as Bo Dahlbohm are quite explicit in defining the boundaries which betrays a certain technocentric perspective: To turn computers into powerful computing machines you need to know numerical methods and algorithms; to develop information systems you must master business modelling, systems design, and project organization; personal computing requires psychological theories of human-computer interaction, skills in interface design, and how to do usability studies; and to support networking you must understand human communication and cooperation, network technology and multimedia production, and the role of cyberspace as a new arena for human enterprise (1996, p. 44) When we consider the information landscape today as a process of harnessing social power through regimental ordering systems that distribute variety within constraints via radical customization, the informatic trope continues to operate in the digital Umwelt as a means of identity determination and the colonization of digital space. Moreover, informatics might actually have a considerable impact on relations between the social and data: First, these technoscientific practices and logics form discrete examples where the relationship between the body and language is reconfigured as a relationship of materiality and data/information. Secondly, this manifestation has been occurring in a socio-cultural site thoroughly enframed by the technological apparatus of computer and telecommunications based developments, contributing to the increasingly intimate conjunction of molecular science research and technological development that constitutes contemporary technoscience. (Thacker 1998) One of the main applications of bioinformatics, beyond the sequencing of genes and developing techniques for steering genetic production in harnessing genetic information, would be the direct intervention of biotechnology on plant life. What began with the discovery of DNA and the increasing power of technology, blossomed in the 1970s and boomed in the 1980s toward the manipulation of discrete genetic sequences for maximizing crop yields that could resist pests. In effect, the harnessing of genetic information toward these ends is an attempt to inscribe both the image of the molecular biologist’s intentionality and capital’s drive for utility and production at the very site of life itself. More particularly, the emergence of genetic variations through modification is an attempt to inscribe or de- and re-territorialize genetic code along capitalist decoded flows that enable older forms of capital such as the idea of private property (in the form of intellectual copyright, or what we can call the mental labour form of the property flow), and according to relative human scales that inscribe itself in biological ones. The practice of genetic modification or biotechnological engineering differs from its older cousin of selective cross-breeding in that the process for constructing something new and possibly more durable occurs directly at the level of code rather than at the level of the completed organisms placed in relation. At the genetic modification level, the versatility and options for recombination are much more varied, for it becomes possible to splice code from an amphibian with that of a tomato––something that cannot be done at the level of cross-breeding due to the breeding incompatibility of their respective biological kingdoms. As Mark Hansen notes (2000), Deleuze and Guattari’s take on evolution appears to adopt more of a neo-Darwinian approach aligned with their biophilosophy, rejecting in part Bergson’s vitalism. And yet, Deleuze and Guattari seem also to reject Darwin’s natural selection, preferring to raise selection to the level of the abstract machine. In this way, it would be a hasty mistake to impute to Deleuze and Guattari a kind of apologia for biotechnologically based genetic modification as the scene of a more profound selection given the strong relation between biotechnological engineering and capitalism in the decoding of flows and the territorialization of life according to the axiomatic of capitalism itself. We must first distinguish between three ways by which new organisms are produced: 1. By mutations that are not directly aided by human intervention, 2. Selective breeding, and, 3. Direct genetic alteration. Mutations in species can occur partially as a result (or answer to) an environmental problem, such as the development of the frog’s tongue to catch flies, or the adaptation to changing climates and interspecies conditions of competition (what can be called perplication). This may be explained in Deleuzean terms as analogous to the “natural selection” of singularities that form assemblages from the ideal line of matter-movement, their temporary assemblage as a perplication whereby the accidents of contingent reason are what condition and resolve the problemata. They may also occur on the basis of more internal and possibly spontaneous arrangements, such as copying fidelity error from one gene sequence to another. A more invasive procedure emerged due to scientific advancements linked to the discovery of DNA: genetic modification. No longer simply a matter of selective breeding of a single or related species, geneticists could perform their changes directly to the genetic code itself, thus making it possible to cross previous boundaries so that, for example, partial code sequences of a frog’s skin could be grafted unto the code of a tomato’s skin. However, it also implicitly endorses fragmentation of the body, or true organ-ization. When Deleuze and Guattari speak of becoming-other, or the person becomingdog, they are not speaking literally, but in terms of what assists in articulating the very traits of the individual in a process of individuation as rooted in a nonhylomorphic understanding of form and content and the double articulation that takes place in terms of content and expression as a relative line. However, the connections that can be drawn between how Deleuze and Guattari define the rhizome seem to uncomfortably apply to genetic modification insofar as here we are presented with radical connectivity between codes, and a crossing over of signification regimes that in effect designify stable relations to allow the new to emerge. But that is only surface resemblance. What we are presented with is the convergence of neoliberal capital and cybernetics inspired control mechanisms making use of the very technical instruments designed for control and modulation frameworks as applied to the combinatory potentials of genetics in the form of biotechnologies. The distribution of genetic modification activities in large scale agriculture, or agri-business, are now assigned by those whose actions control the possibilities that can be harnessed and exploited in the genetic laboratory. The plant is thus deterritorialized from the field, the gene from its sequence, the farmer from the farming function as dequalified labour. The construction of new patterns in genetic territory are expanded at the macro scale, encompassing now corporatized arable lands for the cultivation of these patterns made manifest in a range of products. Nature itself is not so much “created anew” through selective breeding and natural selection as it is modulated according to predetermined outcomes, and corrective feedback is conducted in a variety of ways to ensure maximum yields of resistant strains, and to engage an apparatus of both political influence lobbying to ensure compliance with the genetic modification mission, and litigation against those farmers who would assert any autonomy with respect to their own seeds or in any way challenge the effects of genetic drift and transgene escape. In this way, despite the heavy emphasis on free modulation, biotech corporations like Monsanto or Syngenta still have recourse to disciplinary structures such as the State and its laws, and in some cases can easily outmaneuver the law by continuing to violate laws that stipulate that GM crops cannot be planted within a defined distance of certified organic crops.

### Deleuze K – 1NC Cyberspace Link

#### Cyberspace is the new site of reterritorialization. The AFFs attempt to exert sovereignty generates the conditions for cyberwar to take place.

Lambach, 19 [Daniel Lambach is a political scientist, currently working as a Heisenberg Fellow at the Research Centre Normative Orders at Goethe Universität Frankfurt, 5-11-2019, accessed on 7-22-2022, Oxford University Press, "The Territorialization of Cyberspace\*", https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/22/3/482/5488469]/ISEE

States reterritorialize the “national territory” in cyberspace. These territories are cyber-analogies to physical state territory that solidify states’ regulatory reach and undergird jurisdictional claims. This reterritorialization strategy proceeds from the normative assumption that all online activity that occurs “in” a country (because users, servers, or data are “located” there) should be treated as a part of a corresponding cyberspace territory. This belief has been strengthened by the growing popularity of geolocation technology, which makes the virtual coincide with the physical. Discourses about “cybersovereignty,” “data sovereignty,” or “digital sovereignty,” which are mainly championed by Russia and China but also find some traction in countries like France and Germany, are evidence of this belief (Drake et al. 2016, 45–48; Fliegauf 2016, 79). There are a variety of instruments available to states seeking to recreate their national territory in cyberspace. National firewalls are one of the best-known ways for governments to both communicate their territorial claim and display power within the bounded space. These firewalls combine a range of filtering mechanisms like IP blocking and keyword searches to censor discussions about sensitive topics and deny access to websites deemed subversive. The “Great Firewall of China” is the best-known example, but other countries have developed, or are developing, similar systems of censorship. North Korea is probably the most extreme example, where, until recently, users could only access the countrywide Kwangmyong intranet. Today, access to select internet sites is possible under tight restrictions and government scrutiny. Internet “kill switches” are the ultimate display of power. Being able to shut off the entire national internet, or parts thereof, in a controlled fashion and for extended periods of time demonstrates the capability of the state (DeNardis 2014, 199–221). And while this is clearly a tactic of last resort, there have been shutdowns lasting days or weeks as well as partial shutdowns targeting parts of the country or certain times of the day. The difficulty of a shutdown is determined by the network structure; the smaller the number of “choke points”—for example, Internet Service Providers and autonomous systems—the easier it is for state actors to accomplish (Roberts et al. 2011; Belson 2017). Data localization laws have also become very popular in recent years in the wake of the Snowden revelations.12 Their stated aim is to safeguard data protection for citizens and corporations, mandating “that certain types of data collected in a particular country be stored and/or processed within that country” (Bowman 2015) and regulating which companies are allowed to manage these kinds of data based on whether the corporation falls under national jurisdiction. As Baur-Ahrens points out, the routing and storage requirements of such laws require “changes to the basic functioning of the underlying Internet infrastructure” (Baur-Ahrens 2017, 37). National firewalls, kill switches, and data localization laws reinforce container notions of territorial statehood. They clearly communicate territorial boundaries and openly display state control over territory. Another way of reifying the “national” territory is through country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs), such as .ru, .cn, or .de, which symbolically connect a virtual domain to a country (Mueller and Badiei 2017), although this mostly applies to larger countries. States like Tuvalu or Tonga are marketing their ccTLDs, .tv and .to, globally without reterritorializing a “national” territory in cyberspace. Nonetheless, ccTLDs have legal repercussions: domain name registries—that is, the agencies administering ccTLDs—typically mandate through their terms and conditions that registrants of a “national” domain follow national laws. Notions of cyberwar, cyberdefense, and cyber deterrence also reterritorialize cyberspace into separate state “containers.”13 First, such discourses and strategies reify certain network nodes—for example, CIR or national assets associated with military or intelligence branches of the state (Stevens 2012, 151)—as forming an integral part of a “national territory,” any attack on which is considered grounds for retaliation. Cyberwar strategists often point out the risks that hostile cyber operations can pose for infrastructure in physical space—for example, electrical grids, financial networks, or railways—thus connecting the “national cyber-territory” with the physical state territory (Warner 2012, 795–98). Second, “cyberwar” in the narrowest sense of the term is a practice conducted by states and state proxies (Lupovici 2016, 326–27). The literature is consistent in reserving this term for hostilities between states, whereas actions by/on private actors are commonly described as “cyber attacks” or “cyber operations.” Cyberwar and the state territorial container in cyberspace are mutually constitutive. This is why national security apparatuses have proclaimed cyberspace to be the “fifth domain of warfare” (after land, sea, air, and space) (Manjikian 2010, 384–88; Dunn Cavelty 2015). As a result, many countries have expanded or are expanding their cyberdefense and cyberwarfare capabilities (Fliegauf 2016, 79; Mueller 2017, 73–77). The division of “inside” and “outside” is also important in doctrinal debates about cyberdefense. In other words, should cyberdefense be solely about protecting the “territory,” or should it also include active measures (“active defense,” “hacking back”) that reach beyond the territory and deterritorialize the site of conflict? Beyond these various instruments, there are nascent, and as yet unrealized, possibilities to make cyberspace map even closer to offline geographies by revising fundamental protocols that govern the internet's functionality (Mueller 2017, 81–84). One such proposal would be to move the domain name system (DNS), which translates domain names into the numerical format that the internet protocol uses, from a global system into a system of interconnected national domain name systems, substantially increasing the scope for control by national regulators. In the words of three leading internet experts, this would create “the mother of all fragmentations” (Drake et al. 2016, 28). Beyond this reterritorialization of cyberspace into state containers, some states, given the requisite resources and power, can also create regulatory territories, which expand the reach of a state's laws and regulations in extraterritorial ways.14 The structure of cyberspace and of internet governance makes such a differentiated approach possible, even necessary. States have great control over infrastructure localized in their country but little control over global aspects of cyberspace. However, very powerful countries like the United States or coalitions like the EU can hope to make extraterritorial claims stick. Creating regulatory territories typically rests on an expansive claim to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction was and is typically assigned according to the location of a particular act or one of its constituent elements. Cyberspace has substantially complicated this line of legal reasoning because it is very easy to claim “territorial contacts and thus jurisdiction, for example, on the basis of where the server is located, where the content is viewed, where the content is uploaded, where the content is deliberately directed to, where effects are felt, etc.” (Ryngaert 2015, 63; see also Berman 2002). Absent a rule for adjudicating between jurisdiction claims, there are few legal limits on states’ claims for quasi-global regulatory territories. For instance, there is an ongoing dispute between the French Data Protection Agency (CNIL) and Google relating to the EU “Right to be Forgotten,” where the CNIL demands that Google enforce its orders to delist personal information relating to a claimant from Google's search results globally, not just for users geolocated in the EU (Daskal 2018, 214–88). This multiplicity of regulatory territories and the lack of clear rules for dispute resolution has recently sparked debates about the necessity of norms to regulate cyberspace (Svantesson 2016), especially in the fields of cyberdefense and cybersecurity (Finnemore and Hollis 2016; Schmitt 2017; Taddeo 2018). While the practical impact of these discussions has been arguably shallow, at least thus far, a norms approach is instructive for an appreciation of some deeper dynamics. Put very simply, there is an ongoing and unresolved process of norm contestation between a multistakeholder approach and a multilateral model of internet governance, much of which turns on whether extraterritorial regulatory territories are permissible. The multistakeholder approach has been the prevalent model of internet governance since the 1990s and emphasizes the inclusion of private actors in policymaking, limited influence of governments, and a decentralized architecture of the internet (Carr 2015). It is most clearly expressed by the United States and, with some variation, their Western allies. The second position is informed by ideas of cybersovereignty and argues for a more state-centric form of governance, mediated by intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations (UN) or the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This position is championed by Russia and China, who believe that “multi-stakeholderism is a front for maintaining Western-centric dominance of this new ‘global commons’” (Lantis and Bloomberg 2018, 156) and does not respect national sovereignty (Aronczyk and Budnitsky 2017; Wei 2017; see also Warner 2012, 792–93; Maurer 2017, 50–67). This debate has been going on for more than two decades and has shaped institutional developments in internet governance. Notable sites of contestation include the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee since 1998 (Tikk-Ringas 2012), the 2003 and 2005 World Summits on the Information Society, and the annual, UN-endorsed Internet Governance Forum, inaugurated in 2006. In 2011, Russia, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan proposed an international code of conduct for information security to the UN General Assembly, later elaborated into a proposal to the ITU World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in 2012, that the ITU International Telecommunications Regulations treaty be amended to include the internet under its ambit. This would have given the ITU substantial authority over many aspects of internet governance. The WCIT fell apart when the two camps failed to find an agreement, prompting the United States delegates to walk out of the meeting, although some contentious issues were later resolved at the 2014 ITU Plenipotentiary Meeting. These disputes can be read as competition among “territorial projects,” with repercussions down to the level of infrastructure. The multilateralists envision a more vertically integrated internet of state territories and interstate cooperation. The multistakeholderists prefer a more open, decentralized internet, where states and private stakeholders work together. The latter position is much more comfortable with regulatory territories, whereas the former views these as encroaching on national territories (Aronczyk and Budnitsky 2017). But the opposition between these positions should not be overstated—as much as China wishes to maintain control over “its” portion of cyberspace, it is aware of the economic and commercial significance of the internet (Lantis and Bloomberg 2018, 158). This was also visible in the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE). Since 2004, expert groups have discussed various security-related issues regarding information and telecommunications. And even though the 2017 meeting failed acrimoniously, it should not be forgotten that the 2013 and 2015 meetings had agreed that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to cyberspace as well (Sukumar 2017) and that the use of proxies in offensive cyberoperations should be discouraged (Maurer 2017, 5). A territorialization perspective on states in cyberspace challenges the “internet fragmentation” view of states erecting hard boundaries that will inevitably destroy the internet as we know it, although these arguments are not without merit. We do see efforts to recreate “container” notions of state territories in cyberspace, but these are in tension with “extraterritorial” regulatory spaces. In contrast to narratives of states “colonizing” the cyber-frontier (Saco 1999), the reterritorialization of state territories in cyberspace is a more complex and conflictual process and does not necessarily create “hard” boundaries.

### Deleuze K – 1NC Satellites Link

#### Mapping produces an organization of space that is static.

Peters, 20 [Kimberley Peters works for the Helmholtz Institute for Functional Marine Biodiversity at the University of Oldenburg and for the Institute for Chemistry and Biology of Marine Environments, 11-2-2020, accessed on 7-24-2022, PubMed Central (PMC), "The territories of governance: unpacking the ontologies and geophilosophies of fixed to flexible ocean management, and beyond", https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7662200/]/ISEE

What both were challenging was the difficulty of transferring a landed way of ‘doing business’ to sea in respect of the dynamism of the sea and mobility of life within it. They were presenting alternative geophilosophies (geographically de-territorialized modes of thinking) and different ontologies (of a world not rooted, but mobile). The sea, both sets of authors argued, is geophysically liquid, mobile, three-dimensional. You can draw a line on map, but not the ocean itself. You can attempt to designate a zone, but the sea and life at sea move [61,62]. More so, because the deep sea is legally an international space and for the most part is beyond state jurisdiction, it cannot be territorialized in the same way (although this, of course, does not stop some from trying; see [6]). These different modes of knowing and understanding, of fluid geophilosophies and ‘wet’ ontologies—of de-territorialization—unlock different potentials for ‘doing’ governance. In late 2016, I began a project searching for examples where less mainstream governance regimes were being developed. These were ways of organizing the marine realm that had mobilized a radically different ontology from the territorializing, grounded practices typical of ocean management. It is, of course, difficult to search for such approaches that diverge from the accepted, dominant regimes of marine governance. Indeed, where do you start to find ‘experimental’ modes of managing the seas and oceans, and the activities, and life, within them? Such an approach requires looking beyond the ‘trap’, as Elden calls it [42], that can be territory. As Elden urges, we need to start from a point of looking beyond accepted knowledge regimes [42]. This requires a substantial cognitive shift to recognize our own indoctrination in the reproduction of such traps. Instead we must be aware of how this ‘constrains our thinking’ and ‘hamstrings our potential for critique’ ([42], p. 757). Undertaking this work creates space to see or make visible other organizations of governance. This can occur through a tracing of stories, a listening to new narratives, an openness to future scenarios, built through an array of data including official records, archives, mind maps, interviews, oral histories and other qualitative as well as quantitative data sources, including modes of scenario formation to imagine oceans differently through time (for the latter see [63]). The Bering Strait is a narrow seaway of 44 nautical miles positioned between the landmasses of Russia and the American archipelago of Alaska [64]. It was an area with little explicit marine governance, in part because it has not been a well-used global transport route (although it has, historically been a ‘nexus’ for localized trading, something typically ignored in contemporary governance developments; see [65]). Yet with climate change, ice melt, and an increasingly viable passage emerging, vessel traffic is increasing and with it risks to marine life [65]. Indeed, as the Pew Charitable Trust have noted, this poses unique challenges for, a highly productive marine ecosystem… Almost the entire western Arctic population of bowhead whales travels through the strait twice a year. It also provides important food for the Pacific Walrus, spectacled eider, and grey whales. An estimated 12 million seabirds nest or forage in the area each year. The strait is also home to indigenous communities whose inhabitants have lived a traditional way of life along its shores for untold generations. [64] With ecosystem threats owing to ship strikes, noise, discharge and contamination [65], efforts began to consider mechanisms to mitigate potential harm. In 2010, the United States Coastguard (USCG) began a consultation regarding the implementation of a ship routeing scheme for the Bering Strait to guide increased shipping traffic. Although pertaining to mobility—guiding the movement of ships along a corridor—the technique of governance planned and proposed rested on the very static, fixed, territorializing and grounded modes of spatial management typical in marine environments. A maritime motorway, suggested through the USCG Port Access Route Study, would create a static corridor, cut through space, mapped onto the ocean as a surficial device of management. It was a solution that sought to fix in space governance, in a realm of mobility, where whales, walrus, fish, ice, all move. Against this backdrop, an organization, a Marine Exchange was already working with a different geophilosophy and ontology. The Marine Exchange of Alaska (MXAK), a non-governmental, not-for-profit organization that has been operating since 2001, embodies a networked approach to maritime domain awareness. Through a process of information dissemination to help guide users of the marine environment, it is also flexible and responsive to the very mobile and dynamic environment in which it operates, sharing information in ‘real-time’. As Captain Ed Page, director of the MXAK noted, this presents a radically different way of thinking about how we protect and conserve the Bering Strait. So my point is I think the best way to manage places like the Bering Strait is actually send information … using this new technology, warn those at risk… you can say ‘you can go through the Bering Strait but here's the guidelines now, just stay this far away from shore and … we'll let you know where you can go when you get there because it's a dynamic situation (Captain Ed Page, unpublished interview, 5 November 2016). Built through networks—of satellites, weather stations, radar sites, ships, processed AIS data from the Marine Exchange building, the desk operators, the environment itself, fog, rain, sun, mobile marine life, ice floes—the organization of space emerges through an ethos of knowledge sharing that has no discrete territorialized boundaries built on landed assumptions, but reflects the very relational and connected nature of the marine environment and the human and more-than-human ‘actants’ using the space (see also [24]). It works on a networked ontology responsive to ‘earthly’ processes and relations. This de-territorialized, open, networked geophilosophy provides us with an arguably less areal, flat ontology for thinking about governance. By comparison, it provides us with a spherical, three-dimensional, imaginary, where the earth is connected in a system of related, networked, assembled and co-constituted parts; where the ‘earth’ is, as Elden notes ‘in flux, dynamic, indeterminate, and changeable, rather than static and fixed’ ([66], p. xiv). We might think of the Bering example not as a territorialized zone of management—a cartographic, fixed, mode of stewarding space—but an ‘open building site’ (to quote [67], p. 65). Although, to be clear, the MXAK is not a formal governance actor in Alaska (it is an NGO offering services for stewardship over the marine environment) it offers us, by example, a radically different view of how we might ‘do’ governance based on dismantling dominant territorial discourses. As Callon notes, an actor-network provides ‘more an inspirational frame than a constraining theoretical system… (which) postulates between humans and nonhumans… (in) the configuration of sociotechnical network’ ([67], p. 62). As Captain Page noted, …with AIS (technology) you can actually send information to vessels, an icon or a box and explain what it is by visually showing the issue, like, ‘this is an area to be avoided because of the presence of whale… Reduce your speed or give it a wide berth’. Or, ‘there's a presence of ice here, so you want to avoid that ice because your vessel is not configured or not designed to operate in those icy conditions (unpublished interview, 5 November 2016). Of course, such systems are based on goodwill and collaboration that might not be transferable to all examples, but it demonstrates an approach that exceeds [27] the limits of existing marine strategies. Indeed, although a very distinct example, it makes visible the possibility of a different way of doing governance. As Maxwell et al. note, a shift towards dynamic ocean management… defined as management that rapidly changes in space and time in response to changes in the ocean and its users through the integration of near real-time biological, oceanographic, social and/or economic data…. can refine the temporal and spatial scale of managed areas, thereby better balancing ecological and economic objectives. ([60], p. 42)

#### Satellites generate a point of view that is not neutral but violent.

Peters, 20 [Kimberley Peters works for the Helmholtz Institute for Functional Marine Biodiversity at the University of Oldenburg and for the Institute for Chemistry and Biology of Marine Environments, 11-2-2020, accessed on 7-24-2022, PubMed Central (PMC), "The territories of governance: unpacking the ontologies and geophilosophies of fixed to flexible ocean management, and beyond", https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7662200/]/ISEE

There is, of course, a need to be just as cautious about these de-territorialized developments in marine management. Captain Page posits that ‘new’ approaches should not necessarily replace old ones with de-territorialized modes supplanting territorialized ones. Indeed, as noted, there is quite some evidence that conservation enclosures ‘work’. Decisions on how to manage the marine environment should be based on the particularities of the situation: the balance between protecting the ecosystem, the economy, livelihoods and more-than-human oceanic life. In some scenarios, depending on the purpose of governance and the desired goals, zoning may be optimal; in others, not. As Captain Page noted, ‘I mean the funny thing is that sometimes these things [dynamic approaches] don't replace something else, they just complement and supplement. They have different capabilities and different features' (Captain Ed Page, unpublished interview, 5 November 2016). There is also a need to be cautious about any assumed benefits of de-territorialized approaches vis-à-vis their territorial predecessors. As Maxwell and colleagues note, there is still a ‘gap’ in some of the data needed to make responsive techniques workable ([60], see also [68]). They also rely on the dependability of technological apparatus (satellite tracking systems and such like). In addition, there is a need to ensure that legal frameworks can support such developments where necessary ([60], p. 42). Boucquey and colleagues argue a point further, noting that we should be careful that the data driving such responsive or flexible processes aren't themselves making ‘durable’ new kinds of ocean knowledge ([10], p. 484). Data are always the mirror of their creator, not the world itself, and this can bring with it challenges in respect of reliability, especially where the data for such processes derive from portals of oceanic information collected and collated by various agencies each with vested (political) interests in how the marine environment is used and protected (and for whom) [69–71]. Indeed, while governance does involve a broad range of actors ([2], p. 317), it is not an equal process. In attempting to include a variety of sectors—humanitarian organizations; ocean conservancy NGOs; private companies; and beyond—governance is said to be ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’ in developing modes of organizing, managing and governing people, activities and spaces. As such, the voice of much ocean policy tends to speak in a collective ‘we’ that represents all. Consider, for example, the strapline to the UN Decade of Ocean Science: ‘the science we need, for the ocean we want’ ([53], emphasis added). But who is that ‘we’? What science is needed by different actors, and what kind of ocean do different people desire? Governance, management and policy, accountable as they may try to be, do not ensure every voice is heard and every perspective is accounted for (see Flannery et al. on MSP, [15,16] and the recent report on the latest BBNJ Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, for example, where some nations and perspectives were unable to participate fully [72]). It is necessary to consider the discourses of territory and regimes of power within which territory as a ‘political technology’ sits [4]. Territorializing practice is a political means of taking and appropriating space [5,73]. Modes of ocean governance that are territorial, then, are not politically innocent—they involve the allocation and even seizing of space for a particular purpose (even where that purpose may be situated as a ‘greater good’). In 2014, the Transnational Institute (TNI), Masifundise Development Trust and Afrika Kontakt laid out a brochure highlighting practices of ocean—the snatching of space through schemes such as MPAs, which while situated as beneficial for ocean protection and conservation, can by-pass the needs, experiences, knowledge and uses of local indigenous populations in relation to their ocean space [75]. Indeed, planning and conservation practices based on territorializing logics hold with them colonial traces where territories were first established through the violent land grabs of colonial and imperial enterprise (see [74], p. 10). It is important to go back and engage critically with these histories in the context of present day and future-oriented governance and management strategies to unsettle such approaches [74]. Moreover, it is important that a homogeneous ‘we’ (a ‘we’ that is often a white, western, and predominantly male) also steps back from the work of governance, not just to include, but reorientate entirely approaches to ocean governance through decolonialism. Only this has the potential to truly ‘transform’ the ocean for sustainability.

### Deleuze K – 1NC Environment Monitoring Link

#### The AFFs process of mapping is rooted in the desire for control over territory.

Lambach, 21 [Daniel Lambach is a political scientist, currently working as a Heisenberg Fellow at the Research Centre Normative Orders at Goethe Universität Frankfurt, July 2021, accessed on 7-23-2022, Researchgate, "Space, scale, and global politics: Towards a critical approach to space in international relations", https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353136176\_Space\_scale\_and\_global\_politics\_Towards\_a\_critical\_approach\_to\_space\_in\_international\_relations]/ISEE

There are different ways of conceptualising ‘space’. The first is to view it in a Cartesian sense, that is, a geometric container that other things exist or happen in. Cartesianism is the foundation of geo-determinism, which is encapsulated in the old aphorism that ‘geography is destiny’. Geo-determinism was characteristic of classical geopolitics but was falling out of favour in Political Geography as early as the 1940s. It was replaced by a possibilist understanding of geography, wherein geography is constant but its social impact is mediated by politics, technology, and other factors. Both determinist and possibilist approaches are based on a fixed understanding of space, thereby making geography little more than a ‘territorial stage’ upon which states interact. In Geography and Sociology, space is today viewed in relational and social constructivist terms, as the result of interactions among phenomena, objects, and people. Doreen Massey argues that ‘identities/entities, the relations “between” them, and the spatiality which is part of them, are all co-constitutive’.Footnote67 Martina Löw speaks of space as ‘a relational arrangement of bodies that are incessantly in motion’.Footnote68 Löw's use of ‘arrangement’ implies order, in spite of space's inherent dynamism. Therefore, spaces are reflective of other sociopolitical structures and why ‘social and political practices are co-implicated in different spatial manifestations’.Footnote69 In short, spaces are constructed. While earlier scholarship in Human Geography aimed to identify spaces, its current approach is to understand the social process by which spaces come to exist.Footnote70 This constructivist approach focuses on the process of space making and is particularly associated with scholarship in critical geopolitics, border studies, and feminist geography.Footnote71 Spaces are not independent of physical environments, as the discussion of Simmel's relational sociology highlights. Gazit speaks of space – the ‘dynamic webs of socio-cultural and symbolic relations’ – evolving within, around, and in relation to ‘brute topographical physical settings’. Stuart Elden refers to these settings as ‘terrain’, which consists of geophysical landscapes, a built environment, and their respective material and physical properties. Terrain exists as part of, and in relation to human societies and is therefore malleable, constantly shaping and being shaped by social action. In line with much geographic writing, I approach space as an abstract and general construct and other geographical concepts as more specific kinds of space. For instance, ‘places’ are spaces that have social purposes and meanings. Places are created through shared memories and are enmeshed in wider social relations; in the words of Setha Low, places are the ‘spatial location of subjectivities, intersubjectivities and identities’.Footnote74 As other spaces, places are productive and play their part in the constitution of gender and other social identities. To give another example, territory is politically controlled and bounded space. Territories have three characteristics: The first is a ‘classification by area’. Second, territorial claims have to be communicated, for example by reification of a space and the symbolic marking of borders in space and on maps. Third, territoriality always implies an attempt at enforcing claims of control. In sum, territoriality should be understood as ‘the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area’. ‘Territory’ should not be restricted to terrestrial spaces but also look to those spaces – oceanic, atmospheric, outer space, cyberspace – beyond the familiar environment of terra.

### Deleuze K – 1NC OCOs Link

#### Offensive cyber operations are the next reinvention of state violence.

---OCC = Offensive Cyber Capabilities

Elgoff and Shires, 21 [Florian J. Egloff works for Center for Security Studies and Centre for Technology and Global Affairs, Department of Politics; International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, James Shires works for the Institute for Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University,; Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic Council, 10-12-2021, accessed on 7-22-2022, Cambridge Core, "The better angels of our digital nature? Offensive cyber capabilities and state violence | European Journal of International Security | Cambridge Core", https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/better-angels-of-our-digital-nature-offensive-cyber-capabilities-and-state-violence/B225F961FD2212E34FDB0B267A1CB5E6]/ISEE

The transformation and reinvention of state violence has continued into the digital age. The clearest manifestation of state violence in cyberspace is in offensive cyber capabilities: the adversarial manipulation of digital devices and networks for interstate competition and globalised repression. However, the literature on OCCs is dominated by a narrow definition of violence as bodily harm, classifying OCCs as largely non-violent. This narrow definition has both analytical and policy consequences. Analytically, it implies undue homogeneity across the wide range of strategically relevant uses of OCCs. At a policy level, it means that many harms caused by OCCs are un- or under-appreciated by states and other actors. The account provided here provides greater analytical purchase on this expanding domain, as well as stronger normative foundation for action. An expanded concept of violence, including affective and community harms, reveals how OCCs relocate state violence through new means of repression and information manipulation, without simplifying or exaggerating their complex effects. Some readers may object that expanding the definition of violence is hazardous, diluting the devastating effects violent actions have on their victims and their communities. While we recognise this danger, we aim to show that the opposite is also true. Holding on to a narrow definition of violence leads one to misconstrue the harms resulting from the use of OCCs to the detriment of their victims. Further research is required to substantiate this relocation with empirical data, including large-scale surveys of cyber conflict and extended case studies that trace the decision-making processes behind individual deployments. Further work is also needed to transfer this account of violence from states to semi- and non-state actors, as well as to examine the justifications for violent uses of OCCs in more detail. This article has three main implications for theory and policy on cyber conflict. First, the affective and community harms caused by OCCs need to be identified, anticipated, and taken seriously in decisions about their use. Second, research and policy should focus on the most violent uses of OCCs, which may not be state-sponsored cyber-espionage or sabotage, but instead the adaption of authoritarian systems to rely on digital and globalised repression and rework existing practices of information manipulation against their adversaries. Third, and most importantly, adherence to a narrow conception of violence means that many states have undertaken significant harmful actions in their own and each other's societies without recognising them as such. Our current conceptual tools hamper institutional adaptation to counter and mitigate these broader harms, such as military doctrines and capabilities, intelligence capabilities, criminal laws, police support, victim counselling, and so on. Our redrawing of the concept of violence to include affective and community harms provides defensive actors with a stronger conceptual foundation to accurately measure harms exerted via digital means and then act to prevent them. Are OCCs the better angels of our digital nature? We have argued that they are not; on an expanded concept of violence, OCCs represent not Pinkerian optimism, but a more complex relocation of state violence. The main contribution of this article is thus the application of an expanded conception of violence to better understand the impact of OCCs on individuals and societies. But the account of violence put forward here also has broader implications. Many other emerging security technologies, such as lethal autonomous weapons systems, raise similar questions about the extent and type of violence they cause, in part due to their reliance on informational as well as material means to produce harmful effects. The expansion of the concept of violence we have undertaken in this article could also be applied to other information-enabled technologies, to identify and ultimately work to ameliorate currently unseen forms of harm in global politics. Consequently, in addition to its main contribution in rethinking the violence involved in cyber conflict, our study also provides new insights into how to best conceptualise violence in international affairs more widely.

**Psycho – Link – Security**

**The United States is on an endless quest for absolute security. Not only is this state unobtainable, but justifies endless interventions for the purpose of enjoying the loss of war.**

**McGowan ‘13** (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 159-161) EG

Nowhere is the retreat from enjoyment to pleasure more evident than in the American response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The attacks immediately reinvigorated the social bond for a majority of Americans. The loss that they occasioned brought subjects back to the shared sacrifice that defines their membership in American society. Even as they were horrified by the image of the towers burning and then falling, most Americans, in the strict psychoanalytic sense of the term, enjoyed the attacks insofar as the attacks allowed them to experience once again their social bond with great intensity.

This is a bond that one suffers, just as one suffers from a terrorist attack. Even though it followed from an attack, this bond was not one formed through the male logic of friend/enemy, which is why the headline in *Le Monde* on September 12, 2001, could proclaim, “Nous sommes tous Américains.”27 The bond formed around the September 11 attacks was not initially a bond of exclusivity with a clear outside and inside. Any subject willing to accede to the experience of loss could become a part of American society at that moment. The not-all of the social bond occurs through the experience of loss, but the recognition of this type of bond is unbearable. One enjoys it without deriving any pleasure from it. It is, in fact, painful. Not only is it painful, but it also entails complete humiliation. The society experiences the shame of being a victim and enduring trauma — the shame of enjoyment itself.

In order to disguise this shameful enjoyment, the United States quickly turned to an assertion of power that would carry with it the promise of a restored wholeness — the recovery of an imaginary perfect security. The attack on Afghanistan brought pleasure to most members of American society. This pleasure had the function of rendering the enjoyment that emerged through traumatic loss bearable, but it could not fulfill its inherent promise. Enjoyment satisfies, and pleasure always disappoints. The disappointing nature of the attack on Afghanistan paved the way to the subsequent attack on Iraq in a further attempt to find an actual pleasure equal to what we anticipated. In terms of American society, these foreign wars serve as alibis for the enjoyment of the traumatic attacks themselves. Because we seek respite from the loss that binds us, we flee from the social bond despite our purported desire for it. The authentic social bond exists only in the shared experience of loss — that is, only according to the female logic of not-having.

But the attack on Iraq also illustrates the inescapability of the enjoyment attached to loss. The Iraq War clearly follows from the male logic of having and aims at producing the pleasure resulting from possession: the United States would conquer a recalcitrant dictator and obtain a firm ally in a globally significant region. This is both the stated justification for the war and the explanation offered by critics who see it as an exercise in American imperialism. For both the perpetuators of the war and its critics, the war concerns having, despite the different inflections they give this idea. But the result of the war is the failure of having and the renewed experience of loss. The pursuit of the pleasure involved in having returns American society to the traumatic loss involved in the September 11 attacks. Of course, no one fights wars with the express intention of losing them, but every war brings with it sacrifice and loss, which is ultimately the substance of the social bond and the source of our ability to enjoy that bond. The pursuit of the pleasure of having leads to the loss that inevitably accompanies this pursuit.

Imperial powers do not attempt to stretch their military and economic reach to the point that it breaks because of an inescapable will to power or a biological urge for infinite expansion. The conquering drive of empires has its roots in the search for what no amount of imperial possession can provide — the enjoyment of the experience of loss. Empires conquer increasing quantities of territory in order to discover a territory that they can’t conquer. In this same way, the Afghanistan War disappointed the American leadership because it didn’t provide even the possibility for loss. Donald Rumsfeld’s lament that the country didn’t have any targets to bomb points in this direction. Iraq, in contrast, promised a possible defeat, and if it hadn’t, Syria or Iran would surely have come within the sights of the Bush administration. Whatever the proffered justification or hidden motivation, powerful societies ultimately go to war in order to reenact a constitutive loss and facilitate the enjoyment that this loss entails.28

#### The United States engages in attempts to achieve a fantasy of security as a palliative to its nostalgia for a “lost wholeness”.

**Terada 14 -** Randall Terada is a member of Lacan Toronto and works with a number of local community agencies providing psychoanalytic based consulting. He received his Ph.D. from York University in 2013. (Randall Terada, “Review: A Politics of the Death Drive”, American Imago , Vol. 71, No. 1 (Spring 2014), pp. 89-96)

Drawing political ramifications, McGowan rejects both the politics of nostalgia—either progressive or conservative—that seeks to redeem a lost plenitude and the deconstructionist alternative that posits a receding horizon of possibility that politics should seek to keep open. Instead, he argues for remaining within rather than fleeing this recurrent manifestation of loss, this condition of masochistic self-wounding that derails our best-laid plans, for which we then blame others: Rather than trying to avoid violence, we can restore to it its proper object—the self. The more the subject engages in a violent assault on its own forms of symbolic identity, its own ego, its own deepest convictions, the more the subject finds an enjoyable alternative to the satisfactions of aggression. (p. 51) The repetitive return to painful and humiliating experiences of vulnerability and loss marks the transition to a subject of drive. Enjoying what we don’t have, McGowan argues, opens up the possibility of a different type of social solidarity, one based on loss, yet open to infinite possibility.

Politics, Knowledge, and Enjoyment

McGowan cites the 2001 attack on the World Trade Centeras an example of an enjoyment in loss with direct political bearings. A social bond emerged through an experience of collective loss, such that the headlines of French newspapers proclaimed on that day, “Nous sommes tous Américains” (p. 160). However, precisely because a return to a foundational experience of loss is traumatizing, the subject seeks to escape this unbearable enjoyment and instead finds something pleasurable to disavow it (p. 38). Because enjoyment of loss is a painful, shameful, humiliating experience, the United States quickly covered over the loss and turned to an assertion of imperial will “that would carry with it the promise of a restored wholeness—the recovery of an imaginary perfect security” (p. 160). For a brief moment, a social solidarity emerged around this loss, but at that precise moment, too, forces were deployed that carried the promise—and nostalgia—of restoring a lost wholeness. Reflecting upon the social context in which these conflicting responses occurred, McGowan discusses the relevance of the proximity of the real other. The decline of grandiose figures representing the lawful order—such as the local parish priest, the politician, or the leader of the local business community who doubles as the local football coach—has led more and more to a decline in prohibitions and common symbolic mediations, all of which has given rise to the unbearable proximity of the other and the ideology of tolerance through which we mediate this new proximity. Tolerance, however, simply strips away otherness, so that we do not encounter the other in its real dimension, in other words, unmediated by a symbolic structure (p. 117). Tolerance, McGowan argues, stands in the way of a radical ethical posture. Paradoxically, the fantasy of enjoyment that the xenophobe constructs around the other “permits an encounter with the real other that liberal tolerance forecloses…The ethical position thus involves sustaining the liberal’s tolerance within the conservative’s encounter with the real other” (p. 120).

**Psycho Link – Prolif/Nuke War**

**The desire to understand the real is the root cause of nuclear proliferation**

**Matheson 15** (Calum Matheson is an Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive”, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill , 2015, <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uuid:4bbcb13b-0b5f-43a1-884c-fcd6e6411fd6)/AK47>

The Real of the Bomb reveals the incompleteness of this world and motivates attempts to find what we imagine is concealed beneath it. Nuclear obliteration is to its devotees perhaps even a promise of divine Truth that offers transcendence of the fallen world of mediation in which reality is never complete. With such a contradictory set of attachments, it is **hard to imagine that efforts to think about the Bomb can achieve their goals**—while they might demonstrate their own consistent logic, the rationality of nuclear politics is warped by the intrusion of the Real and the desire to commune with it directly. Communication studies is full of cogent analyses of instances where language or other media worked very well indeed to organize political responses, persuade audiences, bind people together around texts, and change attitudes, but these accounts are incomplete without attention to the Real. The subject of nuclear war challenges how we think about communication itself and demands new thinking on the limits of mediation. The central question of this dissertation is not how should we talk about nuclear war, but what can nuclear war 9 show us about how we attempt to mediate that which we understand to exceed the limits of mediation itself? For attempt we do. The vertiginous hole in the whole of reality is only the first part of the Bomb’s relationship to desire. Nature abhors a vacuum, and so does the **symbolic order through which the human world is built.** The Symbolic, as Jacques Lacan styles it, cannot tolerate the revelation of its inadequacy in the Real, the tears left in our map by the inhuman world. We endlessly attempt to heal the rifts of the Real, to feign unicity where it has failed (Lundberg 2-3). The response to chaos is control; order is imposed against contingency in an effort to re-impose coherence. This dynamic of automaton (order) scripted over tuché (contingency) is developed in Chapter 2. **When these attempts fail—and because the Real by its nature cannot be assimilated, they must—we simply try again.** In Lacanian psychoanalysis, this dynamic is the repetition compulsion, in which the subject tries again and again to control the conditions for presence and absence, enjoying not the outcome but the exercise of subjectivity itself in the capacity to act and to choose. **Subjectivity requires the sacrifice of continuity through the formation of the alienating identity of the mirror phase,** a process explained more in Chapters 1 and 2. Discontinuous subjects are organized in part around the lack—something that would make them whole again, represented in an object that is never more than a partial stand-in for this missing completion. Frustrated in the quest for something outside, we enjoy our own subjectivity.2 In the context of nuclear war, this meant ever more sophisticated simulations of a phenomenon about which we remained basically uncertain. This is the second movement of desire in (or **for) the Bomb**. The enjoyment of our reasserted control over 2 “Enjoyment” is meant here in the Lacanian sense of jouissance, not as happiness or fulfillment, but as an attachment to something that often exceeds pleasure and manifests in quite harmful ways. 10 **the Bomb manifested in the repeated attempts to simulate its use and predict its aftermath.** The fort-da game described by Freud and explained here in the first two chapters is an important tool for unpacking this dynamic because it posits a sense of control over presence and absence as the condition for a subject’s enjoyment. Fort-da refers to the game in which a child makes an object disappear and reappear in succession, simulating her or his mother’s coming and going and the possibility of her eventual disappearance. **Enjoyment comes from the subject’s control over these states of presence and absence, a small example of imposing order in a world of seeming chaos** (Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle 13-17). Understanding this is necessary to draw the common threads between the cold-blooded excesses of Pentagon nuclear plans, the compulsion that leads survivalists to stockpile rooms full of MREs, and the appeal that apocalyptic videogames hold for millions of players. Ins all of these pursuits, the world is made absent in the fantasy of destruction and present again in the myth of reconstruction, survival, and rebirth. Nuclear **weapons scholarship evinces its own compulsion to repeat: myriad investigations of nuclear texts are done, but each leaves something unanswered. The movements of desire are incompletely by scholarship on nuclear weapons concerned only with exposing the truths of nuclear danger, analyzing specific instantiations of nuclear rhetoric, or developing a vocabulary for democratic political resistance.** While the instrumental and political aspects of language are important, to focus too narrowly on specific discourses threatens to neglect the forest for the trees. The political movements that attracted great attention in the 1980s—opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Nuclear Freeze Movement, and the radical disarmament movement—were at best partial successes. This is not to say that these movements or 11 their scholarly treatments are unimportant—they are certainly helpful for those concerned with nuclear activism and decisionmaking. Still, even if we slowly trace an asymptotic relation to the zero of nuclear desire, part of the process is recognizing the pull this unattainable zero has on our efforts to track it and how those investments sustain the larger discourse of nuclear warfare. That **larger system persists almost unchanged, with thousands of weapons prepared for launch on short notice, an endless profusion of war plans, an official policy to secure peace through the threat of genocide, and almost complete public ignorance that the sword of Damocles still hangs from its slender thread.** The primary difference between nuclear awareness in 1985 and 2015 as it relates to their own weapons is that ever fewer citizens of the nuclear states even bother to check how much the rope is fraying. In other words, the material artifice of nuclear warfighting persists despite repeated attempts to understand its persuasive elements. Existing attempts to study nuclear weapons could benefit from the concept of the death drive as a problematic for communication studies.

#### The aff sustains the ‘nuclear priesthood’ of debate – in an attempt to control the absolute contingency of the Real, we repetitively invest in a practice of control over nuclear weapons. The 1AC’s enjoyment of nuclear weapons becomes a form of violent repetition compulsion that turns the case.

Matheson 15 (Calum Matheson is an Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive,” 6/23/15)

The conflation of Symbolic and Real is at the heart of the Bomb. Jacques Derrida famously wrote that nuclear war is “fabulously textual,” having no existence outside of the system of language, which we might broaden to representation, or better yet, mediation. Derrida argued that because a total nuclear war has not taken place and its coming would obliterate the archive, it can exist only in its “essential rhetoricity” as a “fantasy” or “fable” that has no referent in reality (Derrida 24-27). Some, like Masahide Kato, have criticized Derrida on the grounds that nuclear war has taken place in the form of nuclear testing, part of a larger project of radioactive colonialism and destruction of indigenous peoples (Kato). I read this argument a different way. We do not have to deny that a nuclear war is in some sense ongoing in order to claim that it has never happened. The kind of nuclear war imagined by Kistiakowsky at Trinity can never come to pass because it means the end of everything on Earth. The radioactive destruction of native nations does not qualify as a “total” nuclear war in the minds of strategists and their peace activist Doppelgängers because the war they imagine is beyond any material referent, only hinted at by the presence of the Bomb on Earth. It represents both the Real in its punishing materiality and a speculation that could not exist anywhere but the human imagination. The desire to experience the Real is therefore bound to be frustrated. The final advent of the Bomb always seems imminent but is never realized, so obliteration is endlessly deferred.7 The desire for the Real described in this chapter is thus a source of inevitable failure and frustration. But it is only on part of the death drive. Unable to meet the Real and still remain extant as discrete subjects, taunted by the continuity that lies over the line of taboo, our desires remain. We are dislocated and decentered by the Bomb, but we do not accept our being as dust and ashes. Instead, the subject desirous of the nuclear Real finds its enjoyment in the opposite fantasy: one of power over the conditions of presence and absence, mastery of contingency and the Real itself. This is the dynamic of Freud’s fort-da game, and in context of nuclear war, it manifests itself in the compulsion to repetitively simulate nuclear destruction. Atmospheric nuclear testing ended for the USA in 1963. Ultimately only a relatively small number of people witnessed nuclear explosions anywhere in the world, so inevitably awareness and imagination of the Bomb’s overwhelming presence would spread in an increasingly mediated form. War games as rituals helped to sustain a nuclear priesthood in its (necessarily incomplete) access to the revealed truth of the Bomb after the end of atmospheric nuclear testing left its followers merely longing to “feel the heat.” As these technologies gave form to videogames and ostensibly anti-war simulations, they would democratize access to the Bomb and cement its force as an organizing metaphor for the Real. Ipsos Custodes In his “Seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter,’” Jacques Lacan wrote that “it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject,” and that the subject receives “major determination” from “the itinerary of a signifier” (7). One is “possessed” by the signifier, a thrall to its agency: “the signifier’s displacement determines subjects’ acts, destiny, refusals, ~~blindnesses,~~ success, and fate...everything pertaining to the psychological pregiven follows willy-nilly the signifier’s train, like weapons and baggage” (21). One doesn’t have to adopt a fully deterministic attitude towards structure to accept that it is the sign that speaks through us, not vice versa. Human agency does not operate without restriction, but constitutes a negotiation of rules that largely prescribe our behaviors. In the itinerary of an individual life, one can see the influence of accreted structures that give it form. There is perhaps no better example than that of Vice Admiral Tim Giardina. Giardina is the former deputy head of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, the successor to the Strategic Air Command parodied in Dr. Strangelove. In June 2013, Giardina was caught using counterfeit poker chips at a local casino. It was revealed in the ensuing investigation that Giardina had spent almost 1,100 hours gambling in an eighteen-month period. He was such a common sight that other casino regulars remembered him as “Navy Tim,” and recalled comments he had made about the polygraph requirements for U.S. nuclear forces (he was quoted as saying that the purpose is really to find out if one is “having sex with animals or something really crazy”). Giardina was banned from several casinos but continued to play even after being caught with counterfeit chips.8 Following an investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, he was removed from his post, demoted to Rear Admiral, and reassigned to Washington (Burns). It is not illegal for Navy officers to gamble. Vice Admiral Giardina’s habitual compulsion to play poker did not seem to have any effect on his official duties. Giardina had to be punished not because his actions are out of line with the ethos of the Strategic Command, but precisely because they are not. Giardina enjoyed gambling in poker, but in forging fake chips, he seemed to enjoy gambling on gambling: his was a kind of “meta-gambling,” taking risks on the rules that regulate risks.9 In doing so, Giardina exposed what Slavoj Žižek calls the “obscene supplement” of his system. Ideological fantasies are maintained by disavowing their central, obscene foundation, a gesture necessary to the function of the fantasy but impossible to acknowledge, for the lack of distance would collapse the whole edifice (Žižek 35-36). Admiral Cecil Haney, commander of STRATCOM, said in recent Congressional testimony that the core mission of the organization remains to deter attack on the United States. This means minimizing pervasive uncertainty and risk. In Admiral Haney’s words, “America’s nuclear deterrent force provides enduring value to the nation. It has been a constant thread in the geopolitical fabric of an uncertain world, providing a moderating influence on generations of world leaders” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 7). More directly, it is necessary to identify “where we are taking risk and where we cannot accept further risk” (U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Statement 6). “Risk” and “uncertainty” appear constantly in Haney’s statement, which is a statement for minimizing chance and developing “contingency plans” to control the consequences of unforeseen events. The disturbance of Symbolic order by the contingency of the Real is met with an attempt to restore order, to respond to chance with law. Lacan describes this dynamic as the interplay of tuché and automaton: Where do we meet this real? For what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter—and appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us... First, the tuché, which we have borrowed...from Aristotle, who uses it in his search for cause. We have translated it as the encounter with the real. The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle. The real is that which always lies behind the automaton...it is this that is the object of [Freud’s] concern. (Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 53-54, italics in original) This is the central element of the repetition compulsion. Driven to make our encounter with the Real, we are perpetually disappointed, but the Symbolic world of reality abhors a vacuum. Automaton describes the endless attempts to reach the Real which are doomed to failure but cannot be surrendered, so are repeated again and again. These repetitive behaviors thus develop an aspect of order, and are, paradoxically, orderly attempts to reach the chaos of contingency. They are also linked by Lacan gambling, death, and signification (“Purloined Letter” 28-29). Nuclear deterrence can be read in this frame as an attempt to secure the world against the contingency of the Real, the uncertainty of nuclear war. It is the STRATCOM automaton’s answer to the chaos of the Bomb’s tuché. But the attempt to restore order has at its heart a desire to encounter the Real. In a history of nuclear defense intellectuals, Fred Kaplan described them in the 1980s at the height of their power having come with the mission “to impose order,” but lacking any means to control the wild abandon of the Bomb in a hypothetical war for which there was no precedent, “in the end, chaos still prevailed” (Kaplan 391). Desire is the motive force, and that what we desire cannot be attained is what requires repetition. When the chaos of tuché reigns, automaton does not surrender, but comes to be an end in itself, a site of investment. Repetition itself becomes enjoyable. In repeatedly simulating nuclear war, defense intellectuals who could not experience the Real of nuclear violence could enjoy the illusion of mastery over the terror and fascination inspired by the Real by appearing to simulate the conditions of presence and absence—in this case, the presence of the world-for-us and its absence in the Bomb’s inferno. Langdon Winner distinguishes between risk (a term prevalent in both nuclear war and poker) and threat or hazard on these grounds: risk always has an implied benefit to it, an element of desire and an opportunity for control (145). There is little empirical basis for nuclear war simulations and the calculations of probability they rely on, so nuclear war plans always require a good deal of faith, and thus to adopt them is a risk—a calculation of both hazard and reward (Ghamari-Tabrizi 8). Their parameters are set arbitrarily by the personnel who design them. In other words, they are games of chance in which we also manipulate the rules. This is the obscene supplement of nuclear deterrence that Vice Admiral Giardina could not be allowed to reveal: we don’t just repeat nuclear simulations again and again because we think that they will someday be perfect. War games are fun, and we don’t always care about the rules. Poker, after all, was rumored to be the genesis of game theory at the RAND Corporation, prominent modelers of nuclear war, and was a favorite pastime of the defense intellectuals who sought to tame the world with human reason (Arbella 51-53).

**Psycho Link – Tech**

**This form of technological management is an expression of the death drive – that causes projection of our fears onto the human and non-human world to justify their annihilation**

**Dodds 12** [Joseph, MPhil, Psychoanalytic Studies, Sheffield University, UK, MA, Psychoanalytic Studies, Sheffield University, UK BSc, Psychology and Neuroscience, Manchester University, UK, Chartered Psychologist (CPsychol) of the British Psychological Society (BPS), and a member of several other professional organizations such as the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society, Psychoanalysis and Ecology at the Edge of Chaos, p. 70]

Here there are echoes of Freud's (1916) idea of 'anticipatory mourning' and the associated attacks and spoiling that we will study below (see p. 72). However, for Searles the natural world is not just a space for externalizing our conflicts. Rather, a healthy relationship to the non-human environment is essential for human psychological well-being. Furthermore, one consequence of our **alienation from nature** is an omnipotent **longing for fusion with our technology**, and a powerful anxiety should this fully occur.∂ Over recent decades we have come from dwelling in an outer world in which the living works of nature either predominated or were near at hand, to **dwelling in an environment dominated by a technology** which is **wondrously powerful and yet nonetheless dead** ... [T]his technology-dominated world [is] so alien, so complex, so awesome, and so overwhelming that we have been able to cope with it only by regressing, in our unconscious experience ... to a degraded state of nondifferentiation from it ... [T]his 'outer' reality is psychologically as much a part of us as its poisonous waste products are part of our physical selves. (Searles 1972: 368)∂ The further we are alienated from nature, the more we are driven into primitive regressive identification and omnipotent fascination with our technology, a **powerful positive feedback loop.** The inner conflict between our human and non-human selves, and our animal and technological natures, is projected onto the environment, further rupturing the relationship and leading to a **spiral of destructiveness** as we 'project this conflict upon, and thus unconsciously foster, the war in external reality between the beleaguered remnants of ecologically balanced nature and \*(hu)man's technology which is ravaging them' (ibid.).∂ Here we are in Klein's paranoid-schizoid world, with a primitive ego unable to differentiate between good and bad mother. While ecologists portray a good eco-mummy doing battle with bad techno-mummy, things are not so simple. As we have seen, civilization (and its technology) is a defence, a 'good mother' to **protect us from capricious and uncaring mother nature** (Freud 1930), but, as Searles suggests, we are supposed to accept that 'our good mother is poisoning us' (Searles 1972: 369).∂ For Searles (1972), **behind both nuclear danger and ecological catastrophe** lies the raw destructiveness Kleinians link to Thanatos, or what Erich Fromm (1992) understands in terms of **necrophilia**. Searles (1972: 370) argues that at this level of functioning **we project 'our own pervasive, poorly differentiated and poorly integrated murderousness**, bora of our terror and deprivation and frustration, **upon the hydrogen bomb, the military-industrial complex, technology**.' We may find the slow, more controllable death from pollution preferable to 'sudden death from nuclear warfare' or we might yearn for the quick relief of a nuclear blast to the 'slow strangulation' of environmental devastation (Searles 1972: 370). **Living with such apocalyptic threats leads to a kind of ultimate version of the defence** Anna Freud (1936) described as **identification with the aggressor**.∂ At an unconscious level we powerfully identify with what we perceive as omnipotent and immortal technology, as a defense against intolerable feelings of insignificance, of deprivation, of guilt, of **fear of death** ... **Since the constructive goal of saving the world can be achieved only by one's working**, as but one largely anonymous individual among uncounted millions ... **it is more alluring to give oneself over to secret fantasies of omnipotent destructiveness**, in **identification with the forces that threaten to destroy the world**. **This serves to shield one from the recognition of one's own guilt-laden murderous urges,** experienced as being within oneself, to destroy one's own intrapersonal and interpersonal world.(Searles 1972: 370)∂ In this view, we are seeing a kind of repetition on a planetary level of an early intrapsychic anxiety situation. In childhood 'a fantasied omnipotence protected us against the fUll intensity of our feelings of deprivation, and now **it is dangerously easy to identify with seemingly limitless technology and to fail to cope with the life-threatening scarcity** of usable air, food, and water on our planet' (ibid.). Unfortunately our technological powers have outstripped our emotional maturity, and the omnipotent phantasies of infancy now have a frightening objectivity. In place of a religion we no longer believe in, or hopes for future generations we no longer have meaningful contact with, we identify with our immortal, inanimate technology.∂ In this realm of omnipotent fantasy ... mother earth is equivalent to all of reality ... a drag ... to our yearnings for unfettered omnipotence ... It may be not at all coincidental that our world today is threatened with extinction through environmental pollution, to which we are so strikingly apathetic, just when we seem on the threshold of technologically breaking the chains that have always bound our race to this planet of our origin. I suspect that we collectively quake lest our infantile omnipotent fantasies become fully actualized through man's becoming interplanetary and ceasing thereby to be man ... [W]e are powerfully drawn to suicidally polluting our planet so as to ensure our dying upon it as men, rather than existing elsewhere as ... gods or robots ... **[T]he greatest danger lies neither in the hydrogen bomb ... nor in the more slowly lethal effect of pollution ... [but] in the fact that the world is in such a state as to evoke our very earliest anxieties and at the same time to offer the delusional 'promise'** ... of assuaging these anxieties, effacing them, by fully externalizing and reifying our most primitive conflicts ... **In the pull upon us to become omnipotently free of human conflict, we are in danger of bringing about our extinction.**(Searles 1972: 371-372).

### Psycho Link – Hegemony

#### The affirmative’s attempt to construct an American-dominated global system through hegemony is invested in the construct of a “whole” America that sustains itself off Weapon States. In an impossible world of complete hegemony, destruction of subjecthood occurs through the fulfillment of all desire.

Solomon 15 (Ty Solomon is a Lecturer in International Relations (Politics) at the School of Social & Political Sciences, Adam Smith Building, Bute Gardens, University of Glasgow, “The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.5031921>, University of Michigan Press) AqN

The fantasy of Krauthammer’s discourse differs notably from fantasies offered by neoconservatives at other times. In one sense, this is to be expected. Different times and issues call for different arguments. Yet many observers note that since the beginning of the movement during the 1970s, one fairly consistent quality of neoconservatism is the ever-present sense of doom just around the corner and national choices that are always starkly dichotomous. As Bacevich (2005: 77) wryly observes, “On the one hand—if the nation disregards the neoconservative call to action—there is the abyss. On the other hand—if the nation heeds that call—the possibility of salvation exists.” Krauthammer’s text displays many of the usual neoconservative precepts, such as the primacy of military power and the idea that American global hegemony is benevolent and beneficial for non-Americans. The key tension in Krauthammer’s text, though, is that the notion of “chaos” lurking close-by conflicts with the major thrust of the message of unipolarity. We can understand the role of desire in the discourse through this tension. Rather than constructing a subject of lack, Krauthammer’s discourse largely constructs a subject much closer to fullness. This, in turn, does not evoke desire for identification but instead kills desire for identification. Desire (as understood here) is coextensive with lack (Fink 1995: 54). To exist as a subject, one must desire. Lack evokes desire, desire drives identification, and only through identification with the social resources of the Symbolic can subjects gain the recognition they need to achieve a sense of stability and security. Krauthammer’s discourse presumably does not spark much desire because the subject it produces is, strictly speaking, not lacking all that much. As the unipolar power—or, as the subject “America” is constructed through the fantasy of being a unipolar power—Krauthammer’s discourse includes little desire for something else that might make the subject feel more secure or more stable. As the unipolar power, the subject “America” already seems quite close to the wholeness of enjoyment in terms of a world of American-imposed rules. Now that the Cold War is over, and now that the only other superpower that remotely had the capability to impose its own global rules is no more, the obstacles to the subject’s enjoyment have largely been removed. Yet the effect of this subject formation on a receiving audience—in terms of an audience “being positioned (or having existing positionings reinforced) as complex subjects” (Fairclough 1992: 135)—depends on the workings of desire. Once the subject approaches the object it believes it desires, desire for that specific object paradoxically begins to fade. If one were to find the Thing that would truly make one whole, desire would die, and subjectivity would evaporate. The ultimate contingency of our desire and identifications would set in, and one would cease to be a desiring subject. As Lacan (1998: 111) argues, “‘That’s not it’ is the very cry by which the jouissance obtained is distinguished from the jouissance expected” when one approaches the perceived missing object. Desire is sustained by not reaching the missing object: “The satisfaction of desire essentially consists of the preservation of its own unsatisfaction, since a subject remains a subject only insofar as . . . he is a desiring lack-of-being that wants-to-be” (Chiesa 2007: 155; see also Fink 1995: 103). That is, the closer the subject gets to enjoyment, the more desire fades and the more anxiety sets in, since only through desire do we have subjectivity, and therefore the more desiring the subject becomes.5 Indeed, fantasy’s purpose is to ward off anxiety and contingency: This way enjoyment is kept at a “healthy” distance, not too far but not too close either; close enough to support the appeal of an object of identification but far enough from letting us entertain the vision of full satisfaction as an imminent possibility—something that would kill desire, induce anxiety, and put identification processes in danger. (Stavrakakis 2007: 198) Although Krauthammer’s message of unipolarity constructs a discursive subject not lacking all that much, thus evoking less desire for identification with it than might otherwise be the case, the fantasy of the “unipolar moment” was not completely without lack. This is expressed a few ways in the discourse. First, we can understand the place of object a in this fantasy as the lack of an American-dominated world, toward which Krauthammer—and the subject his discourse constructs—is oriented throughout the text. While the international system is, in Krauthammer’s view, undoubtedly unipolar, it is not unipolar to the extent that every other state or actor willingly submits to an American-imposed order. “Weapon States” are some of the few states mentioned at all in the text, presumably because they are the outlaws that do not conform to post–Cold War order as defined by the United States. North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, and South Africa all pose blockages to American/global order through their possession (at the time) of weapons of mass destruction, even though some of these states were more threatening than others. The obstacle that these few states pose to a truly unipolar world—where “we” no longer must “hope for safety” but can seemingly achieve complete safety—evokes desire to remove them as obstacles to the fantasy of enjoyment. Desire is constructed as pushing toward that elusive object believed to bring the enjoyment of being a complete subject— here, understood as an American-centered world with American-imposed global rules. Although this object is unattainable (since it is but a Symbolic manifestation of a void), the subject’s fantasy allows it to believe that this object is attainable. An absolutely American-dominated global system—a full subject—is indeed presupposed to exist were it not for these few states that pose an obstacle. Krauthammer’s entire discourse guides the audience to believe that a truly American-centered world is entirely plausible and desirable, yet this object of desire that promises enjoyment does not exist. Not merely the social construction of threat, Krauthammer’s production of “Weapon States” hinges on the movements of desire and enjoyment that make possible Self-Other relations. The construction of these threats is in one sense, as many international relations (IR) identity theories would contend, the production of a hierarchy of “identities” in which America is differentiated from those states that are not America or the new American unipolar world (see Weldes 1999). “Weapon States” here constitute the opposing side of a binary between those states that are members of and are perceived to openly welcome the new American world, and those states that are not “us.” Yet in contrast to such approaches, more than just the presence of these Others poses an obvious threat to “us.” Consequently, it is not enough merely to make explicit the binary construction of identities. As Slavoj Žižek (1993: 206) contends, “It is not sufficient to point out how the . . . Other presents a threat to our identity. We should rather inverse this proposition: the fascinating image of the Other gives a body to our own innermost split, to what is ‘in us more than ourselves’ and thus prevents us from achieving full identity with ourselves.” In other words, the construction of the subject through reference to an Other—the construction of “America” through reference to “Weapon States”—is premised on a frustration of the “American” subject of the discourse. The fully enjoying subject is an impossible project, and “America” and a completely American-dominated global system are likewise impossible projects, since no social entity can fully construct itself. The discursive production of “Weapon States” “gives a body,” in Žižek’s words, to the ultimate frustration and incompleteness of the subject in Krauthammer’s discourse. These movements of frustration and desire for a full subject give rise to the construction of fantasies of Self and Other in Krauthammer’s discourse. This process involves the notion that fantasies often presume that Others “steal our enjoyment” (Žižek 1997). This subtly appears several times in Krauthammer’s discourse. Although “we” are without a doubt the only superpower, Krauthammer (1990–91: 29) asserts that “there will constantly be new threats disturbing our peace.” Global stability is “our” stability, since American domination is (again) good, necessary, and vital if “chaos” is to be avoided. “Weapon States” that “brandish” their weapons must be policed to alleviate the threat they pose, and the rise of “intolerant aggressive nationalisms in a disintegrating communist bloc” can be read as moments of fantasy blockages in which the Other is doing something “we” should be doing. One gets the sense that as the lone superpower, America alone should have the right to “brandish” its weapons of mass destruction—for example, in “unabashedly laying down the rules of world order.” One also gets the sense that the potential rise of “aggressive intolerant nationalisms” poses a blockage to the desiring American subject because America itself should have the sole right to engage in the behaviors engendered by such forces. Krauthammer’s entire discourse is constructed around the idea that America should aggressively promote its own ideas for how the world should be organized and policed and that no other entity has the ability or license to do so. America alone should dominate the world, and for Krauthammer, America should be intolerant of anyone else attempting to preempt this new opportunity, for this is the road to “chaos.” America possesses the “strength and will” that the rest of the world does not, and thus America rightfully should exercise those qualities to the benefit of all. Others’ “aggressive intolerant nationalisms” are threatening and not to be tolerated, but American aggressive and nationalistic expansion are to be welcomed. American nationalist-driven internationalism is beneficial for the world, while other nationalisms are threatening. This illustrates the notion that constructions of Self and Other are underpinned by desire and enjoyment—or, rather, the perceived theft of enjoyment by others. “What we gain,” Žižek (1993: 206) contends, “by trans- posing the perception of inherent social antagonisms into the fascination with the Other . . . is the fantasy-organization of desire.” Through Krauthammer’s production of threats, one sees the fascination exhibited by what others are doing, the enjoyment that they are displaying, and how “they” are in a sense stealing the enjoyment that “we” should be having and are lacking. The “fullness” that they seem to attain in their enjoyment is perceived as precisely the Thing that “we” seem to be missing. “America” is lacking in some sense, and the Thing it lacks is the very Thing that “Weapon States” brandish openly. Moreover, there is the worry that isolationism keeps “America” from being fully itself. Indeed, if this revival spreads, an American “collapse to second-rank status will not be for foreign but for domestic reasons,” such as the country’s “insatiable desire for yet higher standards of living without paying any of the cost” (Krauthammer 1990–91: 26–27). Krauthammer’s fears of isolationism relate to the “strength and will” of which he speaks in closing his essay. Yet the manner in which isolationists, in Krauthammer’s view, define the national interest goes against America’s true national interests, which extend beyond the narrow confines of the nation’s borders. America should “unashamedly” lay down its own rules for global order, since the world’s interests coincide with American interests (33). Although isolationism may indeed be an old theme of American foreign policy, it is simply out of place in a unipolar world, which by definition must be dominated by the unipolar power. “Isolationism” in this sense weakens precisely the part of the American subject that must be utilized in imposing and enforcing world order. Krauthammer’s emphasis on the necessity of “American strength and will” for world security points to qualities that the subject “America” needs to have, in some sense has, but in another sense does not have. In other words, “strength and will” are a part of the subject that is missing but that is needed so that the subject can fully become its own image of itself. These characteristics are foremost uniquely American. The rest of the world cannot act without America leading the way, since “where the United States does not tread, the alliance will not follow” (24). The rest of the world lacks the “strength and will” needed to define and carry out global order. In a sense, however, so does the United States. As the unipolar power, America without a doubt has a great deal more “strength and will” than any other power. Yet given a resurgent domestic “isolationism” and other potential “domestic” problems, the United States does not yet have the “strength and will” necessary to fully embrace its global role. The subject is lacking some- thing that is posited as having faithfully served it in the past but that it has lost exactly when it needs it the most. What precisely Krauthammer means by “strength and will” is left undefined, yet their meaning could be filled in any number of ways. This lack of definition—indeed, the impossibility of fully defining what they mean—enables them to function as signifiers covering the subject’s lack in the fantasy. “Strength and will” function as the Symbolic stand-ins for what the subject “America” currently lacks the full force of, yet in some sense they remain a part of the subject. They may have been temporarily or partly lost during the current isolationist revival, but they are still a missing part of the subject that must be rediscovered if “America” is going to more fully step into its proper role as global leader. The partial enjoyment implied in both of these aspects—in the just-out-of-reach image of an American dominated global system and the “strength and will” that is both present in and absent from the subject—sparks the desire for their pursuit. In the fantasy of the “unipolar moment,” the subject “America” seeks the perceived to-be-missing parts of itself that it believes will bring it the enjoyment it seeks, yet the fantasy posits obstacles to explain why enjoyment is not forthcoming and why desire remains frustrated. Although figures such as “Weapon States” are posited as blocking the culmination and stabilization of the subject, these figures merely Symbolically cover over the ambiguity, divisions, and frustrations that are inherent to subject formation itself. Even though the signifier “isolationism” is offered for why our “strength and will” have not been delivered, this of course does not mean that “strength and will” would automatically be forthcoming if “isolationism” were to subside. “Strength and will” do not represent anything but the lack of what the subject is constructed as needing to pursue the image of fullness (an Americandominated world), itself an illusory object projected by the fantasy to pursue enjoyment. However, the desires evoked by the fantasy are very much in tension with the overall tenor of Krauthammer’s discourse. Again, as the subject “America” constructed as the sole superpower, there is not much to desire in Krauthammer’s text for another object that might alleviate the ambiguities of subjectivity. As the sole unipolar power, the collective subject is already close to enjoyment in terms of a world shaped by American-imposed rules. However, when the subject approaches the object it desires, desire itself starts to fade. If one were to find the Thing that would truly make one whole, desire would die, and subjectivity would evaporate. The desires evoked by the fantasy ob- stacles posed and the evaporation of desire the closer it approaches the enjoyment seemingly promised are in tension in Krauthammer’s discourse. In other words, there is not much distance between the subject and the missing object, yet this distance is necessary to maintain desire. The subject in Krauthammer’s discourse (and implicitly projected to an audience) in fact helps to dissolve desire rather than evoking the desire for identification. In closing in on a truly American-centered world, the desire for identification with the subject of this discourse (“America,” the “United States”) induces a kind of dissatisfaction because it comes too close to the object(s) of desire. Without desire, there is no subject, and here the subject is close to fulfilling its desire. In terms of its efficacy or resonance, then, it presumably it fails to spark desires for identification. If the United States now sits astride the globe with relatively little to fear from other great powers, what is left to desire?

### Psycho 1NC – Universality K vs K Affs

#### Centering particular identity categories strengthens capitalism and creates barriers to collective emancipation by occluding universality as a shared point of solidarity.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Introduction: Finding Universality,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Introduction, ebook, dml)

The clear argument of Capital and Marx’s other major works is that particularity or the celebration of particular identity actually strengthens capitalism and its control over one’s existence. Freedom, if it is seen and pursued as a purely particular struggle, nourishes capitalism. The more we imagine ourselves as identical to our particular identity, the more we see ourselves as isolated subjects, which is what capitalism requires. Capitalist subjects see themselves as isolated monads, and identification with one’s particularity produces this sense of isolation. It is only when freedom becomes a struggle for universal freedom that it challenges the capitalist behemoth.

Far from seeing a danger in universality, Marx believes that the real threat comes from accepting the value of one’s particular identity within the capitalist socioeconomic system. Capitalism thrives on a variety of particular identities because this variety provides for more types of commodities to be sold. In our contemporary capitalist society, the goth can buy trench coats and dark eyeliner while the jock can purchase sweatpants and jerseys. More identities lead to more commodities. Even if one’s identity isn’t tied to a particular look, variety of identity still plays into the capitalist system by providing more opportunity for the production of needs. But more important, seeing oneself as particular puts one in the capitalist mindset, where there is no universality that might change the entire structure. By believing oneself to be an isolated particular identity, one takes up the role of the perfect capitalist subject. Capitalism depends on all individuals believing themselves isolated from everyone else.

Although capitalist society talks a great deal about freedom, this freedom is actually a form of servitude for everyone, even those at the top. From top to bottom, everyone in capitalist society does what the economy demands as long as they remain trapped within the bounds of particular identity. Of course, no one can simply give up particular identity and exist as a pure universal, but it is possible to become alienated from this identity. Doing so enables one to abandon one’s libidinal investment in particular identity, an abandonment that makes participation in universal struggle a viable option. But if particular individuals fail to grasp their participation in the universal, they will continue unknowingly to play out their parts in the capitalist economy.

According to Marx, emancipatory change comes through the recognition of the universality of the proletariat, whose revolution frees not just the working class but all classes.14 As long as I fail to see my universal connection with others in capitalist society, I remain the dupe of that society. Attempts to challenge capitalism through insisting on identity can do nothing to dent capitalism’s dominance. Particular identity is what keeps one a capitalist subject.

Just as Marx conceives particular identity as a lure for oppressed subjects, so do Simone de Beauvoir and Frantz Fanon. With Beauvoir and Fanon, unlike with Marx, although we remain within the Western philosophical tradition, we leave the arena of European white guys. Their insistence on universality as the key to emancipation—a position they share with the Western philosophical tradition—reveals that this is not just the claim of those tied to their social advantages.

Beauvoir insists on demolishing the image of female otherness that is, for her, nothing but the badge of oppression. There is no question, for Beauvoir, of celebrating feminine identity as a radical alternative to patriarchy. Femininity holds no essential secret that might provide the basis for emancipation. To the contrary, it is the idea of a feminine identity that she finds oppressive. In The Second Sex, she claims, “If man fails to discover that secret essence of femininity, it is simply because it does not exist. Kept on the fringe of the world, woman cannot be objectively defined through this world, and her mystery conceals nothing but emptiness.”15 Rather than asserting an essence of femininity that society must value and protect, Beauvoir’s move here is the opposite: she wants to demolish feminine identity in order to assert women’s participation in universality. Identity is an obstacle to overcome rather than a foundation from which to base one’s politics. Clinging to particular identity cannot possibly be the source of emancipation since it clearly functions as the driving force for female subjugation.

It is so difficult to abandon feminine identity, Beauvoir recognizes, because its blandishments are almost the only symbolic support that women receive in patriarchal society. As a woman, I receive recognition for my embrace of a feminine identity and ostracism when I reject it. In this way, it becomes clear why identity has an appeal. If identity is oppressive, it nonetheless provides recognition from a social authority. But it is for this reason that identity cannot be emancipatory. Identity remains within the domain of the social authority that recognizes it and is thus dependent through and through. For Beauvoir, valuing the particular identity of the feminine is not a way of fighting sexism but the ultimate acquiescence to it. Beauvoir understands that identity is an ideological trap that the feminist must avoid.16

By giving up the feminine as an identity, the feminist simultaneously undermines the masculine as well. Masculine identity depends on its feminine counterpart that affirms it as its complementary other. Without this support, masculine identity collapses. This is why the feminist struggle against feminine identity that Beauvoir advocates is a battle against patriarchy.

Though Fanon advocates a more violent form of revolt than Beauvoir, their investment in the universality of the struggle is the same. When the colonized strike down their colonizing oppressors, according to Fanon, they do so not on behalf of their particular local identity that Europe has destroyed but in the name of a universality that Europe has abandoned through its turn to colonialism.17 The violence of European colonialism does not consist in imposing a foreign universality on the colonized people. This is the fabrication that the colonialists themselves repeatedly broadcast with their claims of bringing culture to the unenlightened. The violence lies instead in the subjugation of the colonized beneath the foot of the European particular. Colonialism does not involve European universality because universality cannot be parochial in the way that the European colonial project was.

As Fanon sees it, to abandon universality is to fall into the same trap that ensnares Europe itself. The colonized must not follow Europe down the path of retreating from universality into the promulgation of a particular identity. To abandon universality for particular identity is to commit the sin of Europe, though ironically today many criticize universality as a vestige of Eurocentrism. The fight against colonialism is a fight to recognize the universal equality and freedom that colonialism renders invisible. It is not a fight to preserve the particularity of local culture that European colonialism wiped out.

Localism, despite its obvious appeal, is always a reactionary phenomenon. Even if it drives out colonizers, it will replace them with an oppressive regime that will not offer opportunity for the distance from particularity that the universal provides. It is only the move to universality, Fanon recognizes, that opens up a genuine alternative to colonialist oppression. Localism is another form of what it struggles against.

Through Beauvoir and Fanon, the emancipatory project that begins with modernity continues its universalist form. For them as for Kant and Marx, if emancipation isn’t universal in scope, it isn’t really emancipation. Emancipation has its basis in universality and forges singularity through this universality. There can be no equality or freedom for certain identities while others exist outside of equality and freedom. Without an appeal to universals, we lose touch with the emancipatory project altogether.

Universality, in contrast to identity, cannot but be emancipatory. Though there are innumerable cases when an oppressive external force imposes itself on subjects in a holistic fashion, this imposition does not involve universality. No external force can impose universality because no one has the universal to impose. It is not possessable. The universal is what the ruling order doesn’t have, not what it does have. In this way, it is always on the side of those fighting on behalf of freedom and equality because they are what is missing, not what is manifested.

Due to its status as an absence that can never become fully present, the embrace of universality represents a challenge because it entails an acceptance of our necessary alienation. The proponents of the universal cannot identify themselves directly with the universal but can only recognize the distance that separates them from it. No subject can be a universal subject, though the universal is the source of the subject’s singularity. We retreat from universality because it deprives us of the consolations of identity. But it is only by giving up the consolations of identity that we can discover our freedom.

PARTICULAR ENTITIES

Since the latter half of the twentieth century, theorists of emancipation have taken refuge in local particular identity as they seek an alternative to the totalizing dangers of fascism, Stalinism, and global capitalism. Universality, which was for earlier thinkers integral to the emancipatory project, becomes the primary feature of oppression.18 Rather than freeing subjects from their ideological particularity, universality comes itself to be seen as an ideology that allows no quarter for difference or otherness. Fascism, Stalinism, and global capitalism all appear to operate through the imposition of their universality on oppressed particulars. The insistence on particular identity appears as the only viable response.

Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction provides one prominent instance (among many) of this turn to the particular and allergy to the supposed violence of the universal. Through the practice of deconstruction, Derrida undermines the pretensions to universality lurking in Western metaphysics. The deconstruction of the metaphysical tradition is an attempt to reveal the particular origins of its purported universality. As Derrida sees it, deconstruction liberates us from the tyranny of the universal by highlighting its failure to be really universal—its reliance on the denial of its particularity.

Nowhere is this strategy more evident than in the essay “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” which figures the deconstruction of universality as a fight against its inherent racism. Here, Derrida uncovers the mythological origin of the supposed universality of reason. He notes, “Metaphysics—the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West; the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason.”19 Derrida is very clear here: the universal is nothing but the substitution of one’s own particular mythology for a structure that applies to all. Universality is the disguised violence of an inflated particularity. Combatting this violence, for Derrida, is not just a matter of directly asserting particulars. It involves instead revealing how the universal deconstructs itself, how its universality points toward a spectral particularity that it never directly articulates.

It is difficult to overstate the extent of the reversal that takes place when universality comes to seem oppressive and particularity comes to seem liberatory. Neither Kant, Beauvoir, nor Fanon would have believed that such a reversal could even be possible. They would be collectively rubbing their eyes today, sure that their vision had been magically inverted. To claim that our particular identity is the site of liberation is to give up on the possibility that emancipation might occur for everyone—and that it must occur for everyone if it is to truly be emancipation. Affirming particular identity as the site for emancipation not only reverses the historical alignment of emancipation with universality but places an unnecessary barrier in the way of collective political action. In a world that insists on particular identity as emancipatory, it is always difficult to get people to see the commonality of their struggles.

But the great setback is that universality, which is necessarily emancipatory, begins to appear oppressive. If freedom and equality cannot be universal, they fall apart as values. When confined to a select group, they necessarily imply unfreedom and inequality for those outside the group. There can be no freedom and equality for some while others remain unfree and unequal. In this sense, the turn from universality to identity betrays freedom and equality. Universality is an integral part of these values. For this reason, the political reversal that they have undergone is a catastrophe. The theoretical attempt to avoid colluding with totalitarianism has created a situation in which we have lost the thread of universal emancipation.

#### Vote neg to theorize universality as central to political struggle. That’s the only way to reckon with and confront the worst forms of capitalist violence.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Conclusion: Avoiding The Worst,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Conclusion, ebook, dml)

Universalist projects always threaten to become seduced by the possibility of creating the universal into a full presence rather than discovering it as a necessary absence. In doing so, they succumb to terror. This is the perversion that universalism must constantly be on guard against. Whenever people insist on their ability to create a world of complete equality, we should recognize this perversion at work. Even if the perversion of universality is an unavoidable danger inherent in universalizing, it is nonetheless worth the risk. The alternative of total particularity is more murderous and barbaric than the Committee for Public Safety. This is why the solution cannot be a retreat into the confines of particularity.

Particularity does not exist without the absent universal that gives this particularity its sense. The universal is antecedent to the particular. The attempt to retreat from the danger of the universal to the security of a particular identity is doomed to fail. What’s more, the repression of universality for the sake of a full embrace of particularity leads to disaster.

Although it doesn’t appear as evident, the danger of the extreme particularity that capitalism produces is even more ominous than the gulag. The dangers of particularity have the advantage, however, of being much more difficult to discern than those of universality. This is why no one talks about the number of people killed under capitalism. The visibility of the gulag for us today contrasts with the invisibility of exploited laborers, racist institutions, and underlying misogyny that sustain the capitalist system. Although we don’t readily see the horrors that capitalism’s unbridled particularity unleashes, we must nonetheless pay attention to them when tallying up corpses.

When we examine the horrors of capitalism’s insistence on particularity, the leger of destruction ceases to seem so one-sided. The suffering perpetuated in the name of universality actually pales in comparison with what occurred quietly under the banner of particularism. From children working in sweatshops to millions living in favelas to the reign of military warlords, particularism destroys lives without even holding out the promise of universal freedom and equality. It does so in order that a few individuals can pursue the project of accumulation without restraint.

The destruction that capitalist particularity has perpetuated includes two world wars, when the capitalist insistence on particularity led to national identitarian conflicts that make the Reign of Terror look like a time of peace and prosperity. The violence of particularism doesn’t appear as part of an explicit project in the way that universalism does, which is why we don’t chalk it up to particularism or identity as such. The structure of particular violence—a particular identity commits it—ends up exculpating particularism because we blame the individual identity rather than the political philosophy of particularism (or the capitalist structure that demands it). Our judgment on particular identities like that of the Nazis rather than identity as such enables identity to get off scot-free from the judgment of history. When it comes to universalism, the situation is reversed, the blood that universalism sheds redounds to the universal itself, not to the individual actors who order the violence.

When one attributes the violence of two world wars to the capitalist insistence on particularity, this immediately raises questions. The violence that particularism produces seems like natural violence rather than the result of any political project.2 No one entered into the wars in the name of particularity itself but rather for the sake of national interest. This is the case even for the aggressors. But when one enacts violence for the sake of an identity, one is not acting naturally, since there is nothing natural about identity. Every claim about the natural status of violence conceals the particularity (and identitarian philosophy) performing the violence. Such violence always exists against the background of a particularist system and a particularist politics.

Blindness to the violence of particularism makes it easy to impugn universality and to envision political struggle without it. But without the appeal to universality, politics becomes nothing other than a battle between competing interests. When this situation arises, the strongest interest, the interest of capital itself, inevitably wins. The retreat into identity neither spares us from violence nor gives us a more secure route to emancipation. It does nothing but create the possibility for conservative rule.

For too long, politics around the world has been staged on right-wing terrain. We envision a particular world with particular causes. This image of politics leads inevitably to right-wing victories, even when moderates win elections. One cannot count the election of Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, or Emmanuel Macron as a triumph for emancipation but as part of the contemporary conservative wave, despite the explicit political affiliation of these figures. In a world of competing particulars, there is no possibility for an emancipatory breakthrough.

But this is not the only possible way of envisioning political struggle. If we view political contestation as a struggle for the form that the universal will take, we are on the terrain of the Left and the project of emancipation. We don’t need to opt for the universal in one grand act but must begin to theorize universality as the fundamental stake in political contestation. The great leap forward consists in recognizing politics as the struggle between universality and particularity. Once we take this leap, we force the Right to play all their political games on the road. Unlike in football games, in a political struggle home field advantage always wins, and gaining this advantage depends on recognizing the role of universality in politics. The fight for emancipation must be a universal fight, or it cannot be won.

#### Independently—only embracing universality can confront existential impacts.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “This Is Not Identity Politics,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Chapter 6, ebook, dml)

There is one arena where the limitations of particularism become fatal. The political implications of the refusal of universality are catastrophic when we look at climate change. Even when we think about climate change as a global phenomenon, our starting point is too often the various disturbances that we link together to form the idea of climate change. We encounter climate change in particular manifestations like shifting weather patterns, more intense storms, higher water levels, increased temperatures, and so on. The question then becomes whether or not the particulars constitute climate change, which is precisely what opens the door to climate skeptics. But even if we all agree that these particular indications amount to climate change, particularist thinking shapes how we respond.

Although climate change requires a universalist approach, we confront it from the perspective of the particular. As a result, most political initiatives are particular: recycling, driving less, biking more, not using the air conditioning, placing solar panels on one’s roof, planting trees, and so on —up to taking a ship across the ocean to reduce one’s carbon footprint. Even the more holistic solutions like the carbon tax or restrictions on carbon output do not confront the crisis through a universalist politics. We can only address the problem of climate change effectively when we address it in universal rather than particular terms.

The problem is not just that our solutions are particularist but that we perceive the crisis through a particularist way of knowing. Epistemology rooted in the particular makes itself felt most prominently in the assumption of an existential scarcity of resources. Those who believe that humancreated climate change is occurring also presuppose this existential scarcity because they take the particular individual as the starting point. For the particular individual, there are a limited number of resources available that the society must distribute in some way. The economic division of resources takes place against the background of a fundamental scarcity. But as the capitalist system hurtles us closer and closer to a global catastrophe, it is important to avoid thinking in particular terms. One cannot fight climate change by not having children, eating vegan, eliminating air travel, or any of the other particular remedies that the advocates of scarcity preach. The only way to join the fight is to embrace universalism. Our universalism must become unrelenting, or we will destroy ourselves through our particularism.

The climate crisis presents us with a unique opportunity for recognizing universality. The climate crisis is universal not because it affects everyone but because it is the point of absence within every social order. What every society shares today is the environmental catastrophe that it cannot master. This hole within every society doesn’t affect every society in the same way, but it marks the limit that no society can eliminate.

By foregrounding the fundamental absence within every social order, the climate crisis puts us directly in touch with the universal. We become aware of the lack that we have in common. Here, Hollywood cinema, which so often leads us astray, offers an instructive example. The disaster film provides an occasion for Hollywood to turn massive destruction into a spectacle for entertainment. In this sense, we should be suspicious of it, since this is the formula that Walter Benjamin uses to define the aesthetics of fascism. But in addition to the spectacle of destruction, the disaster film, at its best, shows us what few other mainstream films do: the reintroduction of absence into the social field, alongside a connection to universality. Within the disaster film, the disaster does not simply pose a threat to the lives of characters. Much more important, it confronts them with the fact of a structuring absence. The disaster disrupts the daily lives of the characters, makes privacy unsustainable, and brings everyone in touch with universality.

In order to register this disruption, every disaster film begins with a variety of characters engaged in their quotidian behavior. Private concerns predominate the openings of these films. We see, for instance, a display of marital troubles in Mark Robson’s Earthquake (1974), the interaction of a town mayor and her children in Roger Donaldson’s Dante’s Peak (1997), or a class field trip in Roland Emmerich’s The Day After Tomorrow (2004). In each case, the focus on private activity serves only as a prelude to its coming insignificance. In the face of the disaster, subjects must turn their concern away from their own particularity and toward the universal.

In the typical disaster film, the disaster makes everyone aware of a fundamental lack that harbors the universal. When the disaster strikes, characters immediately begin to concern themselves with others. The reintroduction of the structuring absence through the disaster is simultaneously the reintroduction of universality. Everyone confronts their equality with everyone else. The disaster film transforms a particularized world containing only isolated monads into a lacking world of the universal.

Perhaps the outstanding example of this trajectory toward universality in absence occurs in Mick Jackson’s Volcano (1997). As a volcano unexpectedly erupts in the middle of Los Angeles, we see characters abandon their private isolation and come together to struggle against the destructiveness of the volcano and the lava flowing through the city streets. But what is most significant about the film is the relationship that it depicts between universality and capitalist particularity. In order to stop the lava flow from destroying a heavily populated portion of the city, the chief of emergency management Mike Roark (Tommy Lee Jones) plans to dynamite a newly constructed skyscraper to form a dam that would direct the lava to the ocean. The skyscraper is the pride of capitalist Norman Calder (John Corbett), who champions particular concerns over the universal in the film.

The dynamiting of Calder’s building represents the destruction of particularity that rejects any universality. The film underlines this idea through its earlier presentation of Calder. As the threat increases, he attempts to persuade his wife, Dr. Jaye Calder (Jacqueline Kim), to stop treating the victims of the volcano and leave the hospital. Norman wants Jaye to forsake any universality for her particular existence. At one point, he comes to the hospital to beg her to escape the danger. He says to her, “These people are strangers, Jaye. Are you doing to die for them?… Answer me!” In response, Jaye simply continues treating the patients and, without ever looking at him, says, “I am answering you.” Jaye answers Norman’s rebarbative particularity with an unwavering universalism. The fact that she articulates her commitment to universality through the act of not speaking befits this commitment perfectly. Through the depiction of this exchange, the film shows that it understands that a point of absence in the structure of signification constitutes genuine universalism. The disaster awakens her solidarity with others while her husband remains unaffected by it. Through this exchange, the film presents the fundamental choice that the disaster makes evident. We can choose to isolate ourselves in our particularity or avow the universal.

Just as in the disaster film, the catastrophe of climate change makes universal equality apparent. In the face of the incipient disaster, all are equal, even though climate change affects people differently. No one can escape, not even the wealthy individuals now buying up land in areas that they believe will be least affected by the disaster. If they survive in some future isolation, they will survive as empty beings, beings without any universality to set them free. The absence of any viable escape for particular individuals is the form that equality assumes today. This is why any project of confronting the disaster must at the same time confront the growing economic inequality in the contemporary capitalist universe.

Capitalism’s inherent refusal of universality leaves it completely ill-equipped to deal with the climate crisis. Its solutions will always be particular—carbon tax, recycling, bike riding, and so on—when the universal is requisite. When large-scale responses emerge within capitalism, they will be profitable for some at the expense of others. We should reject them in the name of universality. The particularist nature of capitalism will attempt to pit people against each other in the name of saving the planet.

When walking through the streets of Berlin in fall 2019, I glanced up at a placard that ominously portended the capitalist future and made me wish that I was unable to read German. The sign (with a very environmental look to it) read: “Berlin Lässt die Unwelt im Regeln Stehen; Mietendeckel bedeutet: Wir können nicht mehr in den Klimaschutz investieren” (“Berlin Let the Environmental Regulations Stand; Rent Caps mean: We can no longer invest in climate action”). Here we have the perfect particularist (and capitalist) twist to the climate crisis. Rather than see the climate crisis as the occasion for articulating universal equality, the placard enjoins Berliners to see a direct opposition between concern for equality and action on the climate. Attempts such as this pose climate action against egalitarian concerns. On the one hand, the placard accepts that the climate crisis is universal, but it uses this universality as a reason for jettisoning the egalitarian project of rent caps. This has the effect of particularizing the climate struggle. The inherent universality of the climate crisis transforms into a particular struggle when the exigencies of capitalism enter into the equation. But capitalism, due to its complete investment in particularism, is unequipped to address a crisis that demands universality. Thus, the fight against climate change must be a universalist fight against capitalism as well.

Particular identity is always a trap, but when the question so clearly involves the whole planet, particularism becomes even more dangerous. It causes us to miss both pitfalls and solutions that universality renders visible. To retreat into our own particular identity is to participate in the ultimate destruction of human existence itself. More than ever before in human history, the urgency of the climate crisis demands an explicitly universalist politics—and a universalist epistemology—in response.

When we sit around wondering why climate skeptics reject the obvious fact of climate change, we need look no further than the universality that environmental destruction makes evident. Identitarians see in climate change a clear argument for the universality that they oppose. Accepting its existence entails admitting the universality that their political position denies. Universality is inherently dialectical. It lets us see what particular identity hides—connection in the midst of division.

Universality allows for a response to a catastrophe like climate change that is equal to the magnitude of the event. Our particular identity, in contrast, leaves us with only a series of responses that can never add up to being adequate to the problem. The stake of the struggle between particular identity and universality is now existence itself.

#### Centering the universal psychoanalytically generates emancipatory politics.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “The Importance of Being Absent,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Chapter 2, ebook, dml)

This shared way of relating to the universal can be seen as the basis of freedom. Although societies may suppress the awareness of freedom, freedom is universal across every type of social order. The basis for this universal freedom is the inability of any form of mastery, no matter how despotic, to be complete. No society can determine its subjects with complete success but has a point of nonbelonging on which mastery ultimately founders. This point of nonbelonging universally marks every form of society and every type of culture from within. Despite efforts to minimize its effects, it acts as a constant disturbance of every society’s daily functioning. As the point of nonbelonging, the universal is the reverse side of total despotism. Universality exists in despotism’s lack.1

Even if a structure of mastery assimilates one point of nonbelonging, it cannot assimilate nonbelonging as such. Mastery strives toward becoming total, but as it comes closer to eliminating all resistance, it runs into an insuperable barrier—its own dependence on what it cannot assimilate—that acts as a brake on its total control. This barrier energizes the compulsion to mastery by giving it something to act on and thus a reason for being. But despite the power exercised on it, the barrier proves unyielding because it represents the necessary condition for the existence of any mastery at all. As a result, despotic power can’t achieve total despotism. Its external barrier is really an internal limit. If the external barrier ceases to be intractable, another one will emerge. When it comes to despotism, the elimination of one barrier is always the prelude to a new one that will seem just as intractable as the former one did.

We can see this even in the case of the actions of the relatively nondespotic global capitalist order after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This event signaled the end of what was an intractable barrier for the capitalist order: the Iron Curtain. For a brief interlude in the early 1990s, it seemed as if this order would eliminate nonbelonging altogether. But the interlude did not last long. New manifestations of nonbelonging quickly arose, most significantly in various forms of reactionary Islamicist projects, including Al Qaida’s destructive assault on the United States and the attempt by the Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL) to establish a caliphate in the Middle East. This Islamicist terror appeared in the guise of a new intractable barrier, which is why George W. Bush imagined the war against it as an almost unending one. By proclaiming a War on Terror with no definite end point, Bush announced the replacement for the Iron Curtain.

The emergence of this new external barrier to capitalism’s complete globalization testifies to the internal limit of capitalism’s totalization, a limit not just for capitalism but one that renders every attempt at total mastery futile. Even if the form of the barrier is contingent— for the capitalist order, it might have been fundamentalist Christians rather than Islamicists—the limit itself is necessary. The limit that every structure ultimately runs into is an unassimilable nonbelonging that acts as a constitutive absence for the structure. Nonbelonging is universal.

No society can include us without simultaneously alienating us from it. My belonging in a society always breaks down, which enables me to turn against this society when it takes a direction that I cannot accept. This is why I am free. Freedom is not a value of belonging, of being a member of a free society. Freedom becomes apparent as a value when we experience our nonbelonging, a nonbelonging that is universal because it applies to everyone, even those who most feel like they fit in.

We universally fail to fit in, and this universal failure is the basis of our freedom from social determination. Even the most authoritarian society cannot eviscerate the freedom that exists as a result of its inability to integrate individuals into its order with complete success. No matter how strongly social forces act on us, we cannot simply obey without an unconscious supplement to this obedience that undermines it in some way, which is why the Stalinist Soviet Union required special sites for those who didn’t go along. The gulag exists because universal freedom pervades mass indoctrination as a structuring absence. This absence owes its existence to the unconscious that throws the individual out of joint with itself. If there were no unconscious, there would be no freedom, even though we assume that the unconscious, because it involves what we don’t consciously will, is the site of our unfreedom.

Nonbelonging manifests itself in each subject as the unconscious. To have an unconscious means that I can’t belong to myself, that I can never be completely identical with what I am. The gap that prevents the social order from completing itself intrudes in me by installing a gap between what I will and how I desire, a gap that psychoanalysis calls the unconscious. As speaking beings with an unconscious, our unconscious desire is at odds with our conscious will. I will to limit my caloric intake every day in order to keep fit, but my unconscious desire leads me to eat a Twinkie after dinner and sabotage my diet. Unfortunately, my will to diet is not an act of freedom, but the sabotage is.

Freedom emerges out of an unconscious desire that doesn’t jibe with social demands, not in our free will. Acts of freedom do not occur when I consciously weigh the options and make a decision to revolt but when I feel that I cannot do otherwise and act in accordance with my unconscious drive. This is the paradox of freedom and the result of its origin in what we lack rather than what we have (our conscious will).

The universality of this internal distance in all subjects marks their freedom from total coercion. If the demands of the social order and the responses of the individual subject lined up perfectly, there would be no space for universal freedom. We would be locked into our particular identity and locked into our given world. But we constantly see their failure to line up with each other. Even when I try to act in total conformity with social injunctions, a gap remains between the command and my obedience to it. This gap is necessary for both obedience and revolt. It enables me to invest in obedience through an act of identification rather than just following it by rote. But on the other hand, the gap between the social demand and my obedience makes total obedience impossible. Total obedience necessarily hides some degree of rebellion, which is why the appearance of complete obedience always renders authorities suspicious.

The employee who always eagerly follows the boss’s orders may come home at night and dream about killing the boss. The conscious effort to be the perfect employee cannot exist without some unconscious investment in subversion, even if it isn’t as dramatic as a fantasy of murder. It could be as simple as the enjoyment of showing up colleagues who fail to follow orders as promptly or as efficiently. In this way, the conforming employee would contribute to the disorder of the company rather than its efficiency. All communities suffer from the same problem of nonbelonging, not just corporations (which actually have incentives in place to produce belonging, like employment itself and salaries, that other communities don’t have). Nonbelonging brings freedom because it indicates that we have no substantial support in the social order to rely on.2

It is our inability to fully belong that also provides the basis for the universality of equality. No one can fully belong to a social order that is itself incomplete and thus cannot precisely differentiate between belonging and nonbelonging. There is no secure inside that can serve to define belonging.3 All fail to belong equally, even though some cling to the illusion of their belonging more than others.

Social hierarchies mask this failure and present some people as more equal than others. But this value depends entirely on the assessment of others. It is not self-sustained by any social authority. If no one truly belongs, then no hierarchy has any substantial status. All social hierarchies depend on our collective belief in them. Simply by collectively disbelieving in someone’s importance, we can cause this importance to vanish, which reveals the universal equality that becomes evident through the lack of belonging.

### Psycho 2NC – FW vs K Affs

#### The most important political question is form—universality or particularity comes prior to the aff.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Our Particular Age,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Chapter 1, ebook)

How one conceives a struggle is always more significant than which side one takes in the struggle—because it determines which side will be more psychically appealing. We should not measure political victory by who wins elections or by whose issues triumph but by how we envision the political struggle itself. The decisive political question involves not the conclusions that we come to but the form that politics takes. This is evident on a very elementary level in the thinking of Karl Marx: he sees that if we view global politics as the confrontation between sovereign nations, it is impossible to recognize the class antagonism that knows no national borders. We’ll always be thinking about international conflicts and will never be able even to raise the question of class exploitation that transcends national barriers. Historically, Marxists have spent so much time fighting against nationalism because they recognize that investment in the idea of the nation produces a fundamental barrier to seeing the possibility of class struggle.1

This is why one of the first things that Lenin wanted to do when he created a communist government in Russia was to put an end to Russia’s participation in World War I. Following Marx, he saw that the question of an international conflict would render the class struggle invisible. This lesson from Marxism shows that our conception of what constitutes the form of political conflict shapes the possibilities that will be able to emerge in the actual political struggle.

Others have emphasized the importance of form in politics. For instance, linguist and political theorist George Lakoff provides an instructive effort to establish the significance of form in political campaigning. Frustrated with the consistent failures of the moderate Left in the United States, Lakoff offers some advice. He argues that leftists tend to forget that what counts is how we frame political issues, even more than the positions that we take on them. Framing—or form—can render battles more winnable before we fight them. According to Lakoff, the real political struggle takes place on a symbolic level. It concerns the terms that we use to describe the contest between each camp. In the afterword to his book on this subject, Moral Politics, Lakoff makes his clearest statement on this issue. He states, “The facts themselves won’t set you free. You have to frame facts properly before they can have the meaning you want them to convey.”2 Lakoff has a particular prescription for the moderate Left that reveals how he thinks about form. He envisions changing the moral frame that surrounds contemporary issues from one conducive to conservatives (the Strict Father) to one favorable for liberalism (the Nurturing Parent). For Lakoff, winning the symbolic frame game will enable liberal politicians to triumph in elections.

Lakoff grasps that form matters more than content, which is surely right as far as it goes. But it doesn’t go far enough. Despite his efforts at reframing in a leftist direction, Lakoff remains on a basically conservative terrain because his vision of form is not wide-ranging enough. The problem is that he continues to see the struggle in terms of two competing particular camps but imagines the camps differently than we currently do. He simply wants to replace the particularity of the Strict Father with that of the Nurturing Parent. The battle between these two forms is a battle of opposed particulars, arranged so that a different particular might be able to win. Lakoff has no place for universality. His formalist vision is not formalist enough because it never attains universality. The image he lights on —that of the Strict Father versus Nurturing Parent—is already an admission of defeat before the battle.3

By conceiving of the struggle in a way that leaves universality out of the picture, one accepts the basic conservative premise of politics that says that the starting point for politics is the isolated individual. According to this position, individuals exist in a meaningful way outside the universality that constitutes them as individuals in the first place. Once one accepts this premise, the struggle is already over because universality will always appear as an impingement on the privilege of the individual. No argument about universality will ever ultimately prove convincing for those who see the isolated individual as the political starting point. The conservative victory occurs with the dominance of the image of two (or more) particular forces fighting it out for political supremacy.

What this image gets wrong is that political struggle takes place between universality and particularity rather than between competing particulars, despite the fact that we don’t recognize it as such. The struggle between competing particulars or opposed tribes is always a play of shadows that obscures the fundamental opposition between universality and particularity. Universality concerns and sustains all particulars, but particularity [often does not understand] ~~is often blind to~~ the necessity of its connection to others that universality constantly foregrounds. Although universal and particular exist in a dialectical relation—there is no universality without particularity and vice versa—it matters which position one chooses as a starting point.

This opposition between particular and universal as the starting point is what constitutes the distinction between conservative politics of all stripes and emancipatory politics, even though this is not how the distinction is commonly understood. My contention is that the most appropriate way to understand the terms Right and Left is by associating them with particularity and universality, respectively. If one doesn’t take this step and instead sees the opposition as one involving competing tribes, then one implicitly gives the Right the upper hand.

### Psycho 2NC – Universality Good vs K affs

#### Universality is the essential historical basis for revolutionary struggle.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Introduction: Finding Universality,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Introduction, ebook)

Despite the obviousness of inequality in contemporary society, universal equality has ceased to be a thriving political project. This is perhaps the strangest feature of the current order. Rather than fight the massive inequality with a project of universal equality, we engage in struggles for justice for a series of groups—without ever defining justice, without ever naming the equality that would constitute justice. The absence of universalist claims today stands out and separates our epoch politically from prior ones. But the turn away from universality is not just one political development among many. To betray universality is to give up on the project of emancipation altogether.

This is what all the great political revolutionaries of the past have recognized. From the Jacobins in France to the suffragettes in the United States to the African National Congress in South Africa, the most significant political actors have seen universality as the absolute key to their struggle. This is why abolitionist hero Frederick Douglass participated in the epochal Seneca Falls Convention for women’s suffrage and why feminist Elizabeth Cady Stanton joined the Anti-Slavery Convention. They were not practicing coalition building. Both understood that one could not separate the emancipation of some from the universal project of emancipation.

The necessary universality of emancipation is what diminishes the grandeur of the American Revolution in the popular imagination relative to its French counterpart.1 Whenever anyone refers to the revolutionary spirit of the late eighteenth century, it is almost always the French Revolution, not the American, that serves as the touchstone. It’s not just that the American Revolution, despite coming first, didn’t generate a catchy slogan like liberté, égalité, and fraternité, nor have as many exciting beheadings.2 The problem is that the American Revolution betrayed the universality of emancipation by excluding slaves from its emancipatory project.

In 1794, when the Jacobins were in power in France, they made it a point to free the slaves of Saint Domingue (Haiti). In contrast, those who wrote the American Constitution took pains to avoid mentioning slavery or freedom for slaves in order to gain approval from the slaveowners who helped to craft it. Instead of addressing the issue head on, the document makes oblique reference to slaves by counting them as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of representation, according to Article I, Section 2. Subsequently, in Article I, Section 9, the Constitution prohibits Congress from banning the slave trade until 1808, while still managing to avoid the mention of slaves or slavery. The final allusion to slavery occurs in the fugitive slave clause, from Article IV, Section 2, which prohibits slaves from fleeing to states without slavery in order to gain their freedom. But again, the authors of the Constitution managed to construct a fugitive slave law while circumventing the use of the term slave. As this quick survey reveals, slavery functions as the repressed content of the American Constitution.3 It haunts the document but never explicitly appears. As this repressed content, slavery reveals the ultimate failure of American universality. Despite the universal claims of the Declaration of Independence —“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal”—the Constitution exposes the American Revolution’s utter betrayal of universal equality.

The American experience shows how costly the violation of universality is. By giving up on universal equality, the U.S. Constitution inaugurates centuries of inequality for all Americans. Black Americans clearly suffer from this inequality as both slaves and then as second-class citizens, but white Americans lose their own equality as well. One cannot exist as an equal in a society that institutionalizes inequality, especially if one is among the privileged class.

Through the 1960s, attempts to fight this inequality focused clearly on universal struggle. But eventually political struggle in the United States and around the world became more diffuse, and universal emancipation slipped into the background. Universality began to seem itself the badge of oppression, as if invoking the universal put one on the side of mastery and violence. While a universal struggle nonetheless continued, it could not explicitly invoke the moniker of universal emancipation without becoming politically suspect. The loss of the moniker was not simply an insubstantial adjustment in the history of emancipation. The abandonment of the idea of universal emancipation has had catastrophic effects.

But this abandonment did not occur in a vacuum. Perhaps the main reason why the project of universal emancipation became suspect is its horrific failure in the twentieth century. The story of the twentieth century is the story of the egalitarian revolution gone awry. The victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917, Mao’s conquest of China in 1949, the takeover of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge in 1975—all these events (and numerous others) seem to reveal that egalitarian projects are not exactly a good idea. If these movements show us what universal emancipation looks like, we should probably think twice about advocating it. They lead to the Soviet gulag, the Maoist Cultural Revolution, or Pol Pot’s killing fields. The communist path to universal equality produced equality only in the very worst sense: all were equal in death.

But these failed projects of universal emancipation did not fail because of their universality. They failed because of their fundamental misconception about what universality was. In the twentieth century, universal emancipation turned into butchery at the moment when the political projects betrayed the universality that animated them. Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot all believed in the possibility of total belonging. To that end, they tried to create societies in which everyone could belong, failing to grasp that universality exists because everyone cannot belong— through the failure of a social order to become all-inclusive. We cannot invent universality as fully realized and present but must discover it in the internal limit that every society confronts. But these murderous projects viewed equality as a value to invent rather as a value to discover. This is the formula for the gulag.

The invention of equality required a violent uprooting of the past, which is why it led so easily to mass murder. This is the core problem of the communist experiment. Typified by Stalin, these regimes sought to break entirely with the past and to create a new person, one without any of the prejudices of tradition.4 But they missed the key fact that we do not need to invent equality out of whole cloth. We need only look for it in a disguised form in the gap that separates us from each other. Equality does not require liquidation of the old or creation of the new.

Redeeming the project of universal emancipation requires looking anew at what universality means. It requires a turn from invention to discovery. When we discover universality, we see it in what already animates our relations, even—or especially—when we seem at odds with each other. The discovery of universality reshapes how we relate to each other and gives our politics a form that it otherwise wouldn’t have. Turning to a viable conception of universality is politically requisite. Without universality, we have no way to orient our political struggle toward a widespread appeal.

The fear of universality on both the Left and the Right has created a vacuum today. The Right rightfully fears universality because it sees in universality the end of the privileges of wealth and status that it wants to sustain. The Left’s fear stems from a genuine desire not to repeat the experience of the gulag and the killing fields. But the abandonment of universality cuts the heart out of the Left.

Emancipation is always universal if it is genuine emancipation. Struggling for freedom, equality, and solidarity for some and not others is not struggling for freedom, equality, and solidarity. If one’s struggle is not universal, if it does not have implications for everyone, there is no reason at all for others to join one in it. Nonuniversal struggle is a zero-sum game that leaves each group (and ultimately each individual) on its own and incentivizes other groups to work against the particular group’s struggle. What’s more, with the contemporary turn away from universal emancipation, we destroy the promise of modernity itself. We turn away from the important lessons of many of the key figures of modern Western philosophy.

#### It’s empirically more emancipatory than centering particular identities.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Introduction: Finding Universality,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Introduction, ebook)

EMANCIPATION THROUGH INTERRUPTION

The basic idea of the modern Western philosophical tradition is that universality is emancipatory. It has become commonplace, with good reason, to critique this tradition for the racial and gender prejudices that it harbors. To some extent, the major thinkers of the West were trapped within an oppressive ideology that they could not think their way out of. According to this critique, theorists such as Kant, Hegel, and even Marx held onto racial and gender prejudices that they weren’t able to transcend.5 But at the same time, what this critique misses is that they had an insight into the possibility for universal emancipation that we are now in danger of losing. Their prejudices represent their own failure to accede personally to the grandeur of the universalist principles they held. They are particular failings. One can upbraid them for their prejudices only from the perspective of the universalist project that they articulate and that remains viable today.

Emancipation occurs through universality and its ability to lift us out of our immediate situation. Our immediate situation is always unfree because it is given to us, either by the natural world or by the society into which we are born.6 There can be no immediate freedom. Freedom emerges when one begins to depart from the givens of one’s existence, not by hunkering down and attaching oneself to one’s identity.

Freedom lies in universality rather than in the particular identity that resists universality. Particular identity is a stumbling block to overcome, the site of prejudices and unthought inclinations, incapable of serving as the basis for emancipation. What I immediately am is not my essential self but instead what the ideological structure has made of me. Identity—conceived as singular or as an intersection of multiple aspects—is not a basis from which I can fight against ideology but the result of ideology’s operations.

This contrasts it with universality. The most important figures of modern Western philosophy from René Descartes onward see in universality an alternative to the particular positions that remain trapped in their isolation. 7 These figures did not necessarily theorize universality correctly, but even in their failures, they touched on genuine universality and contributed something to a possible understanding of it. This universalist tradition is one that we abandon at our peril. Through a variety of thinkers, it makes clear that universality is not oppressive but rather the vehicle through which we can challenge ideology. What seems like universality acting in an oppressive fashion is always some particular identity passing itself off as universal, never the act of an authentic universality. While authentic universality alienates, it also emancipates through this alienation, which is what distinguishes it from all particularisms.

One of the universals of the French Revolution—solidarity —reveals the relationship between alienation and emancipation. While I might feel an inherent solidarity with those closest to me, like my parents, friends, and even colleagues, I don’t feel such a bond with those I don’t know. I might read about their suffering and think that this is unfortunate, but I lack the inherent solidarity that I have with those close by. When I take up solidarity as a universal value, however, I come to recognize myself in the suffering of would-be strangers. If I am to be faithful to the universality of this value, I cannot simply be what I was and remain in solidarity only with my intimates. Solidarity emancipates me from my parochialism as it alienates me from my particular identity. It demands that I include those outside my orbit in my conception of solidarity. By doing so, I cease to be who I was and become alienated, but I also become free of my local prejudices. Through this turn to universal solidarity, I lose the natural sentiment of solidarity with those close to me. But this alienation creates an emancipating solidarity, one in which I take the side of those alien to me.

By making me other than what I immediately am, the universal opens up the possibility for me to act freely, to act against what my ideological programming tells me to do. Only universality accomplishes this because only universality gives me distance from my ideologically given identity. Although emancipatory political projects might look as if they are identitarian today, all emancipation is universalist, or it is not emancipation. Even if this universalism remains unavowed and obfuscated, it is nonetheless a necessary condition for emancipatory or leftist politics.

### Psycho 2NC – Link – POMO

#### Poststructural theorizing abandons universality as a basis for struggle.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Universal Villains,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Chapter 3, ebook)

Most left-wing theorists turned away from universality after Stalinism without directly commenting on it. With the exception of Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and a few others, theorists simply took up a defense of the particular as their response to the gulag. The silence of Theodor Adorno on Stalinism is especially conspicuous, given how much time he devoted to the analysis of Nazism and the individuals who succumbed to its appeal. But equally noteworthy is the lack of analysis by figures like Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jürgen Habermas, just to name a few. Almost no major theorist of the generation that emerges during the 1960s tries to theorize why the communist project went so wrong with Stalin.

Instead of explicitly critiquing Stalinism for its universality as they do with Nazism, most theorists tended to particularize Marxism in order to make it more palatable and to eliminate the danger of the Marxist universal that Stalinism represents for them. In this vision, there become multiple forms of Marxism. Stalinism results from the narrowing of this multiplicity to a single universal model. Stalin oversteps by taking Marxism too far in a universal direction, but we can retain Marxism as long as we jettison the universality that makes it unpalatable.

Here, Jacques Derrida is the representative figure. Despite Derrida’s theoretical distance from Marxism throughout his early career, toward the end of his life he attempts to create a new form of Marxist multiplicity. In his late work Specters of Marx, Derrida explains the attitude that he advocates, taking up Marx and Marxism in a post-gulag world. The weight of Stalinism leads Derrida away from any straightforward embrace of Marxism, but at the same time, Derrida doesn’t want to give up Marxism’s critical apparatus.

Derrida elaborates the relationship between deconstruction and Marxism in very careful terms. He refuses either to identify his project with Marxism or to reject this identification, but what is most important is that he rejects the conception of Marxism that sees it as a unitary and universal theory. He states, “Deconstruction has never been Marxist, no more than it has ever been nonMarxist, although it has remained faithful to a certain spirit of Marxism, to a least one of its spirits for, and this can never be repeated too often, there is more than one of them and they are heterogeneous.”29 For Derrida, we cannot dismiss Marxism, but neither can we continue to sustain it as a universalizing project. To do so is to fall victim to the version of Marxism that led to the horrors of the twentieth century.

Derrida attempts to align himself with Marxist critique without any longer being a Marxist in order to avoid any complicity with Stalin. Others take a similar path as they turn away from Marxism’s universal struggle toward a series of particular struggles. They don’t advocate total revolution but particular changes—toppling of hierarchies, exploding of binaries, undermining of institutions, and so on. This shift occurs as a way of moving away from the universalism that supposedly produced a figure like Stalin and the horror of the gulag.30

Instead of inspiring suspicion about Marxism’s overinvestment in universality, the Stalinist catastrophe should have led thinkers to see the danger of total belonging. It should have led to a revaluation of the identification of the universal with the ideal of inclusivity. But this is not what happened. A series of thinkers moved away from the universal social analysis provided by Marxism and toward the analysis of particular power dynamics. This entailed a turn from Marx to Nietzsche as the central figure for emancipatory politics, which was a disastrous turn for the Left.

### Psycho 2NC – Alt vs K affs

#### Universality solves better—every defense of particularity is actually a defense of the universal in disguise!

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Introduction: Finding Universality,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Introduction, ebook)

But at the same time, the widespread suspicion of universality and corresponding elevation of identity make possible a clarification of both universality and identity. The political catastrophe is a philosophical opportunity. In the wake of this political reversal, we can make clear that universality is not totalitarian and that particular identity isn’t actually outside of universality. Universality is at once what is missing in the totality and the necessary foundation of every particular identity. Paradoxically, the structure of universality can become fully evident in the aftermath of the political turn against the universal. This turn demands a reevaluation of what universality actually is. The universal is not what it seems to be. It is not a quality that multiple particulars possess in common.

The universal is what particulars share not having. The shared absence of the universal rather than the shared possession of it bonds particulars together. The key to an emancipatory politics in the aftermath of Nazism and Stalinism—and in the epoch of global capitalism—is the recognition that the universal is what we don’t have in common or our shared absence.

Understanding the universal as an absence is the key to thinking about universality outside the context of the murderous regimes that invoked it. Stalin can indiscriminately kill peasants that he labels class traitors because he is imposing the universal on Soviet society. But if the universal is an absence—if freedom is not something that one can impose but something that one cannot possess —then this horror becomes theoretically unimaginable.

When we think of universality in terms of absence rather than presence, it ceases to appear as an overarching whole that leaves no room for particular difference and becomes the basis for the subject’s singularity. I attain my singularity through my embrace of universal freedom and equality. For instance, in a gesture of refusing to participate in a system of segregation or in working to expose the violent origins of the iPhone, I become who I am through my contact with universality, through the act that enables me to free myself from my given particular identity—that of an unthinking segregationist or a cheerful iPhone user.

But the retreat from universality that occurs in the twentieth century has militated against this possibility. Thanks in part to the efforts of anti-universalist thinkers, we exist politically in the abeyance of universality and the prevalence of identity. 20 Political struggles today appear as identitarian ones, not struggles partaking in the project of universal emancipation.

But this situation is not just the result of anti-universalist theorizing. It also follows from the structure of capitalist society. Capitalism engenders identity politics. It does so by stripping away the content of all particular identity by imposing the commodity form on every particularity. This commodity form is not a universal but an empty form that necessitates total conformity. Everyone and everything must be translatable into the commodity form. As a result, within the capitalist system, the content of every particularity becomes insignificant. The particular identities of the capitalist and the worker disappear in their roles as capital and labor in the same way that the use value of the particular object disappears in its exchange value as a commodity.

The structure of capitalism vacates particular identity, leaving subjects with a contentless abstraction that few find satisfying. Capitalism’s evacuation of identity creates a vacuum that quickly fills. Identity politics emerges in response to the capitalist system.21 Although there is nothing necessary about the emergence of identitarian struggles, capitalism is a breeding ground for them. Capitalism’s emptying out of particular identity through the general commodity form produces an untenable situation for the subject, an existential emptiness that the struggle for identity attempts to fill. Often, these struggles paint themselves as anti-capitalist or articulate critiques of aspects of capitalism, but actually their role in creating a sense of identity for capitalist subjects helps them to endure the capitalist system.

Particular identity cannot be the basis for the emancipation of every identity because particular identity claims are inherently in competition with other identity claims. Even if an identitarian movement claims to advocate peaceful coexistence with other groups, this claim is necessarily disingenuous. The recognition of one identity comes at the expense of others, which is why identitarians are always quarrelling about the need to recognize the specificity of their identity. We can never reach a point of equilibrium among different identity claims. As long as a movement insists on its identity over universality, this equilibrium will remain out of reach. The only path out of a Hobbesian war of each identity against all others is that of the universal.

We experience identity as the essence of our subjectivity, but this experience is profoundly misleading. Identity, no matter if it seems intrinsic (like race and sexuality) or the result of a conscious choice (like club membership and religious affiliation), is always rooted in the social recognition that sustains it. The most private form of identity has its origin in the given social possibilities. Identity politics hides the alienating quality of all identity and thus has an ideological function.

But many of the movements that we think of in terms of identity politics are actually mislabeled universalist political projects. We must distinguish between what is identity politics and what is an appeal to universality burdened by the term identity politics. Protests against racism or sexism, appeals for gay rights, and calls for rights for trans subjects all seem to fit within the typical definition of identity politics. When we look at these movements closely, however, we can recognize their universalist thrust. It is a mistaken understanding of both identity and universality that leads us to diagnose these movements in terms of the former. The turn back to universality does not simply mean that we must, with Marx, focus on the economy.

As the turn from universality to identity begins to look increasingly irreversible, the time becomes more urgent for calling out identity as an ideological trap. The same urgency demands that we rearticulate the universality that has sustained struggles from the French Revolution to the Haitian Revolution to the Russian Revolution to the suffragist movement to the civil rights movement to the Arab Spring. If certain of these struggles have failed or have gone horribly awry, we must recognize that universality hasn’t betrayed us. We have betrayed it.22

### Psycho 2NC – AT: Perm vs K affs

#### The perm fails—starting points are key!

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Our Particular Age,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Chapter 1, ebook)

Universality is the lack in every particular. 16 It is the insubstantiality of the particular, the dependence of the particular on what it is not. No particular entity is simply self-contained and exists on its own. It is always involved with what it is not.17 The universal is not the other on which the particular depends but what makes the particular’s selfsufficiency impossible. The point at which the particular cannot sustain itself in isolation is the point at which its involvement in universality becomes noticeable. The lack that forges this connectivity is the site of universality. If particular objects were self-contained and isolated, it would be impossible to affect them in any way. There would be genuine particularity—isolated monads. But chopping down a tree or eating a tomato or even skipping a rock across a lake reveals the intrusion of universality in the particularity of these objects. These are not just collisions of particulars with other particulars. The lack that makes such collisions possible is a universal opening insofar as it gives the lie to the isolation of the particular.

Because it exists only as an absence, we can never simply have universality. The universal’s status is thus always in question, always subject to doubt and debate. It is never fully instantiated in the way that Aristotle would have it, but this status is what gives universality its transformative potential. By instantiating the universal, Aristotle strips it of its power to transform the present by reducing it to the present. Instantiating the universal has the effect of hiding it.

The link between epistemology and politics is often obscure. But it is my contention that a genuine leftist politics is ultimately incompatible with an epistemology that begins with particulars (or one that demands the instantiation of the universal as Aristotle does). This is the case not just with conservatism but also with liberalism, which always shares the conservative epistemological starting point.

If the particular is the unassailable beginning of our thinking, as conservative and liberal thought have it, we must do everything we can to protect this particular from other particulars that have conflicting interests. According to this position, we begin as isolated beings that form bonds only in order to preserve ourselves. If we believe that there are only particulars and that universals are nothing but the constructs that result from the assembly of these particulars, then it makes sense to move in the direction of an authoritarian rule that would keep particulars safe. The sole point of any social organization would be maximizing the security of the particular, as it is for Thomas Hobbes.

#### Err neg on mutual exclusivity—there’s no defense of the particular tha doesn’t also apply to the universal.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Our Particular Age,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Chapter 1, ebook)

One of the most politically debilitating errors of recent thought is the contention that one must construct the universal out of particulars. According to this position, particulars are given, while we derive universals from the act of bringing a series of particulars together. This epistemological turn is politically debilitating precisely because it occurs on the Left rather than on the Right—its natural home. In contemporary politics, the Left retreats to the terrain of the particular, which is the Right’s terrain.

This position is fully visible in the contributions from Ernesto Laclau and Judith Butler to the collection Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. In different ways, Laclau and Butler voice their discomfort with universality. 26 This discomfort reveals that they each see the particular as an ontological given and the universal as what we arrive at through engagement with multiple particulars. They are, to put it in the terms from above, disciples of Aristotle rather than Plato.

This position is not unique to Laclau and Butler among the Left. They are representative figures that give voice to what has become the leftist doxa. Laclau claims, for instance, “The ‘universal’ is never an independent entity, but only the set of ‘names’ corresponding to an always infinite and reversible relation between particularities.”27 Here, Laclau advances a nominalist philosophy that assumes that particulars exist and that universals do not. By reducing the universal to a name or set of names that indicates how particulars relate to each other, Laclau eliminates the universal’s epistemological priority, which is the foundation for any sustainable claim to collective responsibility. If the only bond between others and myself is our tenuous relationship, then I am justified in concerning myself with their interests only insofar as I can reconcile them with my own. Or at least my commitment to the collective is less clear than if one assumes that universals exist.

Butler does not go as far as Laclau down this path, but she nonetheless enacts an epistemological displacement of the universal. Butler contends that we construct the universal through the act of negotiating between competing particulars. If we don’t do this, she fears, we risk falling into what she calls a colonial logic. Butler states, “Without translation, the only way the assertion of universality can cross a border is through a colonial and expansionist logic.”28 Butler sees translation of the universal from particular culture to particular culture as the only way of avoiding falling into the trap of the universal’s dominance, which is, in her eyes, politically undesirable. From this perspective, the universal represents a constant danger that we must guard against. But it is such a danger only when one takes particularity as the starting point.

Although the idea of beginning with particulars and focusing on our concern for the particular sounds emancipatory to our contemporary ears, it does so only because our hearing has become so [damaged] ~~impaired~~ by the blaring critique of universalizing, which has been turned up to eleven. **If we presuppose that we begin as particulars and that the universal only arrives through the accumulation of particulars, then any values that we might try to establish will inevitably seem like a violent imposition**. The attempt to defend universal values from the perspective of the priority of the particular is an effort doomed before it commences. Viable values depend on the priority of the universal.

What results from the priority of the particular is a world in which one critiques instances of particular oppression without any ability to articulate what values this oppression violates. We know that particular instances of oppression are bad, but we have lost touch with why. This is because we have lost touch with the universal. It is only universality that gives us a reason to fight collectively against the wrongs of an oppressive situation.

One of the great achievements of the civil rights movement in the United States was its insistence on the universality of its struggle. **Lack of equality for black individuals stood for lack of equality as such. Marches for voting rights made it clear that securing black voting rights meant securing everyone’s freedom**. **The particular struggle always had a universal backdrop to it**, just like the Algerians’ fight against the French or the Viet Cong’s war against the United States. In each case, the emancipation of some holds within it universal emancipation.

Today, we are far removed from this political situation. Now, there is outcry about the treatment of immigrants, lack of acceptance of the transgendered, the ongoing environmental catastrophe, or institutional violence toward black individuals, but there is no universal ground for the outcry or tie that binds all together in a possible mobilization. Instead, the instances of oppression exist in a purely particular fashion. One enumerates the situation of immigrants, the transgendered, people of color, the working class, and so on, while always leaving room for the addition of another particular to the group. The problem with this serial approach to instances of oppression is not that **one is always in danger of forgetting one item in the group but that the list of particulars never adds up to a universal.**

The grouping approach to instances of oppression represents an indirect refusal of universality. It is the necessary expression of liberalism that derives from the ruling particularist epistemology. The ideological violence of this operation is the violence that derives from the abdication of universality. Whereas Butler identifies ideological violence with the imperial imposition of the universal, there is a much more brutal kind of violence in our inability to refer to it. Stuck in the existence of a group of particulars without recourse to the universal, the individual endures the violence of constantly recognizing itself in isolation. Without the emancipatory universal, the individual devolves into the perfect cog in the capitalist machine—taking itself as an isolated particular while performing the systematic role that capitalism demands. The bond of the group of particulars is only contingent and fleeting, never emancipatory.

For the conservative or the liberal, the collective is always on the verge of collapsing. This is because the universal that holds it together—a collective link always requires a universal—is constructed rather than constitutive. As a result, conservatives constantly try to secure it through appeals to national or ethnic identity that would create collectivity through exclusion. Conservative politics has its basis in the opposition between friend and enemy because this is the only way for the conservative to secure a collective bond. Liberals suffer from the same tenuousness but avoid the divisiveness that conservatives use. Instead, liberals advocate forging the connection through difference. For them, the negotiation of differences can be the source of our bond.

For the leftist or the proponent of emancipation, the situation is altogether different. Universality is the condition of possibility for particulars. It plays a constitutive role relative to its particulars. As a result, the collective link established through the universal forms an indissoluble connection. The universal is not a foreign outsider but an intimate point at which each particular finds itself lacking. Through this lack, the universal holds the series of particulars together even when they themselves do not register the connection.

### Psycho 2NC – AT: Universality = Violent

#### Ks of universal politics have it backwards—particularity is historically brutal.

McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Universal Villains,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Chapter 3, ebook)

One could even go so far as to say that the interpretation of the political catastrophes of the twentieth century was itself another catastrophe. It produced fewer victims, to be sure, but the damage to political thought that it left behind was long-lasting. Rather than seeing Nazism and Stalinism as particular crimes stemming from an abandonment or distortion of universality, the common interpretations of these phenomena characterized them as instances of the universal’s inhuman barbarism. These were not crimes of the universal, but this is how most interpreters saw them. Interpreters thus missed that these were either crimes of particularity (in the case of Nazism) or crimes of a deviation from the universal (in the case of Stalinism). The deleterious effect of the predominant interpretation reverberates through the theorization of politics up to the present. We continue to exist in the wake of the fundamental misinterpretation of the horrors of the twentieth century.

Theodor Adorno is perhaps the exemplary figure of this widespread misinterpretation. Adorno contends that the eradication of difference is Nazism’s primary crime. (He doesn’t talk at length about Stalinism but focuses exponentially more of his theoretical energy on Nazism.) His analysis of Nazism links its eradication of difference in the figure of the Jew to the history of universalizing German philosophy. While Adorno locates his own thought in the dialectical tradition of Hegel and Marx, he also sees Hegel’s universalism as guilty for preparing the way for Nazism’s annihilation of the particular. 1 Excessive universality is not just the Nazi sin, but also that of the entire tradition of Western thought beginning with Homer.

Adorno’s critique of universalism—especially Hegel’s— reaches its high point toward the end of his life when he writes Negative Dialectics. Here, he attempts to defend the nonidentity of the particular against the onslaught of universality that reduces all particular difference to sameness. In an exemplary passage from this work, he writes, “Hegel’s transposition of the particular into particularity follows the practice of a society that tolerates the particular only as a category, a form of the supremacy of the universal.”2 Philosophies such as Hegel’s err when they reduce particular difference to nothing but a part of a universal system. Although Hegel is not to blame for the rise of Nazism, a philosophy that ceaselessly champions the “supremacy of the universal” and that has no concern for the particular not under the sway of the universal offers a paradigm for mass annihilation.3 According to this view, it is a small step from Hegel’s supremacy of the universal to Nazism’s Aryan supremacy. 4 Adorno insists on proclaiming the irreducibility of particular difference because it provides a way to respond to what he perceives as the universal violence of Auschwitz.5 He argues that ethics after Auschwitz must focus on particular difference rather than universality. If universality is to blame for Auschwitz, then we must call universality into question.

This type of theoretical judgment about Nazism as an exaggerated universalism makes strange bedfellows, which testifies to its ubiquity. It is not just one group of thinkers that makes this judgment but thinkers from vastly different camps—conservatives and leftists, anarchists and Marxists, parliamentary democrats and revolutionaries. This shared verdict on Nazism brings otherwise alien thinkers into proximity with each other through its production of near unanimity across the political spectrum. One cannot imagine Hannah Arendt, Gilles Deleuze, Leo Strauss, Michel Foucault, Karl Popper, and Theodor Adorno agreeing on anything at all. But they are united in their verdict on Nazism and Stalinism. They all see Nazism and Stalinism as the result of as excessive investment in the universal.

By imagining that Nazism and Stalinism represent universal crimes or crimes of the universal, theorists slander universality and transform it into a political sin to be avoided. This is where we still stand today. In the aftermath of this theoretical distortion, emancipatory politics becomes the assertion of particular identity rather than the striving for universality—which means that emancipatory politics ceases to be emancipatory politics, because emancipation depends on the universal. This misstep results in the Left paradoxically fighting on the turf of the Right, since conservatism is essentially the propagation of particular identity against what it sees as the danger of the universal. When we lament the ease with which right-wing populism wins adherents today, it is this slanted turf that we are lamenting.

Furthermore, the misinterpretation of Nazism and Stalinism as crimes of the universal has the effect of depoliticizing them. Once they become instances of universalist overreach, the sensible response turns out to be an ethical rather than a political one: one must respect particular difference. We must take refuge in the ethical treatment of the other in order to avoid political violence toward this other. 6 To a large extent, the prosecution of this ethical demand replaces politics.7 The ethics that replaces politics is not a Kantian ethic that foregrounds its universality but one that sees universality as the ethical problem that it demands we avoid by respecting particular difference.

But the ethical call to respect particular difference seems especially misguided when we take a closer look at the politics of Nazism and Stalinism. Of course, neither Nazism nor Stalinism was guilty of exhibiting too much respect for particular difference. But that said, Nazism perpetuated mass murder on the basis of an ontology of particular difference, and Stalinism did so by conceiving of a particularized version of universality that tried to liquidate the enemy that blocked its realization.

In this sense, the violence of Nazism and Stalinism is distinct. One cannot reasonably blend the two together under a single label, such as totalitarianism. But they do both partake in a betrayal of the universal.8 In contrast to how theorists of the twentieth century treated them, they were political rather than ethical horrors, horrors that arose directly from the turn away from universalist politics. The misinterpretation of these movements has undermined the possibility for universality. The theoretical legacy of the response to Nazism and Stalinism is an ethical turn that leaves us politically [ruined] ~~crippled~~.9

### Disability K - Norms Bad

#### Reframing what qualifies as “rational deliberation” opens up spaces for embodied political participation within debate.

Afshai 20 – Assistant Professor and Researcher in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, formerly at the University of Amsterdam. [Afsoun. “Disabled Lives in Deliberative Systems.” Political Theory, col 48, issue 6, 751-776 (2020). March 20, 2020.]

Interdependence in Deliberative Systems

After an almost hegemonic focus on the design and execution of minipublics as sites of deliberative democracy, the systemic turn acknowledges that “deliberative democracy cannot easily be sought in a single forum” but rather exists and requires “the contributions of multiple sites,”34 including “formal and binding assemblies,” “interest groups,” “media,” and “everyday [political] talk.”35 It recognizes that “political systems in developed democracies are complex, with numerous sites of politics, multiple separations of functions that require coordination, and many points of pressure, entry and influence.”36 Deliberative systems, by definition, function through relationships between interdependent, rather than autonomous, citizens and institutions.

Much of political theory, in general, and deliberative democratic theory, in particular, has conceptualized the ideal citizen as an autonomous agent. Autonomy was, in fact, seen as both a precondition and a potential outcome of deliberation. For example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, in their account of deliberative democracy, argue that individuals “should be treated not merely as objects of legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous agents who take part in the governance of their own society, directly or through their representatives.”37 At the same time, the cultivation of autonomous citizenship is also a positive potential outcome of public discussion in deliberative democracy.38 Autonomy is both needed before and expected after deliberation.

Such a relationship with autonomy is directly tied to deliberative democracy’s historical origins. Deliberative democracy, especially those based on Habermas’s conception of it, retains “his liberal Kantianism,” which emphasizes autonomy.39 However, even as a theorist of “autonomy,” Kant’s account of critical thinking and dialogue offers a vision of individuals who are far from autonomous and are, indeed, fully interdependent on one another.40 For Kant, “we cannot engage in any project—be it finding the limits of reason, ascertaining the principles of moral law, or engaging a rational-critical debate aimed at securing legitimacy and driving progress—without others to share the burden.”41 This means that interdependence of citizens on one another is an unspoken, disregarded, and forgotten assumption of deliberative democratic theory.42

This recognition of the interdependence of citizens and institutions on one another, when taken seriously and applied to deliberative democratic participation, can decenter and refocus it. It pushes us to consider how possible it is for us to deliberate without others.43 Recognizing this fact explicitly allows us to reflect on the different ways in which all citizens and institutions are dependent on one another within the larger deliberative system. Instead of being solely concerned with individual contributions, it now accepts that we need others to enable our full participation as citizens.

Systemic turn recognizes that citizens do not participate the same way and to the same degree all the time. Instead, a deliberative system is one of “division of labor” among different and interdependent parts, groups, and individuals.44 In other words, similar to the way that different sites of deliberation are interdependent on one another to ensure the overall health of the system, participants, too, depend on one another to ensure ample as well as quality participation and deliberation, “whether they [personally and continuously] are speaking or not.”45

What does interdependent citizenship look like? First, it recognizes that “depending on the particular stage we are at in the life cycle as well as the degree to which the world is structured to respond to some variations better than others,”46 we are all mutually interdependent. This recognition reframes dependence as a universal feature of the system as opposed to a distinct feature that sets CD individuals apart from others. The dependence of CD individuals, even at higher rates than the able-minded, is no longer a difference of kind; rather it is one of degrees.

Second, it emphasizes that the dependency in interdependency is not “an antonym to autonomy or freedom [. . .] but its precondition and correlate.”47 Interdependence, therefore, is posited as part of the human condition. An interdependent account of citizenship means that we can relax the standards of participation in the public sphere in a way that does not require autonomous, individual, and independent contributions at all times and under all circumstances. Moreover, such a move is no longer presented as antithetical to the aims or the development of deliberative democratic theory.

Deliberative systems approach allows us to better take stock of the different modes and degrees of participation by citizens. Some contributions do not meet the previously held deliberative ideal of autonomy and some require others for their formulation and expression. Interdependent citizenship in the context of deliberative democracy means that moments where communicative and/or technical assistance are required to make participation possible are not anomalies but a feature of participation in a deliberative system. Indeed, we can imagine a spectrum of sorts that tracks the participation of the CD. On one end, CD individuals participate with very little assistance from others; on the other end, more robust translation takes place in order for us to include those who interact and convey their interests in alternative ways. Severely cognitively disabled individuals, for example, cannot meaningfully participate on their own or be discursive representatives (see below). However, their participation can be accommodated through the inclusion of their caregivers. Contributions to the deliberative system can take place, while receiving assistance from others, in a manner not much different from everyone else.

In the next sections, I outline the specific ways in which the systemic turn with its recognition of interdependence has opened up opportunities for participation of CD individuals. These are: (1) a more generous account of deliberative speech acts and behaviors; (2) recognition of the role enclaves; and (3) incorporating the role of discursive representatives. These changes normalize the participation of CD individuals and suggest institutional opportunities for more effective participation.

1. Expanding the Scope of Speech Acts

As noted in the previous section, the deliberative systems approach envisages participation in the public sphere as a form of “division of labor.” This means that it does not require “every citizen [. . .] to be equally knowledgeable” or to “become an ideal deliberator” in order to meet the deliberative ideal at every moment or instance of deliberation.48

This is an important and consequential shift. Much of the literature on deliberative democracy has focused on deliberative ideals—sets of desired preconditions and behaviors—that have to be met in order for a deliberative democratic endeavor to be deemed successful. The aim has been to design settings that match the ideal deliberative conditions with the hopes that the setup can guarantee the fulfilment of the desired outcomes associated with deliberation. These ideals have similarly been used to judge the quality of speech in highly controlled deliberative moments.49

These ideals, however, have been the source of much criticism lodged against deliberative democracy. Put simply, critics have pointed to the ways in which ideals of rational and dispassionate discourse can limit the full participation of the most marginalized members of society and contribute to the reproduction of gaps in discursive time and influence.50

The deliberative systems approach comes out of the recognition that these ideals are likely unachievable in practice in every instance of deliberation. While we may try to replicate these ideal preconditions and behaviors within highly structured small deliberations, communication on the ground is messier and more complicated. The deliberative systems approach acknowledges that requiring everyone, who might be in very different social and political positions of power and influence in society, to follow the same rules will likely undermine the emancipatory potential of deliberative democracy. As such, it expands the range of acceptable behaviors to include behaviors that were previously considered “nondeliberative” and even “antideliberative.”

An example of such behavior is that of activists and hard partisans who often engage in behavior that is characteristically antideliberative but increase the overall health of a deliberative system by opening it up to “ [new] voices, interests, perspectives, and claims.”51 Other examples of antideliberative behavior can include “Kill cops” or “All my heroes kill cops”—both of which have been used in protests against police brutality. Alternatively, “All men are trash” or “Men are scum” are examples of antideliberative statements made during the height of #MeToo movement on Facebook and Twitter. While these speech acts do not fit the deliberative ideal of respect, the systems approach does not dismiss them since they are statements made by members of groups who have been historically marginalized and have been victims of failures of reciprocity.52 Furthermore, the meanings of these statements are different from their first-order interpretation. Their intention is to open dialogue to include issues that are easily, historically, and structurally ignored—antiblack racism and sexual harassment and assault. Therefore, far from being defects, these speech acts fulfil deliberative goals by ensuring “new agendas, broader inclusions, publicity for important causes, consciousness raising, and information transmission.”53

I retain the term nondeliberative and antideliberative since they are discussed as such in the literature on deliberative democracy. While this may denote that such behaviors are valued less, this is not the intention. They are seen as necessary, especially, in cases where speakers are marginalized and lack political and social power. In these cases, speech acts that do not strictly follow norms of respect and reciprocity are seen as a byproduct of the “material and political inequality and failures of reciprocity” that underpin the political system and are thus permissible.54

They are called so to distinguish them from the strict standards of behavior previously identified and touted by us (deliberative democratic theorists). The systemic turn does away with the belief that certain (deliberative) contributions are valuable while others (antideliberative and nondeliberative) are not. The purpose behind the use of such terms as opposed to deliberative is to highlight the exact fact that a deliberative system requires speech acts that are not strictly deliberative. 55

People with cognitive disabilities who face marginalization, inequality, and failures of reciprocity fit this mandate. While the literature on deliberative systems approach has been silent on whether we can expand the definition and scope of what counts as deliberative speech beyond verbal communication, its concern with including as many ideas, perspectives, voices, and claims necessitates this expansion nonetheless. This means that their participation, even if it does not conform to previously held deliberative ideals, is not only justified but considered valuable in a deliberative system.56

What does this look like? First, it would involve moving beyond simply “[making] transparent the reasonings behind positions”57 to publicizing not only the experiences of individuals and groups but also highlighting the ways in which their manner of living in the world might substantially and meaningfully differ from our own.

For example, imagine a public deliberation over government funding for music programs in schools, in community or assisted living facilities, and in part-day community centers. Reasons for such funding would include a range of interests from the importance of art and music in boosting cognitive development, to reducing stress, to preserving cultural heritage. However, for CD people, their parents, and their caregivers, music does not only have therapeutic benefits58 but often serves as a method of communication—a way for CD individuals to express their mood, interests, and even ideas. Consider the case of a CD individual who enjoys, demonstrated through smiles and movements, listening to Bach concertos suddenly not reacting or reacting negatively to the music—preferring instead, perhaps, Brahms string quintets. Such a shift may indicate a change in musical interests, a desire for fresh music, or perhaps physical or mental unease or illness.

Alternatively, consider the case of Jam2Jam, an online tool that “provides the resources for [. . .] loosely structured musical performances” or jamming.59 Jam2Jam is innovative, as it enables improvisation through easy drag and drop tools and “the opportunity to develop musical ideas through the observation and imitation of others,”60 encouraging both “experimentation and engagement”61 and a robust exercise of aesthetic agency for individuals with intellectual disability.

These examples demonstrate how the description of lived experiences that are radically and meaningfully different from ours can form the basis of a reason that we would not have had access to otherwise. If music is seen as necessary for communication and expression of agency, our assessment of its importance and its associated costs will be radically different than if we conceive of it merely as a tool for cognitive development or a product of our culture.

Second, it requires an acknowledgement that these contributions might not be made in exactly the same way or to the same degree as those members of society who are able-bodied and able-minded. These contributions may be made through embodied participation, including body posture, stance, and facial expressions. They also include partial or intermittent speech and assisted speech through caregivers or communication devices, as well as writing, typing, or pointing using purpose-built tools.

Expanding the scope of allowable contributions means that participation can be embodied in addition to, or even instead of, verbal.62 Embodied participation or “the physical presence of disabled bodies [and minds]” can “[provoke] new conversations similar to rational speech acts.”63 Once again, this is not radically different for able-minded and able-bodied individuals. We frequently convey messages and pose questions using nonverbal cues and gestures. Think of “an awkwardly placed elbow and a subtly raised eyebrow,”64 or a nod and a smile, and how they can affect a conversation. Since we take notice of such behavior when they are carried out by able-bodied and able-minded individuals, it makes little sense to exclude such behavior as forms of participation when they are exhibited by CD individuals.

This expansion also encompasses partial and assisted speech and takes into account the importance of the role that may be played by caregivers by supporting or, in some cases, even contributing in place of those with disabilities. Under these circumstances participation may rely on “collaborative speech” that coordinates “speech and actions [. . .] among differently situated” individuals.65 In doing so, it “[integrates] the political needs of individuals who have little ability to articulate their own demands.”66 Such collaboration may require mediation from coaches and translators. This may take the form of, first, translating the communication from other participants, experts, and written material into more easily understandable language for CD individuals, and second, translating the communications of CD participants to others, if need be.67 This requires us to, first, be sensitive to the specific ways in which CD people can claim their voice within deliberative systems and the particular forms of accommodation that they may need in order to do so.

Second, it highlights the importance of communicative responsiveness on the part of the collaborators in order to ensure that the speech best represents the volitions of CD individuals. Communicative responsiveness refers to the degree to which the caregiver responds to the reactions of the person they are representing. Being responsive requires continuous reflection and checking in on the part of the caregiver to ensure the accuracy of his or her interpretation and satisfaction of the represented.68 Without robust communicative responsiveness, we run the risk of undermining CD subjects’ ability to claim their own voice and exercise their agency within deliberative systems by assuming that our situated understanding and interpretations of their needs, views, and goals are objective.69

### Settler Colonialism K – Russia Link

#### Russia is a settler colonialist nation, and the aff’s claim against Russia strengthens the “West versus rest” mindset which only serves to prop up global settler colonialism

Ivakhiv 22 [Adrian Ivakhiv (A professor of environmental thought and culture at the University of Vermont. Canadian by birth and Ukrainian by ancestry, his research on culture, identity, and ecology has taken him to the Chernobyl exclusion zone in Ukraine and the Carpathian mountains of east central Europe. He blogs at Immanence.), 3-23-2022, "Decolonialism and the Invasion of Ukraine," No Publication, <https://www.e-flux.com/notes/457576/decolonialism-and-the-invasion-of-ukraine>] // st

Decolonization, Take 1: Ukraine and Russia¶ Writing in e-flux journal (and reprinted in left-wing German magazine Taz), Oleksiy Radynski, filmmaker and cofounder of Kyïv’s Visual Culture Research Center, astutely untangles the deeply colonialist underpinnings of Putin’s war on Ukraine and Ukrainians. In “The Case Against the Russian Federation,” Radynski briefly pursues two fascinating lines of argument. (Each of them has been developed in greater depth by others, but not to my knowledge combined in such a concise and currently relevant way, thus my focus on it here.)¶ The first argues that Putin’s, and many Russians’, anti-Ukrainianism—the “deep ethnic and political hatred towards Ukrainians” evident in his recent speeches—is a disavowal of that which threatens them internally. Ukraine today represents “a radically different Russia,” with the disavowal working in both directions.¶ What Putin calls the “historical unity” of both nations refers to centuries of imperial domination by Russia … We [Ukrainians] share with Russians a history of serfdom (a form of de facto slavery in the Russian Empire), worker movements, revolution, industrialization, and war. Generations of our families have mixed with each other. But any relationship between metropole and colony—like any master-slave relationship—is dialectical and reciprocal …¶ By colonizing Ukraine, the Russian metropole had unwittingly swallowed a political culture based on horizontal forms of democracy—even if they seem brutal, like the Cossacks’ councils, the anarchist armies of Nestor Makhno, or the Maidan uprisings. And this alien presence will disintegrate the metropole from within. In a way, the Putinist fear of a “Russian Maidan” uprising in Moscow is totally justified—but not because, as Russian propaganda suggests, it will be organized by NATO-trained Ukrainian terrorists. The fear is justified because, if Russians are a little bit Ukrainian, they might also be able to topple an authoritarian government … It is this “historical unity” that today’s autocratic Russia is trying by all means to exorcize from within itself by turning Russia into a police state and preempting the popular uprising.¶ In other words, Ukraine threatens to topple the “historical unity” of Russian imperialism—so (for Putin) it must be vanquished.¶ Radynski’s second line of argument is that the latter, Russian imperialism, is at root a Slavic and eastward variation on the European settler colonialism that expanded across the Americas and beyond. Far from simply expanding to peacefully settle the lands to the east of their Kyïvan Rus’ “homeland,” as it is often imagined, expansion to the east, north, and south involved “the genocide of indigenous populations” (Finno-Ugric and Turkic speaking peoples, among others), “the extraction of resources, and the emergence of autocratic governance.”¶ As mentioned, Radynski’s arguments are not original (nor are they intended as that), and there are others who have developed them in more detailed and refined form. For instance, on Russian colonization of the Siberian Far East, see Forsyth 1994; Stephan 1994; Wood 2011; Pesterev 2015. On Russian imperial coloniality more generally, including self-exculpatory discourses of “self-colonization,” see Sunderland 2000; Morrison 2012; Tlostanova 2012; Etkind 2013 and 2015; Eskanian 2015; and this beautifully illustrated 2020 article by Engelhardt; and in relation to Ukraine, Chernetsky 2003; Velychenko 2004; Sakwa 2015; this 2020 panel; and Badior 2022. And that’s just a smattering.¶ Radynski concludes, provocatively, by advocating that¶ Kyiv accept its thousand-year-old historical responsibility towards the colonized nations oppressed in today’s Russian Federation by belatedly acknowledging itself as the unfortunate origin of a despotic, colonialist Russian state—a state that oppresses every people with the misfortune of being within its territory, including the Russian people. For the sake of all these peoples—and the rest of humankind—the Russian state in its current form should cease to exist.¶ In this intentionally provocative version of decolonization, Kyïv, the Ukrainian capital, would reclaim its (colonial/postcolonial) mantle of “mother of Russian cities” to play a leading role in the decolonization of this entire part of the world, which has hitherto been largely neglected by decolonial theory elsewhere. Decolonialism as a liberatory process would thus proceed through Kyïv, with this thousand-year-old capital now an “obligatory passage point” for it (as actor-network theory might call it).¶ Decolonization, Take 2: Russia and the World¶ Here’s where things get trickier. Arguments about decolonization rest upon an understanding of the identity of the colonizer. A nuanced historical analysis can critically distinguish between British, French, Spanish, Russian, and other forms of colonial, as well as imperial, power. A less nuanced, but more globally palatable, understanding typically takes aim instead at the broad and loose category of “the West,” while placing itself ostensibly in the service of the non-West, that is, “the rest.” Each of these approaches has its virtues (Europe, speaking generically, did indeed colonize the world), but each also carries risks. (See here for an example of a poorly informed “decolonial” analysis of the invasion of Ukraine.)¶ Let’s put this in the context of the “war for hearts and minds” being played out in global media. As Carl Miller’s Twitter analysis has shown, Russian information warfare may not be doing so well in the West during the present invasion—it’s mainly succeeded in fragmentary pockets of the far right (and far left). But it appears to be doing much better in the non-West, especially the BRICS countries (Brazil, India, China, South Africa) and other parts of Africa and Asia, where it may in fact be strategically aimed. Mother Jones’s Ali Brelan makes the same argument, and notes that the US right wing has just started getting in on the pro-Putin action. Another take on Russian social media strategy is that it is focusing on being feared rather than being loved, and that it is succeeding better with that.¶ As I argued in my recent piece on Noam Chomsky, one of the lessons of this invasion is that we live in an unstable and multipolar world, and if our analytical lenses remain fixated on Europe and the Atlantic world, we will fail to recognize what’s happening.¶ A thinker who has argued this for a long time, but who has also weaponized it on behalf of Russian neo-imperialism, is Alexander Dugin (who’s been covered on this blog numerous times). Like decolonial thinkers who emphasize the need to rebalance “the West versus the rest,” taking the side of the latter, Dugin sets himself up as the geopolitical theorist for “the rest.”¶ Like a specific (but not dominant) strand of decolonial thinkers, he maps this “West versus rest” duality onto the opposition of tradition versus progress, where the West is corrupting the fabric of traditional society, which was “organic,” “holistic,” “rooted,” and so on. “With the Enlightenment,” Dugin writes,¶ the West entered a totally artificial civilization based on wrong ideas—such as progress, materialism, technology, capitalism, selfishness and atheism. That was the Enlightenment—Luciferian pride, the war against the Heaven. That coincides with Western colonial expansion. Colonialism was a kind of projection of the same disease on the global scale. No civilization concentrated so much effort on the material aspect of life as the West. The Chinese discovered the powder long ago but used it in order to make beautiful fireworks. It was a kind of cultural and artist phenomena. When Europeans discovered the same gunpowder, they started immediately to kill each other and all other peoples. Western hegemony is based on disease so we should recognize the Western civilization of modernity as the pathology.

### Settler Colonialism K – Root Cause China/Taiwan

#### China’s history in Taiwan is in line with a settler colonial empire where, for the indigenous peoples of Taiwan, colonization is an ongoing project

Tsai 19 [Lin-chin Tsai (PhD candidate at UCLA), A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Asian Languages and Cultures at UCLA advised by Shu-mei Shih, 2019, Re-conceptualizing Taiwan: Settler Colonial Criticism and Cultural Production, UCLA, <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/30h7d8r5>] // st

At the inception of the Martial Law period, the Nationalist government asserted its territorial claim on China, Taiwan, and other surrounding islands, and contrived to impose a unified Han Chinese national and cultural identity upon every single person on the island. By doing so, it consolidated its ruling power as well as its political legitimacy because it represented the “authentic Chinese polity,” as opposed to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) the Chinese Communist party established. Alternative voices or dissent against this official Nationalist ideology were either brutally repressed or severely silenced. However, the Nationalist political and cultural hegemony was challenged beginning in the 1970s due to a process of social transformation and intellectual transition. The “nativist literature movement” (鄉土文學運動 xiangtu wenxue yundong), a literary movement that took shape in the mid-1960s and further prospered during the 1970s, called for a closer connection of literature with the land and its people on the island of Taiwan via a more realistic mode of literary expression. This movement served as a counter-discourse against the predominant anti-Communist literature (反共文學 fangong wenxue) and nostalgic literature (懷鄉文學 huaixiang wenxue) that the Nationalist government propagandized. Later, the Formosa Incident (美麗島事件 Meilidao shijian, also known as the Kaohsiung Incident)3 in 1979 not only marked a watershed of democratization movements in Taiwan history, but more importantly, paved the way for the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. The above nativist literature movement, as well as the democratization and localization movements since the 1970s, served as social and historical backdrop to the ideological debate between the “Chinese complex” and “Taiwanese complex” in the early 1980s. The rising of “Taiwanese consciousness” (in contrast to the “Chinese consciousness” that the Nationalist government imposed), as well as a variety of social movements during the 1980s, urged the Nationalist government to lift the Martial Law in 1987, putting an end to the thirty-eight year-long martial law era.¶ In these circumstances, postcolonial discourse was introduced to Taiwan’s academe and became a prevailing theoretical paradigm of Taiwan literature studies beginning in the 1990s. The academic trend of postcolonial theory began with Han Taiwanese literary scholar Chiu Kuei-fen’s seminal essay, “Discover Taiwan: Constructing the Postcolonial Discourse of Taiwan,” presented at the sixteenth annual Republic of China Comparative Literature conference in 1992. This essay led to a series of debates between Chiu and another Taiwan-based literary scholar Liao Chao-yang centering on whether or not Taiwan is a postcolonial state.4 Chiu defined Taiwan as a postcolonial society by stressing Taiwan’s translingual and cross-cultural condition attributed to its history of multiple colonialisms. Liao questioned Chiu’s argument, noting that although Taiwan can be considered a multicultural and multilingual society, the national language (Mandarin Chinese) is still the dominant language promoted by the Nationalist ideological policy after 1945. Therefore, the hybrid and multilingual characteristics of Taiwan, Liao argued, do not constitute a basis for Taiwan’s postcoloniality. Between 1995 and 1996, their debate about Taiwan’s postcoloniality triggered a more intense wave of debates among other scholars from diverse disciplines. These debates were published in Chung-wai Literary Monthly (中外文學 Chungwai wenxue, now renamed Chung-wai Literary Quarterly), one of the leading journals of literary and cultural studies in Taiwan. Further debates in the late 1990s involved the issues of whether Taiwan is postcolonial or postmodern, of the rise of Taiwanese consciousness and the politics of Taiwanese identity and subjectivity, and of Taiwan’s nationhood/ statehood.5¶ In hindsight, it is clear that the advent of postcolonial discourse in Taiwan is significant to the formation of Taiwanese political, national and cultural identity, as it offers critical and theoretical insights to conceptualize Taiwan’s colonial past. More importantly, postcolonial criticism has significantly contributed to the study of Taiwan literature as an autonomous discipline. During the Nationalist authoritarian era, Mandarin Chinese was the national language of Taiwan. Speaking other languages, such as Hakka, Minnan or Hoklo, Japanese, or several Austronesian languages spoken by the indigenous peoples, was censored. While the studies of Chinese literature or Sinology were favored by the Nationalist government, Taiwan literature, and other studies associated with or relevant to Taiwan, were considered valueless, if not treated as a taboo, during this period. In this sense, the insights of postcolonial theory and historiography which acknowledge the historical subjectivity and cultural hybridity of Taiwan became a useful and critical lever to foreground the specificity and uniqueness of Taiwan literature as a distinct field of study against the hegemony of Chinese studies or Sinology that the KMT advocated. As Taiwan literature scholar Lee Yu-lin aptly states, postcolonial criticism has been introduced to Taiwan as a theory to supplement the nativist discourse beginning in the 1970s by providing more critical and complicated methodologies and theoretical concepts.6 The peaceful transition of power from the KMT to the DPP in 2000 and the support of institutionalization of Taiwan literature by the DPP government further consolidated the discursive primacy of postcolonial theory. In short, postcolonial studies in Taiwan and Taiwan literature as a distinct field of study, together with the institutionalization of Taiwan literature, have been intimately intertwined, supplementing and complementing one another.7¶ Even with such theoretical primacy, some scholars have continued to question the applicability of postcolonial theory in Taiwan. Liao Ping-hui has persuasively pointed out that the KMT recolonization after the February 28 Incident in 1947,8 and the expelling of Taiwan from the United Nations in 1971 led to the “belatedness” of postcoloniality in Taiwan, since the former led to the White Terror of the KMT rule and the Order of Martial Law promulgated by the Governor of Taiwan Province Chen Cheng (陳誠) in 1949, and a series of setbacks in the international arena further delayed Taiwan’s entry into the postcolonial condition.9 As a result, postmodernism, in Liao’s view, had been taken by some scholars as a “substitute project” for this “belated postcoloniality” to reconsider multiculturalism and multilingualism of Taiwan’s society. By the same token, Liou Liang-ya also argues that Taiwan’s history of multiple colonialisms and the lack of transitional justice after lifting the Martial Law in 1987 had further deferred Taiwan’s postcolonial project, and thus the postcoloniality of Taiwan, in comparison to several other newly established independent nations around the world, is “belated.” 10 Liou then reminds us that we need to more prudently reconsider what has constituted Taiwan’s postcoloniality and whether or not Taiwan has entered the postcolonial phase at all. Although Liou maintains this cautious attitude toward postcolonial discourse and its theoretical applicability, she still believes that the insights of postcolonial theory as well as the texts of postcolonial fiction in Taiwan not only critique the Nationalist government’s recolonization and authoritarian rule of Taiwan but also address “issues such as gender, race, and class in relation to Taiwanese identity and Taiwan’s colonial past” as opposed to the China-centered Nationalist historiography.11¶ As scholars noted, another problematic of postcolonial studies in Taiwan lies in its dualistic construct of the colonizer and the colonized. As Li Cheng-Chi and Lee Yu-lin have argued in their article, “The Problematics of the Postcolonial Project in Taiwan,” the dialectic paradigm of postcolonialism (the colonizer vs. the colonized, domination vs. resistance) is an oversimplified paradigm for the study of Taiwan’s colonial history. Because of the belatedness of postcoloniality and the marginalized international status of Taiwan under the dual impact of the global neocolonialism and the rising power of China, they contend that Taiwan’s postcolonial project should instead understand its own limitation and insufficiency.12 They thus propose that it is imperative to reexamine the dichotomy of postcolonial dialectics within the formation of knowledge production in Taiwan and reconsider the history of serial and multiple colonialisms of Taiwan at the intersection of different empires, races, ethnicities, classes, gender, and so forth. The postcolonial project in Taiwan, they conclude, will remain “an incomplete project,” if we fail to recognize its theoretical inadequacy and incompatibility with Taiwan’s reality and its far more complicated colonial history.¶ Despite their divergent views on Taiwan’s postcoloniality, we should note that they are all predominately articulated from a Han-centered perspective and periodization of history. According to the orthodox Nationalist historiography, Taiwan has entered its postcolonial phase right after the Japanese colonial government retreated in 1945. But for most of the Han Taiwanese people who lived through the Japanese colonial period and suffered from KMT’s recolonization, it is 1987, the year in which the Martial Law was lifted, that should be regarded as the beginning of the postcolonial era. For the indigenous peoples in Taiwan, postcoloniality is not just “belated” (as described by Liao and Liou), but rather, has “not yet” come into being. If the “post-” in “post-colonialism” can be understood in temporal terms, then the colonial condition, from the perspective of Taiwan indigenous peoples, has not yet come to an end. Sun Ta-chuan (Paelabang Danapan), one of the leading indigenous intellectuals,13 has protested that there will always be theoretical blind spots if Taiwan’s postcolonial studies and Taiwanese nativist discourse fail to take indigenous peoples into consideration. 14 Genetically and linguistically speaking, the indigenous peoples of Taiwan are peoples of the Austronesian language group, and have inhabited Taiwan (and other surrounding islands) for thousands of years, far before the seventeenth century arrival of Han immigrants from China.15 These Han immigrants from China became the demographic majority of Taiwan’s population in the late seventeenth century attributable to the settlement policies of the Dutch colonial government and the first Han regime that Zheng Chenggong established. These Han immigrants and their descendants have not stopped their exploitation of the indigenous peoples over natural resources and land. On top of the dispossession of land and resources throughout history, Taiwan indigenous peoples have been subject to both racial/ethnic discrimination and structural violence via mainstream Han settler society for hundreds of years. Specifically, indigenous peoples have long been stigmatized as “uncivilized groups” and categorized into “cooked savages” (熟番 shufan, an ethnic construct that refers to the indigenous population who occupy the plain areas of Taiwan) and “raw savages” (生番 shengfan, generally referring to the aborigines who lived in the mountains) since the Qing period. During the ROC era, the indigenous populations were relegated to the derogatory category of “mountain compatriots” (山胞 shanbao), while plains indigenous groups were considered “civilized” and were assimilated into the body of Han settler society via cohabitation and intermarriage with early Han settlers. Not until very recently were some plains indigenous communities recognized as indigenous peoples and renamed as the Pingpu indigenous peoples (平埔族 pingpuzu) in order to make a distinction between the two categories of indigenous population. The disavowal of the Pingpu indigenous status by Han settler regimes caused the loss of cultural practice and ethnic identity of the plains indigenous communities. Today, many of the plains indigenous tribes are still struggling for official recognition. Belated official apologies by President Tsai Ing-wen on August 1, 2016, unfortunately, did not bring about forgiveness from the indigenous peoples. Rather this official attempt provoked, even deeper disappointment and indignation from the indigenous activist communities, not to mention the thorny controversy over radioactive waste in Orchid Island (or Lanyu), Taiwan’s main nuclear dumpsite where the Tao indigenous people reside. The story of the dark history of the Han settlers and their continual suppression and exploitation of the indigenous peoples of Taiwan from the seventeenth century to the present is indeed a very long one.¶ Colonization for indigenous peoples in Taiwan is not a past tense, but rather the present tense. The postcolonial discourse, to borrow Liao Ping-hui’s words, can “only partially describe what constitutes the ‘postcolonial’ condition in Taiwan,” 16 given its total neglect of indigenous peoples. Postcolonialism, as New Zealand-based indigenous scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith succinctly argues, serves to a large extent as “a strategy for reinscribing or reauthorizing the privileges of non-indigenous academics because the field of ‘post-colonial’ discourse has been defined in ways which can still leave out indigenous peoples.” 17 This type of colonial situation whereby settlers (superordinate migrants) displace the indigenous residents and take over the land is what scholars have termed settler colonialism.

#### Settler colonialism and settler socialism can explain China’s foreign interactions

Byler 22 [Darren Byler (A sociocultural anthropologist and assistant professor at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, British Columbia whose teaching and research examines the dispossession of stateless populations through forms of contemporary capitalism and colonialism in China, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.), May 2022, "Maoist Settler Inheritance and Native Claims in Northwest China," positions politics, <https://positionspolitics.org/maoist-settler-inheritance-and-native-claims-in-northwest-china/>] // st

Since its founding, the revolutionary ethos of the People’s Republic of China has been framed by discourses of liberation and a rhetoric of anti-imperialist solidarity. The founding of the People’s Republic stood in opposition to a legacy of European and Japanese imperialism and the entrenched inequalities of Qing and Republican-era modernism. Like the Soviet Union, China positioned itself as a postcolonial state. But despite these claims and efforts by Maoist leaders to promote multinational solidarity and guard against Han chauvinism, the Han-dominated party-state nevertheless inherited and intensified control over the ancestral lands of the largest non-Chinese speaking groups in the country, the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. This led to the establishment of a settler state in Inner Asia during the Mao era, and, as China transitioned into a central node of global capitalism in the 1980s and 1990s, this Inner Asian project has evolved to include more and more of the features of an internal settler colonialism. At the same time, the enduring legacy of Mao era “settler socialism,” a term that I borrow from the work of my colleague Grace H. Zhou,1 has served to further elide the contemporary autonomy and knowledge claims of Uyghurs and other frontier peoples. ¶ The People’s Republic of China was founded on the imperial legacy of the late Qing Empire. While aspects of the early Qing empire were conciliatory and coalition-focused toward Inner Asian peoples, the People’s Republic also inherited a more recent, largely Han-led, Qing legacy of mass violence carried out by Zou Zangtang’s armies in the 1870s, a Confucian education-centered capture of Turkic institutions, and the mass deportations and settlements of both Turkic and Han people in the region. So as the national liberation campaign was launched by the PRC in the 1950s with the goal of indigenizing Communist Party state systems, administrative structures, and adapting existing institutions such as schools, media, and communal authority structures to promote the core values of the Party these, often unacknowledged, legacies of expropriation and domination played a role in the way Uyghurs were forced, at least in some instances, to receive their liberation.¶ The defensive state building politics of the new People’s Republic also mitigated against Uyghur autonomous liberation. A 1949 conversation between Joseph Stalin and Chinese Communist vice chairman Liu Shaoqi, where Stalin describes the need for Chinese to “occupy” Xinjiang in order to secure oil and cotton resources for China in reaction to British imperialism is particularly instructive in this regard. As Stalin put it:¶ One should not put off occupation of Xinjiang, because a delay may lead to the interference by the English in the affairs of Xinjiang. They can activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable, for there are large deposits of oil and cotton in Xinjiang, which China needs badly. The Chinese population in Xinjiang does not exceed 5 percent, after taking Xinjiang one should bring the percentage of the Chinese population to 30 percent by means of resettling the Chinese for all-sided development of this huge and rich region and for strengthening China’s border protection. In general, in the interests of strengthening the defense of China one should populate all the border regions by the Chinese.¶ So while the People’s Republic did strive to institutionalize a Uyghur socialism, from the very beginning, the resources of Uyghur and Kazakh ancestral lands now belonged to the party-state and were subordinated to the demands of the majority-led revolution. As an archipelago of Han-led agricultural and military colonies was established across the region in the 1950s the settlement of those lands by decommissioned soldiers and others established the occupation that Stalin invoked. By the end of the decade, many Uyghur and Kazakh carriers of traditional knowledge—glossed as counterrevolutionary superstition, or as “local nationalism”—had been removed from positions of power in community leadership and a new focus on Han-centric scientific modernization came to the fore. This is the period in which Uyghur “native” or yerlik knowledge, a term I will return to in the second half of this essay, came to be conflated with a “backwardness” in need of the “advanced” or scientific civilization of the Han majority. ¶ The enduring presence of imperialist aspects in China’s rule of Inner Asia is what leads me and a number of other scholars committed to decolonization and antiracism to think in parallel with Grace Zhou about 1950s to 1980s Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Central Asia as spaces of settler socialism. This framing, which I view as both an acknowledgement of the unfulfilled promise of Maoist revolution and an acknowledgment of the emergent occupation, domination and dispossession brought about by the same process, is a way of naming the particular forms of twentieth century Soviet and Chinese colonial projects.¶ Settler socialism is perhaps best understood as a type of “subimperialism” or subcolonialism that responds to what Natasha Kaul refers to as a “moral wound” of past colonization or semi-colonization often narrated as a “century of humiliation” in contemporary Chinese state-narrated history. Subcolonialism, what I take to mean the colonial actions taken by the formerly colonized, is expressed in this case through the imposed development and intensified colonization of China’s Inner Asian frontier (particularly during China’s post-Mao embrace of global capital) and justified through the logic of the wound. This logic leads to the conclusion that because China’s body politic was so badly wounded by its experience with colonialism, it’s occupation, domination and dispossession of peripheral peoples is not only justified but is itself an expression of anti-imperialist care.

### Settler Colonialism K – Root Cause Russia/Ukraine

#### Settler colonialism explains Russia’s actions in Eastern Europe – specifically Ukraine

Short 22 [John Rennie Short (Professor for School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. An expert on urban issues, environmental concerns, geopolitics and the history of cartography. He has studied cities around the world, and lectured to a variety of audiences.), 3-14-2022, "Settler Colonialism Helps Explain Current Events," UMBC, <https://umbc.edu/stories/settler-colonialism-helps-explain-current-events/>] // st

These tactics of invasion and occupation can also be seen in the way 250,000 Russians moved to Crimea after it was annexed in 2014.¶ Academics sometimes refer to these tactics as “settler colonialism.” As a strategy of subjugation, it has many historical precedents and it provides an important lens for understanding geopolitics in various parts of today’s world.¶ Two types of empire¶ History is studded with empires. Broadly speaking, there are two types.¶ British rule in India exemplifies an empire of control, where imperialists extract wealth and resources without large-scale emigration from the colonizing country. The importation of the wealth of India, especially its textiles, was an essential requirement of Britain’s Industrial Revolution.¶ There are also empires of settlement that occupy colonial territories by moving in large numbers of settlers. Across the world, especially in the lightly settled open grasslands of Australia and the Americas, the original inhabitants were displaced and marginalized as their homeland was taken by treaty, sale, guile and theft.¶ The process often involved brute force or ethnic cleansing as land was seized and handed over to immigrants. In Australia, the British justified colonization by declaring the continent “terra nullius” – that is, empty and uninhabited.¶ Settler colonies were used to safeguard the edges of empires. A policy used by the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) that moved ethnic Chinese settlers into recently captured territory is still used today in Tibet and Xinjiang. Both imperial Russia and the former Soviet Union encouraged citizens to settle border regions, so today at least 20% of the population of Ukraine is ethnic Russian.¶ Settler colonialism¶ Many settler empires rose in the 18th and 19th centuries and continued well into the 20th century. In Africa, for example, settler societies were established by the British in Kenya, the French in Algeria and the Dutch in South Africa.¶ The colonists who moved in, often in large numbers, were typically white Europeans who took control over the land, lives and economy of Indigenous peoples. There were exceptions, though. In Liberia, Black Americans settled in the land of Black Africans; in Israel, mainly Jewish immigrants took over the land of Arab populations; and in China, the majority Han people moved into non-Han areas.¶ My research into the interactions between Indigenous people and European settlers in North America and resistance to cultural integration by an Indigenous art movement in central Australia has offered me a different way to view history. Looking at the past through a lens of settler colonialism substantially changes how we view histories of many countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the U.S.¶ Today’s issues, viewed through a colonial lens¶ Most settler societies are steeped in a prejudiced history in which racial categories define who has power. One strategy has been to make full citizenship available only to settlers and their offspring. Some of the more extreme examples include racialized rule in South Africa that created brutal apartheid and traumatized generations of aboriginal Australians.¶ There is also a long history of child abuse, with Indigenous children taken from their homes to be assimilated into settler society. Emerging evidence of these practices, including those experienced by Indigenous children in Canada’s residential schools, is helping to rewrite the history books from the Indigenous – rather than just from the settler – perspective.¶ By restricting immigration, some countries – including Australia, Canada and the U.S., among others – have tried to maintain their racial or ethnic identities and their power. Many of these policies were weakened only in recent years.¶ But in acts of amazing resilience, Indigenous societies have resisted cultural assimilation, political marginalization and economic insecurity.¶ Land is a key issue, as Indigenous groups continue to pursue land claims and resist land grabs. From ongoing Mapuche claims in Chile to aboriginal Australians’ successful campaign to overturn the legality of “terra nullius,” land seized by settlers is being disputed.¶ New facts and greater awareness of the racist nature of settler societies are challenging the triumphalist view of progress. New information is providing a darker understanding of the impact of settler colonialism on Indigenous peoples, including ethnic genocide and the devastating impacts of the loss of both land and cultural identity.¶ This isn’t just history. Unequal, brutal treatment of settlers and indigenous peoples continues in today’s settler societies, not least of all in Xinjiang and in Ukraine.

#### Settler colonialism is still alive and well at the core of Russian actions

Sviezhentsev 20 [Maksym Dmytrovych Sviezhentsev (A historian of Crimea. His research focuses on the post-Soviet transition of the Crimean settler colony in the 1990s and the Russian involvement in that transition.), 2020, "‘Phantom Limb’: Russian Settler Colonialism in the Post-Soviet Crimea (1991-1997)", Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository for a PhD in history supervised by Marta Dyczo, <https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/7077>] // st

Where does the myth that ‘Crimea has always been Russia’ come from? How did the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union ‘make’ Crimea Russian? This dissertation shows how the they applied settler colonial practices to Crimea, displacing the indigenous population and repopulating the peninsula with loyal settlers and how Crimean settler colonial structures survived the fall of the Soviet Union. It argues that this process defines post-Soviet history of the peninsula.¶ For centuries Crimean existed within the discourse of Russian imperial control. This dissertation challenges the dominant view by applying settler colonial theory to Crimea’s past and present for the first time. This produces two major scholarly contributions. Firstly, it broadens the geography of settler colonialism, demonstrating that it existed not only in Western European imperialism but also in Russia’s imperial project. Secondly, it challenges the ‘uniqueness’ of Russian imperialism.¶ The focus is on Crimea as a settler colony during the first years after the USSR’s collapse. The main argument is that the 1990s conflict in Crimea was mainly around decolonization attempts and resistance by the settler colonial system. Contrary to the analysis of ‘conflicts that did not happen’ it argues that Crimea is a case of a conflict that never stopped since the late 18th century. It analyses how settler colonial structures fought for their own preservation in opposition to the forces of decolonization represented by the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar national movements, maneuvering between the Russian and Ukrainian capitals, which in turn triggered perceptions of Crimean separatism.¶ A main theme is control over the narrative. Crimean settler colonial institutions maintained their monopoly over ‘the truth’ about the peninsula’s past and present. This dissertation demonstrates how this continued in the 1990s, how Crimean newspapers forged the meaning of ‘Crimean,’ redesigned boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in order to marginalize Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists. Another important issue is the role of hybrid institutions including government structures in Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, both which conducted subversive operations (informational and military) to counter and reduce the growing presence of the Ukrainian state on the peninsula.¶ Summary for Lay Audience¶ The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 for many people was the first time they heard about the existence of this peninsula. A region in the Eastern Europe for most people of the West was too far away from their home to take the conflict around it seriously. Meanwhile, the claims of the Russian authorities that Crimea is ‘historically Russian’ for many seemed like a good enough justification for the annexation. As a result, the first territorial annexation in Europe since the Second World War received little to no active response from the world.¶ The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the popular image of Crimea is a result of the Russian and Soviet imperial policies. I argue that since the late 18th century Crimea has been a settler colony of the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, and now – Russian Federation. In other words, the history of Crimea is similar to the history of other settler colonies of Western European empires. Therefore, the fact of settler colonization has to be at the basis of any analysis of Crimean past and present. Through the analysis of the political events in Crimea during the 1990s, this dissertation demonstrates that the fall of the Soviet Union did not bring decolonization to the peninsula. Quite the contrary, local institutions fought to preserve the colonial status quo and prolonged a conflict between the colonizers and the colonized. In that fight, Russian state, a former metropole, pretended to be a non-participant, but in fact actively interfered into Crimean domestic politics.

#### Neo-imperialism explains Russian aggression and foreign policy

Kushnir 22 [Ostap Kushnir (Lecturer at Lazarski University and Coventry University programs. Researcher in government and comparative politics, international organizations, European geopolitics and regionalization, political and economic geography. Specialist in mass communication and mass information.), January 2022, "Russia’s neo-imperial powerplay in Ukraine: The factors of identity and interests," <https://doi.org/10.17613/tmda-6v65>] // st

I argue that Russian military aggression and diplomatic pressure against Ukraine stems from the neo-imperial thinking of Russian elites and ordinary citizens. This thinking requires a reproduction of expansionist patterns that once led Russia to its “historical greatness”: construction of a territorially large state, rich in resources and demographically. All Articles Society Politics Original Writing Media Become an Author Contact diverse, with its own distinct voice in international relations. The human cost for “making Russia forever great,” however, has rarely been seriously considered¶ Russia as (neo-)empire¶ The most productive way to understand contemporary Russian neo-imperialism is probably to contrast it with traditional imperialism. Мy preferred definition of the latter entails a state’s unilateral desire to project its models of governance, values, and culture onto foreign lands under a pretext that looks plausible to the elites and citizens of that state.¶ The pursuit of imperialist goals was not an uncommon practice in the past. As we know, for example, Western European states expanded their colonial reach to Latin America, Asia, and Africa. They portrayed themselves as philanthropists who “brought civilization” to the “underdeveloped” aboriginal communities—like Prometheus who gave fire to people in need. This “civilizing initiative” usually took various forms: propagation of the Christian religion, the dissemination of new technology, and/or promotion of the principles of postEnlightenment humanism. Later, by the mid-20th century Western European states acknowledged that their Promethean activities had brutally distorted aboriginal cultures and lifeways.[1] Thus, the citizens and elites of these formerly imperial states declared imperialism to be a policy of evildoing—the process of decolonization started.¶ Russian imperialism, on the other hand, has never been properly regarded as destructive or shameful. The pace and breadth of expansion of the Tsardom of Muscovy (that evolved into the Russian Empire under Peter I) into Asia were astounding. East of the Urals there existed many indigenous territories that the authorities in Moscow perceived as “poorly administered” and “isolated.” This perception encouraged aggressive steps to fill the imaginary “power vacuum” with centralized governance. According to Colin Gray, every single year from the mid-16th and to the late 17th century Muscovy/Russia aggrandized itself by the land equivalent of the modern territory of the Netherlands.[2] These 150 years of almost uninterrupted expansion, including the destruction of indigenous and local cultures have never been reckoned with; no remorse has followed to match that of the former empires in Western Europe. Alexander Morrison notes that migration to new lands and frontiers has always been praised in Russian history, while the negative impact of settler colonialism is fiercely contested.[3] As a result, contemporary Russian elites—and the citizens who legitimize these elites through voting—preserve an outward-looking, assertive worldview. They are inclined, therefore, to reproduce the expansionist patterns that had formerly led Russia to its “greatness.”¶ Unlike classical imperialism, which invented honourable justifications for ruthless expansion, Russian neo-imperialism can be said to be milder and more cautious. President Putin and his circle aim to erect a “soft empire” by aggregating the post-Communist republics, as Edward Lucas put it a few years ago.[4] In other words, the Kremlin strives to influence the governments of these republics to make them more Russia-orientated and/or Russia-obligated instead of physically taking over the land that it deems appealing. To achieve these objectives, new tactics are being used, including media brainwashing, cyber-breaches, election manipulation, religious indoctrination, UN veto power, “green man” interventions, and many others. Citing former secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council and finance minister Oleksandr Danylyuk, Russian objectives entail in “the establishment of pro-Russian regimes in satellite countries, followed by the violent suppression of attempts to change political course, both at the level of the population and at the level of elites. Relying on the threat of military force, Russia is actively using election fraud, coups, and even revolutions to maintain control in such countries.”[5]¶ Another distinctive feature of Russian neo-imperialist thinking resides in the Kremlin’s very specific framing of its foreign policy objectives. In its statements the Kremlin emphasizes Russian national interests and spheres of influence instead of recognizing and respecting the sovereign choices of neighbouring states and their right to national self-identification. This can be seen in the constant demands by Putin and his circle that NATO stop its enlargement—which it naturally perceives, given its own proclivities, as an increase of America’s “sphere of influence.” The self-evident argument that states themselves apply to join NATO, not that NATO seeks to expand itself, seems to fall on deaf ears. The truth is, furthermore, that NATO can hardly be defined as a catch-all and open-to-everybody organization; it is quite a challenge for any sovereign state to join NATO, requiring much political and social dedication, deliberation, and sacrifices.¶ Similar observations can be made about the Kremlin’s protests in 2014 against Ukraine becoming an Associate Member of the European Union—again, it was objecting to the perceived increase of the EU’s “sphere of influence.” In the direct aftermath of the Euromaidan, Russia demanded the renegotiation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement—a bilateral deal between Ukraine and the EU—to accommodate its interests, i.e., the interests of a third party. Finally, there is the whole Russkii Mir (Russian World) concept, a unilateral attempt to expand the Kremlin’s sphere of influence to all territories where “Russian [serves] as the language of international relations and Russian culture as the shrine of uniform values.”[6]¶ In fact, many scholars have described the neo-imperial thinking of Russian elites and citizens, but under different guises. Alena Ledeneva presents it as an external dimension to Putin’s sistema,[7] Igor Gretskiy formulated an original “Lukianov Doctrine” that a priori limits the sovereignty of Russia’s neighbouring states,[8] and Angela Stent recently introduced the “Putin Doctrine”: “The core element…is getting the West to treat Russia as if it were the Soviet Union, a power to be respected and feared, with special rights in its neighborhood and a voice in every serious international matter. The doctrine holds that only a few states should have this kind of authority, along with complete sovereignty, and that others must bow to their wishes…And the doctrine is tied together by Putin’s overarching aim: reversing the consequences of the Soviet collapse, splitting the transatlantic alliance, and renegotiating the geographic settlement that ended the Cold War.”[9]¶ Rather than attributing any doctrinal approach to Putin himself, I prefer to label contemporary Russian foreign policy as neo-imperial for two reasons. Firstly, it repeats Russia’s historical tradition of expansion, one that proved successful in the past and led to the state’s “greatness.” Secondly, it has little to do with the figure of Putin, who merely became the latest of many imperial-type leaders coordinating Russian expansion. In other words, Putin “filled the shoes” of the tradition, found that these shoes fit Russia’s current ambitions… and he seems to like walking in them.¶ Putin’s justification for Russian neo-imperialism¶ On 18 March 2014, on the eve of the Russian invasion in the Donbas, Putin delivered a pivotal address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.[10] This address entered the history books as the “Crimean speech” and unveiled some of the cornerstones of the Kremlin’s neo-imperialist thinking about the world and Ukraine.¶ Primarily, Putin declared that the US and its allies had undermined the international order and preferred to follow the “rule of the gun” instead of the rule of law. Russia felt humiliated and robbed every time the US ran amok, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. That was not to be tolerated.¶ Secondly, Russian interests had been systematically ignored since the downfall of the USSR. Putin believed that Western leaders were constantly cheating him with their objectives and actions (i.e., NATO enlargement, EU’s enlargement, EU’s Eastern Partnerships, and other developments).[11] Moreover, they were continuing to pursue “containment” policies regarding Russia and attempting, as Putin defined it, “to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position.”¶ Thirdly, Putin underlined that no one should underestimate Russia’s resolve to take decisive actions: “Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected.”¶ Fourthly, the downfall of the USSR was yet again portrayed by Putin as the major geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Because of that downfall, the world became US-led and, thus, unstable and imbalanced.¶ Finally, Putin blamed international institutions and organizations for the failure to ensure global security and order. He considered them to be mere tools and agents under the command of Western states.

#### Russian history confirms settler colonialist motives for aggression

Cavanagh and Veracini 17 [Edward Cavanagh (received degrees from universities in Australia, South Africa and Canada. He has published in the fields of history and law, including Settler Colonialism and Land Rights in South Africa (Palgrave, 2013) and The Griqua Past and the Limits of South African History, 1902–1994 (Peter Lang Publishers, 2011).) and Lorenzo Veracini (An Associate Professor in History at the Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne, Australia. His research focuses on the comparative history of colonial systems and on settler colonialism. His publications include The Settler Colonial Present (Palgrave 2015), Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Palgrave, 2010) and Israel and Settler Society (Pluto, 2006). Lorenzo is editor in chief of Settler Colonial Studies.), *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017) pp.313-316] // st

Russian Settler Colonialism¶ While migration to new lands and frontiers is a dominant theme in Russian history, the existence of settler colonialism1 in Russia is fiercely contested. This chapter will argue that in the 19th century Imperial Russia developed ideologies and practices of settler colonialism which bore a clear family resemblance to those of other European states and peoples. It will concentrate primarily on migration, resettlement and colonization in Russia before the revolutions of 1917 and the establishment of the USSR. While the movement of Russians into Siberia and the other republics of the USSR continued throughout the Soviet period, this took place within a high modernist nation-building framework quite alien to earlier European colonial practice, which distinguishes it from the settler colonialism of the Tsarist period.2 ¶ In the 1920s and 30s the first generation of Bolshevik historians to write about the subject, some of whom were Kazakhs or other non-Russians, had a licence to denounce peasant colonization as one of the Tsarist regime’s many exploitative policies, publishing fierce critiques which explicitly compared Russian settlement in Asia to other instances of European colonialism.3 By the outbreak of the Second World War this could (and did) attract accusations of ‘bourgeois nationalism’.4 From the 1940s the very terms ‘colonisation’ and ‘colonial’ were deeply sensitive when applied to Russia, implying as they did parallels with the policies of Western imperialist powers who were the USSR’s ideological enemies. Soviet scholarship on the subject became largely confined to platitudes on the ‘progressive role’ played by Russian settlers in introducing the indigenous peoples of Siberia and the Steppe to advanced agricultural techniques and Bolshevism, descriptions of the exploitation of these regions by Russian capitalist entrepreneurs, and explorations of the rise of ‘class differentiation’ amongst the settlers.5¶ The narrative of growing ‘friendship’ between settlers and the indigenous populations of Central Asia and Siberia was always one of the least convincing aspects of Soviet historiography, but it has had a long afterlife in modern Russia. Even today, suggestions that Russian colonisation policies had anything in common with those of the Western Imperial powers can provoke extremely hostile reactions from Russian scholars.6 Western historians, meanwhile, were largely restricted to the use of published sources until 1991, and the cold war agenda of much Western historical writing meant that it paid little attention to agrarian resettlement in the Tsarist period.7 Twenty-five years on, we now have a small but valuable body of publications based on archival research which analyse this vital question of the history of Imperial Russia in considerable depth and detail.8 Russian settlement in Siberia, which had already all but erased many indigenous peoples and cultures even before the heyday of settler expansion in the ‘Anglo-World’ in the 19th century, has probably attracted the most attention, with the work of the late Anatoly Remnev standing out as the most important.9 Alexander Etkind has suggested that the history of Russian expansion is best understood as a process of ‘internal colonization’ of different peoples (including the Russians themselves) by a state that was equally alien and remote to all, but this interpretation does not take into account the significant differences which had emerged in the treatment of Russian and non-Russian peoples by the imperial state in the course of the 19th century – differences which can be seen most clearly when examining Russian colonization in Central Asia.10 Here Jeff Sahadeo has given us an excellent account of urban settler society in Tashkent,11 and there are a number of publications on Russian settlement on the Kazakh steppe,12 and in the rural regions of southern Central Asia (Turkestan).13 Much has also been written on colonization in Central Asia in Russian, notably an excellent monograph and collection of documents from the Kazakh historian S. N. Maltusynov.14 Unfortunately some of the other scholarship from Kazakhstan takes a narrowly nationalist view of the question, and that from Russia by and large continues to tip-toe round the more difficult and sensitive questions of inter-ethnic relations, while the idea of Russia’s osobyi put’ (‘Special path’ or Sonderweg) remains persistent.15 Nevertheless, even looking solely at English-language historiography, there is now enough published scholarship on Russian settler colonialism to allow its integration into the wider narrative of European colonial expansion and settlement.16

### Settler Colonialism K – AT: Perm

#### Perm fails – an effective decolonial movement must refuse any engagement with the state. The perm is a form of indigenous tokenization and assimilationist liberal pluralism which only serves to perpetuate colonialism by giving the state the power to select and force indigenous identities to fit into their existing colonial narrative

**Walia 12** [Harsha Walia (A South Asian activist and writer based in Vancouver, Coast Salish Territories. She is active in a variety of different social movements, particularly migrant justice, anti-racism, Indigenous solidarity, Palestine solidarity, and anti-imperialist struggles. In her organizing over the past decade she has prioritized support for Indigenous communities, from multiple land defense struggles to justice for missing and murdered Indigenous women. Her writings have appeared in alternative and mainstream publications, magazines, journals and newspapers), 1/1/2012, "Moving Beyond a Politics of Solidarity Towards a Practice of Decolonization," Colours of Resistance Archive, <http://www.coloursofresistance.org/769/moving-beyond-a-politics-of-solidarity-towards-a-practice-of-decolonization/>] // st

North America’s state and corporate wealth is largely based on the subsidies provided by the theft of Indigenous lands and resources. Colonial conquest was designed to ensure forced displacement of Indigenous peoples from their territories, the destruction of autonomy and self-determination in Indigenous self-governance, and the assimilation of Indigenous peoples’ cultures and traditions. Given the devastating cultural, spiritual, economic, linguistic, and political impacts on Indigenous people, any serious social or environmental justice movement must necessarily include non-native solidarity in the fight against colonization.¶ Decolonization is as much a process as a goal. It requires a profound re-centring of Indigenous worldviews in our movements for political liberation, social transformation, renewed cultural kinships, and the development of an economic system that serves rather than threatens our collective life on this planet. As stated by Toronto-based activist Syed Hussan “Decolonization is a dramatic re-imagining of relationships with land, people and the state. Much of this requires study, it requires conversation, it is a practice, it is an unlearning.”¶ It is a positive sign that a growing number of social movements are recognizing that Indigenous self-determination must become the foundation for all our broader social-justice mobilizing. Indigenous peoples are the most impacted by the pillage of lands, experience disproportionate poverty and homelessness, are over-represented in statistics of missing and murdered women, and are the primary targets of repressive policing and prosecutions in the criminal injustice system. Rather than being treated as a single issue within a laundry list of demands, Indigenous self-determination is increasingly understood as intertwined with struggles against racism, poverty, police violence, war and occupation, violence against women, and environmental justice.¶ Intersectional approaches can, however, subordinate and compartmentalize Indigenous struggle within the machinery of existing Leftist narratives: anarchists point to the anti-authoritarian tendencies within Indigenous communities, environmentalists highlight the connection to land that Indigenous communities have, anti-racists subsume Indigenous people into the broader discourse about systemic oppression, and women’s organizations point to relentless violence borne by Indigenous women in discussions about patriarchy.¶ We have to be cautious to avoid replicating the state’s assimilationist model of liberal pluralism, whereby Indigenous identities are forced to fit within our existing groups and narratives. The inherent right to traditional lands and to self-determination is expressed collectively and should not be subsumed within the discourse of individual or human rights. Furthermore, it is imperative to understand being Indigenous as not just an identity but a way of life, which is intricately connected to Indigenous people’s relationship to the land and all its inhabitants. Indigenous struggle cannot simply be accommodated within other struggles; it demands solidarity on its own terms.¶ The practice of solidarity¶ One of the basic principles of Indigenous solidarity organizing is the notion of taking leadership. According to this principle, non-natives must be accountable and responsive to the experiences, voices, needs, and political perspectives of Indigenous people themselves. From an anti-oppression perspective, meaningful support for Indigenous struggles cannot be directed by non-natives. Taking leadership means being humble and honouring frontline voices of resistance, as well as offering tangible solidarity as needed and requested. Specifically, this translates to taking initiative for self-education about the specific histories of the lands we reside upon, organizing support with the clear guidance and consent of an Indigenous community or group, building long-term relationships of accountability, and never assuming or taking for granted the personal and political trust that non-natives may earn from Indigenous peoples over time.¶ In offering support to a specific community in their struggle, non-natives should organize with a mandate from the community and an understanding of the parameters of the support that is being sought. Once these guidelines are established, non-natives should be pro-active in offering logistical, fundraising, and campaign support. Clear lines of communication must be maintained and a commitment made for long-term support. This means not just being present for blockades or in moments of crisis, but instead, activists should sustain a multiplicity of meaningful and diverse relationships on an ongoing basis. Feminist writer bell hooks suggests, “Solidarity is not the same as support. To experience solidarity, we must have a community of interests, shared beliefs and goals around which to unite, to build Sisterhood. Support can be occasional. It can be given and just as easily withdrawn. Solidarity requires sustained, ongoing commitment.”¶ Organizing in accordance with these principles is not always straightforward. Respecting Indigenous leadership is not the same as waiting around to be told what to do while you do nothing. “I am waiting to be told exactly what to do” should not be an excuse for inaction, and seeking guidance must be weighed against the possibility of further burdening Indigenous people with questions. The appropriate line between being too interventionist and being paralyzed will be aided by a willingness to decentre oneself and by learning and acting from a place of responsibility rather than guilt.¶ Cultivating an ethic of responsibility begins with non-natives understanding ourselves as beneficiaries of the illegal settlement of Indigenous people’s land and unjust appropriation of Indigenous peoples’ resources and jurisdiction. When faced with this truth it is common for activists to get stuck in their feelings of guilt, which I would argue is a state of self-absorption that actually upholds privilege. While guilt is often representative of a much-needed shift in consciousness, in itself it does nothing to motivate the responsibility necessary to actively dismantle entrenched systems of oppression. In a movement-building roundtable long-time Montreal activist Jaggi Singh expressed that “[t]he only way to escape complicity with settlement is active opposition to it. That only happens in the context of on-the-ground, day-to-day organizing, and creating and cultivating the spaces where we can begin dialogues and discussions as natives and non-natives.”¶ Alliances with Indigenous communities should be based on shared values, principles, and analysis. For example during the anti-Olympics campaign in 2010, activists chose not to align with the Four Host First Nations, a pro-corporate body created in conjunction with the Vancouver Olympics Organizing Committee. Instead, we took leadership from and strengthened alliances with land defenders in the Secwepemc and St’át’imc nations and Indigenous people being directly impacted by homelessness and poverty in the Downtown Eastside. In general, however, differences surrounding strategy within a community should be for community members to discuss and resolve. We should be cautious of a persistent dynamic where solidarity activists start to fixate on the internal politics of an oppressed community. Allies should avoid trying to intrude and interfere in struggles within and between a community, which perpetuates the civilizing ideology of the White Man’s Burden and violates the basic principles of self-determination.¶ Building intentional alliances should also avoid devolution into tokenization. Non-natives often determine which Indigenous voices to privilege by defaulting to the more “well-known, “easy to get ahold of” or “less hostile” Indigenous activists. This selectivity distorts the diversity present in Indigenous communities and can exacerbate tensions and colonially-imposed divisions between Indigenous peoples. In opposing the colonialism of the state and settler society, non-natives must recognize our own role in perpetuating colonialism within our solidarity efforts. We actively counter this by theorizing and discussing the nuanced issues of solidarity, leadership, strategy, and analysis not in abstraction but within our real and informed and sustained relationships with Indigenous peoples.¶ Decolonizing Relationships¶ While centring and honouring Indigenous voices and leadership, the obligation for decolonization does rest on all of us. As written by Nora Burke in Building a Canadian Decolonization Movement: Fighting the Occupation at Home, “A decolonisation movement cannot be comprised solely of solidarity and support for Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and self-determination. If we are in support of self-determination, we too need to be self-determining. It is time to cut the state out of this relationship, and to replace it with a new relationship, one which is mutually negotiated, and premised on a core respect for autonomy and freedom.”¶ Being responsible for decolonization often requires us to locate ourselves within the context of colonization in complicated ways – often as simultaneously oppressed and complicit. This is true, for example, for racialized migrants in Canada. Within the anti-colonial migrant justice movement of No One Is Illegal, we go beyond demanding citizenship rights for racialized migrants as that would lend false legitimacy to a settler state. We challenge the official state discourse of multiculturalism that undermines the autonomy of Indigenous communities by granting and mediating rights through the imposed structures of the state and seeks to assimilate diversities into a singular Canadian identity. Indigenous feminist Andrea Smith reminds us that “All non-Native peoples are promised the ability to join in the colonial project of settling indigenous lands… In all of these cases, we would check our aspirations against the aspirations of other communities to ensure that our model of liberation does not become the model of oppression for others.” In B.C., immigrants and refugees have participated in several delegations to Indigenous blockades, while Indigenous communities have offered protection and refuge for migrants facing deportation.¶ Decolonization is the process whereby we intend the conditions we want to live and the social relations we wish to have. We have to supplant the colonial logic of the state itself. German philosopher Gustav Landauer wrote almost a hundred years ago that “the State is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships.” Decolonization requires us to exercise our sovereignties differently and to reconfigure our communities based on shared experiences, ideals, and visions. Almost all Indigenous formulations of sovereignty – such as the Two Row Wampum agreement of peace, friendship, and respect between the Haudenosaunee nations and settlers – are premised on revolutionary notions of respectful coexistence and stewardship of the land, which goes far beyond any Western liberal democratic ideal.

#### The perm’s faith in the state is in direct opposition to the alt

**Donovan 01** [Mike Donovan (A speech given by ARA Toronto member Mike Donovan at “From protest to resistance,” a hugely successful public forum on the Free Trade Area of The Americas and the radical anti-capitalist, anti-racist and anti-authoritarian elements organizing against it), 1-25-2001, "Stick ’em up motherfucker! An anti-fascist perspective on the movements against global capitalism," Colours of Resistance Archive, <http://www.coloursofresistance.org/287/stick-em-up-motherfucker-an-anti-fascist-perspective-on-the-movements-against-global-capitalism/>] // st

We are organizing against the FTAA in solidarity with indigenous people of the Americas, both north and South. No one has been as screwed over, exploited, and generally scammed as the indigenous people of the Americas. They’ve had their land stolen, the treaties they signed were broken before the ink was dry, and they’ve been pushed onto ever smaller “reservations.” (Let’s not forget that Canada’s reservation system was the blueprint for apartheid in South Africa.) Their land has been raped for commodities, their children were sent to government run residential schools in a effort to destroy their culture, and they have had outright war and genocide inflicted upon them.¶ The history of indigenous people is also one of incredible and inspiring resistance, however. Indigenous people have fought back, from the Red River rebellion to Pine Ridge, from Kanesatake to Gustafson Lake, from Stoney Point to the Zapatistas in Chiapas, who kick-started the fight-back against the neo-liberal agenda in 1994 when the North American Free Trade Agreement first came into effect. The movements against global capitalism have a lot to learn from indigenous resistance movements, and we damn well better be in solidarity with them and their struggles, too.¶ We have learned in anti-racist and anti-fascist organizing to ask nothing from the state. The state will not stop nazis; it uses and protects them. The state cannot be depended on to write “social contracts” on labor or the environment into international “agreements” on trade, let alone to enforce such protections. The state’s primary purpose in the capitalist system is to subsidize and protect large corporations interests while attacking the working class and indigenous resistance movements opposing those interests. This is exemplified by the massive mobilization of the state’s police forces for The Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, which has been called the “largest security operation ever undertaken in Canada”. The same thing was seen last June in Windsor for the demonstrations against the Organization of American States which initiated the FTAA process. To put any faith in the state would be putting faith in one of the most powerful forces directly opposing our calls for labour rights, environmental protection, indigenous self-determination, open immigration and an end to capitalism itself.